本文關(guān)鍵詞： 公司僵局 司法救濟 有限責(zé)任公司　出處：《華東政法大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 有限責(zé)任公司由于其人合性的本質(zhì)屬性以及公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的缺陷,容易出現(xiàn)公司僵局。有限責(zé)任公司僵局一旦產(chǎn)生,將會給公司、股東、利益相關(guān)者及社會帶來很大的危害。因此,在公司治理機制自身無法發(fā)揮作用的情況下,就必須借助于司法救濟手段來破解有限責(zé)任公司僵局。 我國于2005年修訂的《公司法》賦予股東在公司出現(xiàn)僵局時,有請求人民法院解散公司的權(quán)利。隨后,《最高人民法院關(guān)于適用中華人民共和國公司法若干問題的規(guī)定(二)》對司法解散公司制度作了更為詳細的解釋。但我國確立股東提起解散公司訴訟制度的時間比較短,仍需在司法實踐中不斷加以完善。 本文通過探析公司僵局的基本問題及形成原因,論證司法介入有限責(zé)任公司僵局的合理性。同時,本文試圖在分析各國為破解公司僵局構(gòu)建的多種司法救濟制度的基礎(chǔ)上,探索我國有限責(zé)任公司僵局司法救濟制度的完善。 本文分為以下四部分: 第一部分主要探析公司僵局的基本問題。本部分闡述了公司僵局的概念、特點、類型和危害,為在司法實踐中準確把握公司僵局打下了基礎(chǔ)。 第二部分主要分析司法介入有限責(zé)任公司僵局的合理性。本部分指出有限責(zé)任公司的固有特性是造成公司僵局的根本原因。因此有限責(zé)任公司僵局一旦產(chǎn)生,將很難依靠自身力量予以破解。同時由于公司章程、調(diào)解制度、仲裁制度或多或少存在著一定的局限性。因此,司法介入有限責(zé)任公司僵局是十分可行并且必要的。 第三部分主要研究了四種公司僵局司法救濟制度。本部分介紹了司法解散公司制度、強制股權(quán)收購制度、任命臨時董事制度和指定財產(chǎn)管理人制度的立法規(guī)定,并分析了四種制度的利弊之處。 第四部分主要對完善我國有限責(zé)任公司僵局司法救濟制度提出了相關(guān)建議。本部分建議應(yīng)當在立法上完善司法解散公司制度并且在我國構(gòu)建強制股權(quán)收購制度。此外,本部分還從司法實務(wù)層面探討了法院處理有限責(zé)任公司僵局案件時應(yīng)具有的原則和思路以及如何認定可予解散的公司僵局,并強調(diào)應(yīng)當注重發(fā)揮法院的司法調(diào)解作用。
[Abstract]:Limited liability companies are prone to corporate deadlock due to their inherent human nature and defects in their internal governance structure. Once the deadlock of a limited liability company comes into being, it will be given to the company and its shareholders. The stakeholders and the society bring great harm, therefore, when the corporate governance mechanism itself can not play a role, we must resort to judicial remedies to solve the deadlock of limited liability companies. The Company Law, amended in 2005, gives shareholders the right to hold a deadlock in the company. Subsequently, the provisions of the Supreme people's Court on the Application of the Company Law of the people's Republic of China (2) made a more detailed explanation of the system of judicial dissolution of the company. It is relatively short for shareholders to establish a system of litigation for the dissolution of a company. It still needs to be perfected in judicial practice. By analyzing the basic problems of corporate deadlock and the reasons for its formation, this paper demonstrates the rationality of judicial intervention in the deadlock of limited liability companies. At the same time, this paper attempts to analyze the various judicial relief systems constructed by various countries in order to break the corporate deadlock. To explore the perfection of judicial remedy system of limited liability company deadlock in our country. This paper is divided into the following four parts:. The first part mainly analyzes the basic problems of corporate deadlock. This part expounds the concept, characteristics, types and hazards of corporate deadlock, which lays a foundation for accurately grasping the corporate deadlock in judicial practice. The second part mainly analyzes the rationality of judicial intervention in the limited liability company deadlock. This part points out that the inherent characteristics of the limited liability company is the root cause of the corporate deadlock. At the same time, because of the company articles of association, mediation system and arbitration system, there are some limitations. Therefore, judicial intervention in the deadlock of limited liability companies is very feasible and necessary. The third part mainly studies four kinds of judicial relief system of corporate deadlock. This part introduces the legislative provisions of judicial dissolution of company system, compulsory ownership acquisition system, appointment of temporary directors system and appointed property manager system. And analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of the four systems. In the 4th part, the author puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect the judicial remedy system of the deadlock of limited liability companies in our country. In addition, this part suggests that the judicial dissolution of the company system should be improved in legislation and the system of compulsory equity acquisition should be established in our country. This part also discusses the principles and ideas that the court should have when dealing with the limited liability company deadlock case from the judicial practice level, and how to determine the corporate deadlock that can be dissolved, and emphasizes that we should pay attention to the judicial mediation role of the court.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D922.291.91

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 張民安;公司瑕疵設(shè)立效力研究[J];比較法研究;2004年04期

2 羅培新;;填補公司合同“縫隙”——司法介入公司運作的一個分析框架[J];北京大學(xué)學(xué)報(哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版);2007年01期

3 黃美園,周彥;我國公司僵局司法救濟制度之構(gòu)建[J];法律適用;2004年05期

4 鮑為民;美國法上的公司僵局處理制度及其啟示[J];法商研究;2005年03期

5 李泫永,官欣榮;公司僵局與司法救濟[J];法學(xué);2004年04期

6 萬國華;原俊婧;;論破解公司僵局之路徑選擇及其對公司治理的影響——兼論新《公司法》第75條和第183條之公司治理解讀[J];河北法學(xué);2007年04期

7 李曙光;;新《公司法》中破解“公司僵局”制度安排的探討[J];武漢理工大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2006年03期

8 劉桂清;公司治理的司法保障——司法介入公司治理的法理分析[J];現(xiàn)代法學(xué);2005年04期

9 潘云波;公司僵局及其司法救濟研究[J];政治與法律;2004年04期

10 曾東紅,宋佑光;論有限責(zé)任公司僵局及其應(yīng)對[J];中山大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2004年03期

，

本文編號：1506060