公司高管薪酬:制度積弊及法律應(yīng)對(duì)之限度——以美國(guó)經(jīng)驗(yàn)為分析視角
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-10-30 17:50
【摘要】：公司高管薪酬積弊重重,其核心問題并不在于薪酬之高,而在于薪酬與公司績(jī)效之間關(guān)聯(lián)度低下,而且缺乏有效的程序來(lái)制約董事會(huì)的恣意。另外,過(guò)高的薪酬吸引著大量有天賦的人才涌入商學(xué)院,未能從事其他社會(huì)價(jià)值更高的行業(yè),從而減損了社會(huì)福利。然而,市場(chǎng)自身力量理論、最優(yōu)合同理論、管理層權(quán)力理論等均無(wú)法全面解釋高管薪酬之高企。事實(shí)上,公司的自我拉抬偏差、商業(yè)判斷原則對(duì)高管薪酬安排之庇護(hù)、法院因無(wú)力對(duì)高管薪酬的妥當(dāng)性予以事后裁斷而不愿介入相關(guān)紛爭(zhēng)、謀求政治資本最大化的立法者的機(jī)會(huì)主義心理,以及有關(guān)公司法律的"信任型"特征,均使公司高管薪酬的制約力量極度弱化。由于諸多因素極不確定,要求以確定性和規(guī)范性為特征的法律在這些方面做出應(yīng)對(duì),其限度至為明顯。
[Abstract]:The core problem of executive compensation is not the high compensation, but the low correlation between compensation and company performance, and the lack of effective procedures to restrict the board of directors' arbitrariness. In addition, too much pay has drawn talented talent into business schools, failing to engage in other sectors of higher social value, thereby eroding social welfare. However, market power theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory can not fully explain the high executive compensation. In fact, the company's self-imposed bias, the commercial judgment principle to protect the executive pay arrangement, the court is unable to rule on the executive compensation appropriateness after the fact, does not want to intervene in the related dispute, The opportunistic psychology of legislators seeking the maximization of political capital, as well as the "trust type" characteristics of corporate law, make the restriction force of executive compensation extremely weak. Due to the uncertainty of many factors, the law characterized by certainty and normality is required to deal with these aspects, the limits of which are obvious.
【作者單位】： 華東政法大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】：D971.2;DD912.29
本文編號(hào)：2300731
[Abstract]:The core problem of executive compensation is not the high compensation, but the low correlation between compensation and company performance, and the lack of effective procedures to restrict the board of directors' arbitrariness. In addition, too much pay has drawn talented talent into business schools, failing to engage in other sectors of higher social value, thereby eroding social welfare. However, market power theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory can not fully explain the high executive compensation. In fact, the company's self-imposed bias, the commercial judgment principle to protect the executive pay arrangement, the court is unable to rule on the executive compensation appropriateness after the fact, does not want to intervene in the related dispute, The opportunistic psychology of legislators seeking the maximization of political capital, as well as the "trust type" characteristics of corporate law, make the restriction force of executive compensation extremely weak. Due to the uncertainty of many factors, the law characterized by certainty and normality is required to deal with these aspects, the limits of which are obvious.
【作者單位】： 華東政法大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】：D971.2;DD912.29
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