【摘要】：哈特主張其法理學(xué)是描述性的，與規(guī)范性法理學(xué)分屬于兩種不同的事業(yè)，此即為描述性命題。但是，關(guān)于何謂“描述性”卻是眾說紛紜，至少存在三種不同的解讀：法律社會(huì)學(xué)的實(shí)證性、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)語義學(xué)的描述性和自然科學(xué)的客觀性。然而，由于沒有數(shù)據(jù)予以支撐，或者因缺乏方法論上的抱負(fù)，或者因違背法律的人為屬性，這些解讀均無法得到辯護(hù)。本著最佳解釋的原則，“描述性”可被解釋為社會(huì)理解命題，即主張法理論的任務(wù)與性質(zhì)僅僅在于價(jià)值中立地理解法律與社會(huì)，而不試圖去證立某種政治道德價(jià)值。 理解法律需以詮釋內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)為基礎(chǔ)，而對(duì)內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)的詮釋依賴于描述性詮釋方法。試圖在完全忽略實(shí)踐觀點(diǎn)的行為主義和完全參與實(shí)踐的建構(gòu)性詮釋方法之間尋求平衡的描述性詮釋面臨著諸多困境：描述性詮釋方法試圖通過詮釋實(shí)踐陳述以理解人們的觀點(diǎn)，但是實(shí)踐陳述本身的復(fù)雜性，致使陳述與觀點(diǎn)無法保證一一對(duì)應(yīng)的關(guān)系；描述性詮釋方法無從判斷它所詮釋的觀點(diǎn)是事實(shí)上正確的觀點(diǎn)；嘗試通過詮釋人們的觀點(diǎn)來理解法律這一方法本身是可疑的。因此，，描述性詮釋方法自身都搖搖欲墜，更是無法為社會(huì)理解命題的實(shí)現(xiàn)提供有力的支撐。 詮釋內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)是理解法律的前提，這是一個(gè)何種性質(zhì)的判斷呢？描述性命題將之定性為確立法理論邏輯起點(diǎn)的間接評(píng)價(jià)而非道德評(píng)價(jià)，即堅(jiān)稱內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)具備某種重要性因而應(yīng)作為法理論的邏輯起點(diǎn)。然而，間接評(píng)價(jià)并不具有恰當(dāng)?shù)恼归_方式：法律作為獨(dú)特的社會(huì)組織形式，包含大量的粗糙的社會(huì)事實(shí)，間接評(píng)價(jià)無法從中擷取出重要的或本質(zhì)性的具體特征；通過反映實(shí)踐者的觀點(diǎn)，并不能證明內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)的極端重要性；企圖借助直接評(píng)價(jià)問題來論證某個(gè)邏輯起點(diǎn)的重要性，將陷入直接評(píng)價(jià)與間接評(píng)價(jià)的循環(huán)論證當(dāng)中；雖然法律的實(shí)踐特性為人們所共享，但是這并不能賦予內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)在法理論中的核心地位。 深究哈特的論證路徑，內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)實(shí)質(zhì)上扮演著將指引功能內(nèi)化為法律的本質(zhì)功能的角色，從而使得訴諸內(nèi)在觀點(diǎn)與指引功能成為理解法律的必然途徑。這種功能論證的背后，暗藏著哈特對(duì)于效率價(jià)值的偏愛，以及他所立足的形式法治觀。這表明哈特并不是價(jià)值中立地描述法律，而是在其理論深處安置著道德論證：將合法性價(jià)值納入法概念之中。正因?yàn)槿绱�，他的法理論并非描述性的�?br/>[Abstract]:Hart claims that his jurisprudence is descriptive and belongs to two different causes, namely, descriptive proposition. However, there are at least three different interpretations of what is "descriptive": the positivism of legal sociology, the descriptive nature of standard semantics and the objectivity of natural science. However, these interpretations cannot be justified because they are not supported by data, or because of a lack of methodological ambition, or because of the artificial nature of a violation of the law. According to the principle of best interpretation, "descriptive" can be interpreted as a proposition of social understanding, that is, the task and nature of the theory of assertive law is to understand law and society in a value-neutral manner, rather than trying to establish a certain political moral value. The understanding of law should be based on the interpretation of the internal viewpoint, and the interpretation of the internal point of view depends on the descriptive interpretation method. There are many difficulties in seeking a balance between behaviorism, which completely neglects the viewpoint of practice, and constructive annotation, which is fully involved in practice. The descriptive interpretation method tries to understand people's views by interpreting the statement of practice. However, the complexity of practice statement makes it impossible to guarantee one-to-one correspondence between statement and viewpoint, and descriptive interpretation method can not judge that the viewpoint it interprets is in fact correct. It is questionable to try to interpret the law by interpreting people's views. Therefore, descriptive interpretation methods themselves are teetering, and can not provide a strong support for the realization of social understanding proposition. What is the nature of judgment when interpreting an internal viewpoint is a prerequisite for understanding the law? The descriptive proposition characterizes it as the indirect evaluation of the logical starting point of the theory of law rather than the moral evaluation, that is, to insist that the internal viewpoint is of some importance and should be used as the logical starting point of the theory of law. However, indirect evaluation does not have a proper way of development: law as a unique form of social organization, including a large number of rough social facts, indirect evaluation can not extract important or essential specific characteristics; By reflecting the viewpoint of the practitioner, we can not prove the extreme importance of the internal viewpoint, and try to prove the importance of a logical starting point by the direct evaluation, which will fall into the circular argumentation of direct and indirect evaluation. Although the practical characteristics of law are shared by people, it does not give the inner viewpoint the core position in the theory of law. By studying Hart's path of argumentation, the intrinsic viewpoint plays the role of internalizing the function of guidance into the essential function of law, which makes it an inevitable way to understand the law by resorting to the internal viewpoint and the function of guidance. Behind this functional argument is Hart's preference for efficiency and his formal view of rule of law. This shows that Hart does not describe the law in a value-neutral way, but places moral argument in the depth of his theory: to incorporate the value of legality into the concept of law. It is for this reason that his theory of law is not descriptive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘇州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D90

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