本文選題：法律淵源 + 事物本質(zhì)�。� 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】： 法律淵源是一個古老而常新的話題,傳統(tǒng)立法立場的法源理論對法律方法研究貢獻(xiàn)有限,而司法立場的法律淵源是法官為正確裁判案件而尋找法律的大致場所,與法律發(fā)現(xiàn)結(jié)合使其具有了方法論意義。司法立場的法律淵源形式也不同于法律的表現(xiàn)形式,它的范圍比較廣泛。在此立場下,事物本質(zhì)也是法源之一種,能夠成為法官裁判的理論源泉。 西方學(xué)者極為重視事物本質(zhì)這一理論,它是事物間關(guān)系的內(nèi)在規(guī)定性,也是法律的存在基礎(chǔ),涉及到對事物的評價,歸根結(jié)底表現(xiàn)為人的本質(zhì)。事物本質(zhì)能夠作為法源,外在原因是制定法不可避免的缺陷和法官不得拒絕裁判原則的適用,內(nèi)在原因是事物本質(zhì)所固有的性質(zhì)。 將事物本質(zhì)作為法源,有著巨大的理論和實(shí)踐意義:拓寬了傳統(tǒng)法律淵源的范圍,符合法源理論的發(fā)展趨勢,能夠在無具體條文指引時,防止法官濫用自由裁量權(quán),從而最終達(dá)到個案衡平。 事物本質(zhì)作為人們對事物自在性的認(rèn)知,反映了事物的規(guī)律和內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。正因如此,它是制定法、判例法、習(xí)慣、民間規(guī)則和公序良俗以及法官造法的存在基礎(chǔ)。事物本質(zhì)是權(quán)威性法源的補(bǔ)充,在有權(quán)威性法源存在的時候,事物本質(zhì)便不能隨意發(fā)揮作用,只有權(quán)威性法源不足以提供裁判依據(jù)時,才能以事物本質(zhì)進(jìn)行裁判。 法官在不得已情況下用事物本質(zhì)進(jìn)行裁判時,還必須滿足以下幾個方面的條件:能動主義的司法理念、重視法律方法的價值判斷、法官整體素質(zhì)的提高、說明理由制度的建立。只有這樣,才既能使事物本質(zhì)作為法源充分發(fā)揮作用,又保證其不被濫用,從而最終恰當(dāng)解決糾紛,實(shí)現(xiàn)個案正義。 用事物本質(zhì)作為法源解決糾紛的例證很多,但是在我國,由于對這一概念比較陌生,人們普遍沒有意識到。最后一章舉出用事物本質(zhì)作為依據(jù)進(jìn)行裁判的實(shí)例意在說明:假以時日,人們理解并接受了這一概念,完全可以直接用事物本質(zhì)進(jìn)行裁判,而不必委婉繁瑣地用其它方式表達(dá)同樣的意思。
[Abstract]:The origin of law is an old and often new topic. The legal source theory of the traditional legislative position has limited contribution to the study of the legal method, while the legal source of the judicial position is the general place where the judge seeks the law for the correct adjudication of the case. The combination with legal discovery gives it methodological significance. The source form of judicial position is different from the manifestation of law, and its scope is wide. In this position, the essence of things is also one of the sources of law, and can become the theoretical source of judges. Western scholars attach great importance to the theory of the essence of things, which is the inherent stipulation of the relationship between things and the basis of the existence of law. It involves the evaluation of things, and in the final analysis, it is manifested as the essence of human beings. The essence of things can be regarded as the source of law, the external reasons are the inevitable defects of the law of making law and the fact that the judge can not refuse the application of the principle of adjudication, and the intrinsic reason is the inherent nature of the essence of things. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to regard the essence of things as the source of law: it widens the scope of traditional sources of law, conforms to the developing trend of the theory of source of law, and can prevent judges from abusing their discretion when there is no specific provision to guide them. So that the final case balance. The essence of things, as people's cognition of the freedom of things, reflects the laws and internal relations of things. For this reason, it is the basis for the establishment of law, case law, custom, folk rules, public order and good custom, as well as the law made by judges. The essence of things is the supplement of authoritative sources of law. When there is an authoritative source of law, the essence of things cannot play its role at will. Only when the source of authoritative law is not sufficient to provide the basis for adjudication, can the nature of things be judged. When judges have to judge with the essence of things, they must satisfy the following conditions: the judicial concept of activism, the value judgment of legal methods, the improvement of judges' overall quality, and the establishment of the system of explaining reasons. Only in this way, can the essence of things play a full role as a source of law and ensure that it is not abused, so as to solve disputes properly and realize case justice. There are many examples of using the essence of things as a source of law to solve disputes, but in our country, because of this concept is relatively unfamiliar, people generally do not realize. The last chapter gives an example of judging on the basis of the essence of things, which is intended to show that, over time, people understand and accept this concept and can judge directly with the essence of things. It doesn't have to be euphemistic and cumbersome to express the same meaning in other ways.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：D903

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本文編號：2025043