本文選題：憲法解釋 + 原意主義��； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2010年博士論文

【摘要】： 憲法解釋理論的研究已經(jīng)成為憲法學(xué)者所關(guān)注的前沿問(wèn)題,也是中國(guó)憲法學(xué)亟待解決的重大課題。任何解釋都離不開(kāi)方法的指導(dǎo)與制約,方法是保證解釋客觀性的手段,因此憲法解釋方法的研究應(yīng)當(dāng)成憲法解釋學(xué)的核心問(wèn)題。國(guó)內(nèi)憲法解釋方法的研究剛剛起步,而美國(guó)憲法解釋方法的研究由于成文憲法的性質(zhì)以及大量憲法解釋實(shí)踐的需求已經(jīng)伴隨著美國(guó)憲政進(jìn)程日臻成熟與體系化。美國(guó)憲法解釋中關(guān)于原意主義的爭(zhēng)論一直持續(xù)至今,原意主義者不僅與非原意主義者進(jìn)行論戰(zhàn),原意主義者內(nèi)部也是觀點(diǎn)迥異。因此,以原意主義方法論作為切入點(diǎn),就可以全面理解把握美國(guó)憲法解釋理論與方法。本文對(duì)美國(guó)原意主義方法論進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)的全方位的分析與論證。首次提出了原意主義的類型劃分,梳理了原意主義的發(fā)展歷史,具體闡述原初理解理論和文本主義理論,分析原意主義的正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)以及原意主義針對(duì)質(zhì)疑所做的辯駁,從而揭示了原意主義維護(hù)民主與法治的積極意義以及自身的理論局限性,對(duì)于中國(guó)憲法解釋方法論的完善具有一定程度上的填補(bǔ)空白之效。本文內(nèi)容主要由以下六個(gè)部分組成。 第一章對(duì)原意主義的概念進(jìn)行闡釋。本文認(rèn)為,應(yīng)當(dāng)將原意主義定位為一種憲法判決理論,或者說(shuō)司法化的憲法解釋理論。原意主義理論經(jīng)歷了從原初意圖理論,到原初含義理論,再到語(yǔ)義學(xué)原意主義的發(fā)展脈絡(luò)。盡管原意主義者之間存在分歧,但他們所共享的核心主張就是,應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)制憲者的原初意圖以及憲法文本的原初含義來(lái)解釋憲法。根據(jù)對(duì)于先例的重視程度、對(duì)于解釋目標(biāo)的態(tài)度可以將原意主義劃分為強(qiáng)硬原意主義與柔性原意主義、嚴(yán)格原意主義與溫和原意主義。當(dāng)代原意主義最重要的兩個(gè)類別則是原初文本主義和原初意圖主義。最合理的原意主義類型應(yīng)當(dāng)是綜合原初文本主義和原初意圖主義二者優(yōu)勢(shì)的溫和形式的原意主義。 第二章梳理了原意主義在美國(guó)憲法解釋理論與實(shí)踐中的發(fā)展演變。第一階段是從建國(guó)時(shí)期一直到19世紀(jì)晚期,不證自明的文本原意主義一直占據(jù)憲法解釋的正統(tǒng)地位。第二階段開(kāi)始于20世紀(jì)早期,隨著反抗形式主義革命以及現(xiàn)代司法權(quán)力的興起,原意主義遭遇邊緣化并逐漸衰落。第三階段是自從20世紀(jì)80年代,新政聯(lián)盟的分裂以及新的保守政治運(yùn)動(dòng)的再現(xiàn),為沉寂多年的原意主義的復(fù)蘇提供了政治空間。盡管1987年里根總統(tǒng)對(duì)原意主義者博克的提名遭到了參議院的否決,但是不可否認(rèn)的是原意主義理論經(jīng)過(guò)穩(wěn)步發(fā)展達(dá)到了一個(gè)高峰,并且朝著精細(xì)化、復(fù)合化的方向發(fā)展,保持著經(jīng)久不衰。通過(guò)分析原意主義在美國(guó)憲法理論以及憲法判決實(shí)踐中的源頭及其發(fā)展脈絡(luò),我們可以清晰地發(fā)現(xiàn)原意主義理論的發(fā)展演變與美國(guó)憲政發(fā)展歷程密切相關(guān),與憲法存身于其中的社會(huì)的整體變革、政治運(yùn)動(dòng)的發(fā)展以及道德觀念的變遷密切相關(guān)。 第三章具體分析了兩種典型的原意主義理論。博克的原初理解理論強(qiáng)調(diào),只有原初理解才能滿足任何憲法判決理論為了具有民主的合法性所必須滿足的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),只有這一方法才符合美國(guó)共和制度的設(shè)計(jì)。原因在于,原初理解理論要求法官探求制憲者意圖和憲法文本在獲得批準(zhǔn)時(shí)公眾的理解,并且原初理解理論還可以指引法官在原則的推導(dǎo)、界定以及適用三個(gè)方面同時(shí)做到中立,以此確保法官權(quán)威的合法性。斯卡里亞的文本主義既不是嚴(yán)格解釋主義,也不是文本虛無(wú)主義,而是對(duì)文本的合理解釋。憲法解釋的重大分歧不在于制憲者意圖與客觀含義之間,而是在于原初含義與當(dāng)下含義之間。斯卡里亞批判了“活的憲法”這種憲法進(jìn)化論的主張,并認(rèn)為原意主義是一種脫離法官個(gè)人偏好的歷史標(biāo)準(zhǔn),一種更能適應(yīng)司法審查體系的解釋方法。 第四章從四個(gè)方面分析了原意主義的正當(dāng)性基礎(chǔ)。首先,原意主義的正當(dāng)性來(lái)源于人民主權(quán)原則的要求。憲法強(qiáng)調(diào)的是“人民對(duì)有限政府的同意”,司法部門被設(shè)計(jì)成人民具體意志的實(shí)施者,因此司法部門只能通過(guò)客觀地適用這些在制憲時(shí)人民就同意的原則來(lái)獲取權(quán)威。原意主義方法還有助于化解“反多數(shù)主義難題”,通過(guò)維護(hù)憲法的權(quán)威來(lái)促進(jìn)民主的價(jià)值。其次,原意主義的正當(dāng)性來(lái)源于成文憲法的要求。憲法的成文性內(nèi)在地要求固定化與確定性,因此憲法在通過(guò)之時(shí)其含義就已經(jīng)固定下來(lái),法官不能做出根據(jù)制憲者的意圖沒(méi)有被成文憲法所認(rèn)可的解釋。成文憲法是法律文件,具有根本法的地位,必然要求解釋者根據(jù)憲法的原意,以法律的方式對(duì)它進(jìn)行解釋。憲法作為法律文本承載著作者意圖。憲法解釋者只有嚴(yán)格尋求文本作者的理性和意圖,才能保證解釋結(jié)果的客觀性。再次,原意主義的正當(dāng)性來(lái)源于分權(quán)與制衡機(jī)制的要求。分權(quán)制衡機(jī)制要求不經(jīng)民主選舉產(chǎn)生的法官應(yīng)當(dāng)遵從制憲者的原初意圖,不僭越司法權(quán)的界限,否則將會(huì)埋下法官“造法”的火種。最后,原意主義的正當(dāng)性來(lái)源于憲法的中立原則的要求。司法審查權(quán)力本身應(yīng)當(dāng)是嚴(yán)格“司法性的”,司法部門應(yīng)當(dāng)充分尊重其他政府部門在它們的憲法權(quán)力范圍內(nèi)所做出的決策。法官無(wú)權(quán)改變法律或憲法。憲法必須按照制憲者的原初意圖或者憲法的原初含義進(jìn)行解釋,因此法官必須選擇那些能夠中立適用的原則,這是防止憲法過(guò)度政治化的屏障。 第五章分析了原意主義遭遇的質(zhì)疑以及做出的辯駁。首當(dāng)其沖的質(zhì)疑就是,由于原意主義方法有賴于精密的歷史研究,而歷史資料一定程度上的匱乏以及法官的歷史研究能力的有限性造成在實(shí)踐中難以確定制憲者的原意以及憲法文本的原意。原意主義者認(rèn)為,這樣的質(zhì)疑只是說(shuō)明了歷史研究的難度,并不能直接導(dǎo)致原意主義不可行的結(jié)論。第二,是基于民主視角的質(zhì)疑。1787年憲法存在諸多民主性缺陷,而且修憲程序極其繁瑣。如果再要求強(qiáng)制遵守制憲者的原初意圖的話,那就是用“過(guò)去的死人之手治理國(guó)家”。而根據(jù)潛在主權(quán)論,原意主義并非簡(jiǎn)單或者武斷地將死者的政治偏好強(qiáng)加給活著的人,它確認(rèn)了主權(quán)的連續(xù)性,而且保留下了主權(quán)在現(xiàn)代的再次表達(dá)機(jī)制。第三,是基于文本不確定性論的質(zhì)疑。所有文本不確定論不同程度地解構(gòu)了作者對(duì)文本的控制與剝奪,消解了固定而確切的文本意義。為了維護(hù)法治傳統(tǒng),原意主義擔(dān)負(fù)起“反解構(gòu)”的理論使命,指出對(duì)于文本不確定性的彌補(bǔ)并非憲法解釋的任務(wù),而是屬于政治部門的憲法闡釋的范疇。第四,是基于分權(quán)與制衡機(jī)制的質(zhì)疑。司法能動(dòng)主義主張,法院在政治生活中發(fā)揮著實(shí)質(zhì)性的和積極的政策導(dǎo)向作用,法官可以根據(jù)社會(huì)現(xiàn)實(shí)和實(shí)際需要進(jìn)行創(chuàng)造性解釋。原意主義則主張,司法權(quán)只是一種判斷權(quán),最高法院要保持對(duì)憲法的忠誠(chéng)就應(yīng)當(dāng)遵從立法和行政等由選舉產(chǎn)生的政治機(jī)關(guān)所做出的法律和政策,盡量避免將法官個(gè)人的價(jià)值判斷適用到判決之中。原意主義與司法能動(dòng)主義之爭(zhēng)的實(shí)質(zhì)在于對(duì)司法權(quán)在憲政體制中的恰當(dāng)角色的不同認(rèn)識(shí)。需要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是,過(guò)分強(qiáng)化司法能動(dòng)主義傾向?qū)?huì)給法院帶來(lái)沉重的政治負(fù)擔(dān),侵蝕其自身存在的基礎(chǔ)。法院應(yīng)當(dāng)尋求在司法克制框架下的適當(dāng)?shù)哪軇?dòng)。此外,非原意主義者還提出了制憲者本身并未要求解釋者忠誠(chéng)于原意以及憲法文本中含有反原意主義的條款等質(zhì)疑,原意主義者基于自身立場(chǎng)做出了辯駁。 第六章對(duì)原意主義理論進(jìn)行全面綜合的評(píng)析。原意主義理論是對(duì)憲法解釋客觀性的一種追求,遵循原意主義解釋方法,可以保障判決的可預(yù)測(cè)性和法的安定性價(jià)值。從原意主義維護(hù)人民主權(quán)理論、堅(jiān)持憲法文本權(quán)威性的理論內(nèi)涵而言,原意主義也是符合憲政框架下民主與法治的目的的憲法解釋理論。其局限性在于：過(guò)度強(qiáng)調(diào)法律的確定性,喪失憲法解釋應(yīng)有的靈活性,忽視了解釋者的主觀價(jià)值判斷、社會(huì)現(xiàn)實(shí)因素、普通法的造法傳統(tǒng)對(duì)憲法判決的影響。原意主義與非原意主義之爭(zhēng)的實(shí)質(zhì)在于先定約束與后代民主的關(guān)系、憲法解釋的客觀性與創(chuàng)造性的關(guān)系、憲法的穩(wěn)定性與適應(yīng)性的關(guān)系。沒(méi)有任何一種解釋理論能夠單獨(dú)解說(shuō)法院的解釋實(shí)踐,法院的解釋實(shí)踐也沒(méi)有遵循任何一種解釋理論。法院在憲法解釋的過(guò)程中,不僅要遵循憲法文本、制憲者意圖、憲法先例、制憲歷史,還要考慮社會(huì)現(xiàn)實(shí)的合理需求、公共政策以及道德倫理,實(shí)現(xiàn)憲法解釋的客觀性與創(chuàng)造性的融合遷就,既維護(hù)憲法文本的權(quán)威性與穩(wěn)定性,又能使憲法與時(shí)俱進(jìn),適應(yīng)不斷變化的社會(huì)需求。
[Abstract]:The study of the theory of constitutional interpretation has become a frontier issue that the constitutional scholars pay attention to. It is also a major issue to be solved in Chinese constitutional law. Any explanation can not be separated from the guidance and restriction of methods. The method is the means to ensure the interpretation of objectivity. Therefore, the study of the constitutional interpretation method should be the core issue of constitutional hermeneutics. The study of interpretation methods has just started, and the study of American constitutional interpretation method has been accompanied by the maturity and systematization of the American constitutional process due to the nature of the written constitution and the demand for a large number of constitutional interpretations. The argument of the original idealism in the American constitutional interpretation has been continued, and the original idealists not only with the non original owners. The righteous carries on the debate, and the original idealists are also different in their views. Therefore, taking the methodology of original idealism as a breakthrough point, we can fully understand and grasp the theory and method of the American constitutional interpretation. This paper makes a systematic and comprehensive analysis and demonstration of the methodology of the American original idealism. The history of the development of the original meaning doctrine, expound the original understanding theory and the textual theory, analyze the justifiable foundation of the original meaning and the refutation of the original meaning doctrine, thus reveal the positive meaning of the original meaning doctrine to maintain democracy and the rule of law and the limitation of its own theory, and finish the theory of interpretation of the constitution of China. Good has some effect to fill gaps. The content of this paper is mainly composed of six parts.
The first chapter explains the concept of idealism. This article holds that idealism should be defined as a theory of constitutional judgment, or judicial interpretation of the constitution. The theory of original idealism has gone through the theory of original intention, to the theory of original meaning, and then to the development of semantics of the original idealism. The core proposition they share is that the constitution should be explained in accordance with the original intention of the constitution maker and the original meaning of the constitutional text. According to the importance of the precedent, the attitude to the interpretation of the target can be divided into the original idealism and the flexible original idealism, and the original idealism and the gentle original intention. The most important two categories of contemporary originality are original textivism and original intentional doctrine. The most reasonable type of original meaning should be the mild form of primalism which combines the advantages of the original original textivism and the original intentional two.
The second chapter combs the development and evolution of the theory and practice of the original meaning doctrine in the interpretation of American Constitution. The first stage is from the founding of the people's Republic to the late nineteenth Century. The unproof text fundamentalism has occupied the orthodox position of the constitutional interpretation. The second stage began in the early twentieth Century, with the revolutions against the formalism and the modern judicial power. The rise of force, the marginalization and gradual decline of idealism. The third stage is that since 1980s, the division of the new deal alliance and the reappearance of the new conservative political movement provided the political space for the resurgence of the silence for years of original idealism. In 1987, President Reagan's nomination for the original idealist Bok was denied the Senate. But it is undeniable that the theory of original meaning has reached a peak through steady development and has been developing towards a fine and complex direction. By analyzing the origin and development of the constitutional theory and the practice of constitutional judgment in the United States, we can clearly find the principle of original meaning. The development and evolution of the theory are closely related to the development of constitutional government in the United States. It is closely related to the whole reform of the society, the development of political movement and the change of moral concept.
The third chapter concretely analyzes the two typical theories of original meaning. Bock's original understanding theory emphasizes that only the original understanding can satisfy the standard that any constitutional judgment theory must meet with the legitimacy of democracy. Only this method fits the design of the American Republican system. The reason is that the original understanding theory requires the judge. The intent of the constitutionalism and the constitutional text are understood by the public at the time of approval, and the original understanding theory can also guide the judge to be neutral in three aspects, such as the derivation, definition and application of the principle, so as to ensure the legitimacy of the judge's authority. The major differences in the interpretation of the constitution are not between the intention and the objective meaning of the constitution, but between the original meaning and the present meaning. It is more suitable for the interpretation of the judicial review system.
The fourth chapter analyzes the justifiable basis of the original meaning from four aspects. First, the legitimacy of the original idea comes from the requirements of the principle of the people's sovereignty. The constitution emphasizes the "people's consent to the limited government", and the judicial department is designed to be the implementer of the people's specific will, so the judicial department can only apply these in the system objectively. In the constitution, the people can obtain authority on the principle of consent. The original iticism method also helps to resolve the "anti majority problem" and to promote the value of democracy by maintaining the authority of the constitution. Secondly, the legitimacy of the original meaning is derived from the requirements of the written constitution. The constitutional nature of the Constitution requires internal fixation and certainty, so the constitution is through. The meaning of the constitution is fixed at the time of passing. The judge can not make an interpretation which is not approved by the constitution according to the intention of the constitution maker. The written constitution is a legal document and has the status of the root law. The interpreter will inevitably require the interpreter to explain it in the way of the constitution. The constitution, as a legal text, carries the author's meaning. A constitutional interpreter only strictly seeks the rationality and intention of the author of the text to ensure the objectivity of the interpretation results. Again, the legitimacy of the original idea comes from the requirement of decentralization and balance mechanism. In the end, the justitiality of the original idea comes from the requirement of the principle of neutrality in the constitution. The judicial review power itself should be strictly "judicial", and the judicial department should fully respect the decision made by other government departments in their constitutional powers. The judges are not entitled to change the law. Or constitution. The constitution must be interpreted in accordance with the original intention of the constituent of the constitution or the original meaning of the constitution, so the judge must choose the principles that can be neutrally applied, which is the barrier to prevent the overpoliticization of the constitution.
The fifth chapter analyzes the question and the refutation of the experience of the original itenism. The first question is that the original meaning of the original itenism depends on the precise historical study, the lack of historical data and the limited ability of the judge's history research, which makes it difficult to determine the original meaning of the Constitution maker in practice and Xian Fawen. Original meaning. The original idealists believe that such a challenge only illustrates the difficulty of historical research and does not directly lead to the infeasible conclusion of the original idealism. Second, it is based on the democratic perspective that there are many Democratic defects in the constitution of.1787, and the constitutional procedure is extremely complicated. The picture is to use "the hands of the dead of the past to govern the country". According to the theory of potential sovereignty, it is not simple or arbitrary to impose the deceased's political preferences on the living. It confirms the continuity of sovereignty and preserves the mechanism of the reexpression of sovereignty in modern times. Third, based on the theory of text uncertainty. All textual uncertainty deconstructs the author's control and deprivation to the text to a different extent. It dispels the fixed and exact text meaning. In order to maintain the tradition of the rule of law, the original meaning doctrine bears the theoretical mission of "Deconstruction", points out the task of making up for the text uncertainty and not the constitutional interpretation, but belongs to the political department. The category of constitutional interpretation. Fourth, it is based on the question of decentralization and balance mechanism. Judicial activism advocates that the court plays a substantial and positive policy oriented role in political life, and the judge can make creative interpretations according to social reality and actual needs. In order to maintain the loyalty of the constitution, the court should comply with the laws and policies made by the elected political organs, such as the legislature and the administration, and try to avoid applying the judge's judgment of value to the judgment. The essence of the dispute between the original idealism and the judicial activism lies in the different recognition of the proper role of the judicial power in the constitutional system. It is important to emphasize that excessive strengthening of judicial activism will bring a heavy political burden to the court and corrode its own existence. The court should seek the appropriate activism under the framework of judicial restraint. Besides, the non idealists also put forward the constitutionalists themselves and did not require the interpreter to be loyal to the original meaning and Xian Fawen. This contains questions such as anti idealism, and the original idealists refute it based on their own position.
The sixth chapter makes a comprehensive and comprehensive analysis of the theory of original itatiism. The theory of original italism is a pursuit for the objectivity of the interpretation of the constitution. Following the means of original meaning, it can guarantee the predictability of the judgment and the value of the stability of the law. The original idealism is also a constitutional interpretation theory which conforms to the purpose of democracy and the rule of law in the framework of constitutional government. Its limitations lie in overemphasizing the certainty of the law, losing the flexibility of the interpretation of the constitution, ignoring the subjective value judgment of the interpreter, the social reality, the influence of the traditional law making tradition on the constitutional verdict. The essence of the contention of non original meaning lies in the relationship between restriction and future democracy, the relationship between the objectivity and creativity of the constitution, the relationship between the stability of the Constitution and the adaptability of the constitution. No explanation theory can explain the interpretation practice of the court alone, and the interpretation of the court has not followed any explanation theory. In the process of the interpretation of the constitution, we should not only follow the text of the constitution, the intention of the constitution maker, the constitutional precedent, the history of the constitution, the reasonable demand of the social reality, the public policy and the moral ethics, and realize the fusion of the objectivity and creativity of the constitutional interpretation, which not only maintains the authority and stability of the constitutional text, but also makes the constitution keep pace with the times, Adapt to changing social needs.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D971.2;DD911

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

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1 馬洪倫;論美國(guó)憲法原意主義方法論之爭(zhēng)[D];山東大學(xué);2012年

2 馮靜;美國(guó)司法積極主義哲學(xué)論[D];上海交通大學(xué);2012年

3 張華;法律原則的司法適用[D];南京師范大學(xué);2012年

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1 陳偉玲;論伊利的憲法解釋[D];黑龍江大學(xué);2011年

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本文編號(hào)：1853932