本文選題：人權(quán) + 全球法律秩序　； 參考：《現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)》2012年02期

【摘要】：哈貝馬斯提到如果把第一人權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)入實(shí)在法,要實(shí)現(xiàn)已經(jīng)刻寫在人類集體記憶中的嚴(yán)格的道德要求,就會(huì)產(chǎn)生一種法律義務(wù)。作者認(rèn)為要解讀這一觀點(diǎn),需要借助康德哲學(xué)中的一個(gè)要素,即實(shí)行強(qiáng)制性法律秩序的道德義務(wù)。通過對(duì)哈貝馬斯的上述觀點(diǎn)及康德理論結(jié)構(gòu)的分析,特別是對(duì)人的尊嚴(yán)和天賦權(quán)利概念的比較研究,作者論證了哈貝馬斯的人的尊嚴(yán)概念相當(dāng)于康德的天賦權(quán)利概念,它們都構(gòu)成了人權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)。由于二者對(duì)人權(quán)以及法律的強(qiáng)制性有著共同的認(rèn)識(shí),所以在哈貝馬斯的交往理論中能再次形成康德的論證結(jié)構(gòu),即以道德為基礎(chǔ)的權(quán)利義務(wù)。作者認(rèn)為正是這種義務(wù)構(gòu)成了現(xiàn)存的和未來的法律秩序的基礎(chǔ),并進(jìn)而提出了所有行為者都有促進(jìn)以人權(quán)為基礎(chǔ)的全球法律秩序的義務(wù)。
[Abstract]:Habermas mentioned that if the first human rights were transferred to positive law, a legal obligation would arise if the strict moral requirements, which had been written down in the collective memory of mankind, were to be realized. The author thinks that in order to interpret this view, one of the elements in Kant's philosophy is the moral obligation to enforce the compulsory legal order. Through the analysis of Habermas' above views and Kant's theoretical structure, especially the comparative study of the concepts of human dignity and natural rights, the author proves that Habermas's concept of human dignity is equivalent to Kant's concept of natural rights. They all form the basis of human rights. Because they have a common understanding of human rights and the compulsion of law, Kant's argumentation structure can be formed again in Habermas's theory of communication, that is, the right and obligation based on morality. The author argues that it is this obligation that forms the basis of the existing and future legal order, and further suggests that all actors have an obligation to promote a global legal order based on human rights.
【作者單位】： 美國波士頓大學(xué)哲學(xué)系;中國社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究生院哲學(xué)系;
【分類號(hào)】：D09;D909.1

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