法律維穩(wěn)政治化現(xiàn)象之分析
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-04-28 23:24
本文選題:維穩(wěn) + 法律。 參考:《南京大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文
【摘要】:穩(wěn)定作為壓倒一切的頭等大事,自建國以來就為黨和政府所重視。建國初期一直到改革開放之初,維穩(wěn)主要依據(jù)的是黨的政策和各種政治運(yùn)動(dòng)。中國共產(chǎn)黨自革命斗爭年代以來一直注重群眾路線,依靠群眾,發(fā)動(dòng)群眾。而政治運(yùn)動(dòng)離不開群眾的參與,就是通過發(fā)動(dòng)群眾來達(dá)到一定的政治效果。在建國初期,經(jīng)濟(jì)利益和社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)都很單一。在人們都能接受以平均社會(huì)為核心意識形態(tài)的情況下,社會(huì)容易治理,黨的政策和政治運(yùn)動(dòng)被用作社會(huì)治理的重要方式。“文化大革命”使中華民族遭受十年浩劫,從苦難中走出的中國人民開始尋求法制,大量的法律在這一時(shí)期被制定,維穩(wěn)逐步走向了一個(gè)“有法可依”的時(shí)代。然而,伴隨著市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,我國社會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)型的深入,各種社會(huì)利益分化,群體性突發(fā)事件大量涌現(xiàn)。這不僅為社會(huì)穩(wěn)定造成巨大隱患,也成為我國深化改革開放、加快經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的阻礙。維護(hù)社會(huì)穩(wěn)定工作,引起了黨和政府的極大重視。為此,各級政府都加大了維穩(wěn)投入,包括人力、物力、財(cái)力,但是卻走向了一個(gè)“越維越亂”的怪圈。在社會(huì)大眾心理上甚至出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)扭曲的認(rèn)識,即要想在政府那里得到利益,就要敢于制造“麻煩”,沒有“麻煩”,政府不會(huì)自動(dòng)的把好處給你。所以有了“大鬧大解決,小鬧小解決”的維穩(wěn)現(xiàn)象。 筆者認(rèn)為,中國社會(huì)之所以走向一個(gè)“越維越不穩(wěn)”的怪圈,是因?yàn)殡m然經(jīng)過改革開放三十年的法治建設(shè),我們在維護(hù)社會(huì)穩(wěn)定方面做到了“有法可依”,但是,法律維穩(wěn)卻表現(xiàn)出了一種政治化的傾向。法的特性是一致性和普遍性,即所謂的法律面前人人平等;而政治化的特性就是多樣化和特殊性,不同的人在法律面前有不一樣的待遇;法律被作為維穩(wěn)的工具,服務(wù)于地方政府的“中心工作”;法院在一些涉訴信訪案件中一味追求社會(huì)效果,過多的考慮判決結(jié)果的社會(huì)影響,消解了法律的公平;司法不獨(dú)立,法院在政法委的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下,審判工作受到政法委的影響。這種法律維穩(wěn)政治化現(xiàn)象使法律在維護(hù)社會(huì)穩(wěn)定的功能受到消減,甚至扭曲,法律權(quán)威被消弭,進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致維穩(wěn)陷入“越維越不穩(wěn)”的怪圈。 法律維穩(wěn)政治化對公眾看待法律的態(tài)度影響也是巨大的。信訪案件的激增,是公民“信訪不信法”的直接體現(xiàn)。一旦出現(xiàn)損害公民利益的情況出現(xiàn),很多群眾選擇的是找政府,而不是找法院。信訪作為一種信息通道,本身并不具有社會(huì)救濟(jì)功能,但現(xiàn)實(shí)社會(huì)中,信訪對于司法的影響,對政策的影響,使上訪者的訴求得到了比司法途徑更高效的解決。但這種解決往往是有違法治精神的。只有讓信訪回歸本位,樹立司法權(quán)威,才能使維穩(wěn)跳出“越維越不穩(wěn)”的怪圈。
[Abstract]:Stability, as the overriding priority, has been valued by the Party and the government since the founding of the people's Republic of China. From the beginning of the founding of the people's Republic of China to the beginning of reform and opening up, the maintenance of stability was mainly based on the Party's policies and various political movements. Since the revolutionary struggle, the Communist Party of China has been paying attention to the mass line, relying on the masses and arousing the masses. The political movement can not be separated from the participation of the masses, is to mobilize the masses to achieve certain political results. In the early days of the founding of the people's Republic of China, the economic interests and social structure were very single. Under the condition that people can accept the average society as the core ideology, the society is easy to govern, and the party's policies and political movements are used as the important ways of social governance. The "Cultural Revolution" caused the Chinese nation to suffer for ten years. The Chinese people who had come out of the misery began to seek the legal system. A large number of laws were formulated during this period, and the maintenance of stability gradually moved to an era of "having laws to abide by". However, with the rapid development of market economy, the deepening of social transformation, the differentiation of various social interests, mass emergencies emerge in large numbers. This is not only a huge hidden danger for social stability, but also a hindrance to deepening reform and opening up and accelerating economic development strategy. The work of maintaining social stability has aroused the great attention of the Party and the government. For this reason, governments at all levels have increased their investment in maintaining stability, including human, material and financial resources, but they have gone into a strange circle of "more and more chaos." In the public psychology, there is even a distorted understanding that if you want to get benefits from the government, you must dare to create "trouble", no "trouble", the government will not automatically give you the benefits. So there is a "big trouble to solve, small to small," the stability of the phenomenon. The author believes that the reason why Chinese society is moving towards a strange circle of "more and more unstable" is that, although after 30 years of reform and opening up to the rule of law, we have achieved the "legal basis" in maintaining social stability, but, The stability of the law shows a tendency to politicize. The nature of the law is consistency and universality, that is, equality before the law; the politicized character is diversity and particularity; different people are treated differently before the law; the law is used as a tool to maintain stability. The "central work" that serves the local government; the courts blindly pursue social effects in some cases involving complaints, letters and visits, too much consideration is given to the social impact of the outcome of the judgment, and the fairness of the law is dispelled; the judiciary is not independent, and the courts are under the leadership of the political and legal commissars. The trial was influenced by the political and legal committee. This phenomenon of law stability and politicization reduces the function of law in maintaining social stability, even distorts it, and eliminates the authority of law, which leads to the stability falling into a strange circle of "more and more unstable". The politicization of legal stability has a great impact on the public's attitude towards the law. The surge of petition cases is the direct embodiment of citizens'petition and non-trust law. In cases where citizens are harmed, many people choose to go to the government rather than the courts. As a kind of information channel, petition does not have the function of social relief, but in the real society, the impact of petition on justice and policy has made the appeal of petitioners more efficient than the judicial approach. But such a solution is often contrary to the spirit of the rule of law. Only by returning the petition to the standard and establishing the judicial authority, can the stability jump out of the strange circle of "more and more unstable".
【學(xué)位授予單位】:南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號】:D90-052
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