本文選題：權(quán)利的本質(zhì)　切入點：權(quán)利的普遍性　出處：《政法論叢》2012年04期

【摘要】：權(quán)利觀是任何法律思維都無法擺脫的根本構(gòu)思。權(quán)利觀的核心是權(quán)利的本質(zhì)。圍繞"意思"范疇展開的權(quán)利意志論,與以利益作為權(quán)利的本質(zhì)的學(xué)說,更能突出權(quán)利所應(yīng)具有的主體性、普遍性及防御性。權(quán)利的主體性體現(xiàn)在主體對客體的排他性支配以及主體之間的平等;權(quán)利的普遍性則說明權(quán)利應(yīng)當(dāng)來自普遍意志并以形式理性表現(xiàn);而權(quán)利的防御性則反映出從權(quán)利意志論的角度最有助于防范公權(quán)力對于權(quán)利的干預(yù)。以普遍意志為根本的權(quán)利觀就不僅于民法學(xué)具有意義,更于中國法制的進步具有深遠意義。
[Abstract]:The view of right is the fundamental conception that any legal thinking can not get rid of. The core of the view of right is the essence of right. The theory of right will, which revolves around the category of "will", and the theory of taking interest as the essence of right, It can highlight the subjectivity, universality and defense of rights. The subjectivity of rights is embodied in the exclusive domination of the subject over the object and the equality between the subjects. The universality of the right means that the right should come from the universal will and be expressed as formal rationality. The defensive nature of the right reflects that it is most helpful to guard against the interference of the public power to the right from the angle of the wills of right. The view of the right based on the universal will is of great significance not only in the civil law but also in the progress of the Chinese legal system.
【作者單位】： 深圳大學(xué)法學(xué)院;
【分類號】：D90
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本文編號：1664095