本文關(guān)鍵詞： 卡特爾法 水價調(diào)控 價格濫用 地區(qū)自治　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在德國,供水作為地區(qū)自治的一部分,是受德國《基本法》第28條第2款保護(hù)的。供水的組織形式是多種多樣的,供水者可以選擇私法的組織方式,比如以有限責(zé)任公司的形式,通過與用水方簽訂供水合同進(jìn)行供水。當(dāng)然,供水者也可以選擇公法的組織方式進(jìn)行供水,比如以市政企業(yè)的形式,而在這種情況下,供水者則向用水者收取水費(fèi),這是種行政性的費(fèi)用。然而高昂的水價以及各地區(qū)間巨大的價格差異體現(xiàn)出,在德國長久以來缺乏對水價有效的卡特爾法調(diào)控。這也直接導(dǎo)致了這樣的情形：德國的水價幾乎是西方工業(yè)國家最高的,而且各個地區(qū)間水價的差異甚至達(dá)到了三倍。雖然在德國《反限制競爭法》中一直都存在著關(guān)于對價格濫用進(jìn)行調(diào)控的條文。這主要是為了避免以下情況的產(chǎn)生：市場支配地位的占有者通過利用其優(yōu)勢地位而任意制定價格,他們在獲得高額利益的同時使其交易的對方遭受經(jīng)濟(jì)上的損失。但是,數(shù)十年以來這些條文在供水價控制方面都沒有發(fā)揮實(shí)際的作用一一特別是在以公法形式收取的水費(fèi)領(lǐng)域。人們一直都基于這種觀點(diǎn)：行政費(fèi)用是依據(jù)行政法等公法征收的,只受地區(qū)行政法的調(diào)控,不受卡特爾法的調(diào)控,因?yàn)榭ㄌ貭柗ㄔ诒举|(zhì)上是私法。但在最近的"Niederbamimer Wasserverband"判決中,最高法院提出了這么一個問題：公法性質(zhì)的費(fèi)用是否也受卡特爾法的調(diào)控?這一案件判決的法律意見中,聯(lián)邦最高法院表示出了這樣的傾向,即使是有行政性質(zhì)的水費(fèi)對卡特爾法也沒有天然的免疫力。這一判決在整個德國引起了強(qiáng)烈的反響,也引起了各方激烈的爭論,爭論的核心就是卡特爾法能否調(diào)控這種以公法性質(zhì)征收的行政費(fèi)用。依照傳統(tǒng)的理念,公法性質(zhì)的費(fèi)用只受地區(qū)行政的調(diào)控�？ㄌ貭柗ㄋ苷{(diào)控的價格僅限于私法性的,也即是那種通過平等的民事合同關(guān)系協(xié)商建立而來的價格。地區(qū)行政固然是必不可少的,實(shí)際中水價產(chǎn)生的弊端卻說明,地區(qū)行政調(diào)控卻是無效率、不足夠的。面對德國如此高昂的水價,對水費(fèi)有權(quán)進(jìn)行監(jiān)管的地區(qū)行政卻常常是不作為。這樣就使得水費(fèi)在實(shí)際上處在了不受任何監(jiān)管的境地。相應(yīng)的,在地區(qū)行政監(jiān)管無效率、不足夠的情況下,水費(fèi)就應(yīng)該受卡特爾法的調(diào)控,所有聯(lián)邦州和聯(lián)邦的卡特爾部門都應(yīng)該對其負(fù)責(zé)。尤其是用水的消費(fèi)者需要卡特爾法提供的保護(hù)。用水者一直處于在弱勢的地位,供水者的壟斷地位使得他們毫無能力去影響價格的形成。出于這種保護(hù)弱勢消費(fèi)者的目的,也需要卡特爾法的調(diào)控。所以,在地區(qū)行政調(diào)控之外由卡特爾法進(jìn)行平行的調(diào)控是有必要的。在憲法層面上,綜合考慮聯(lián)邦的經(jīng)濟(jì)權(quán)力和地區(qū)自治,我們也能得出這樣的結(jié)果：通過卡特爾法對水價進(jìn)行調(diào)控,是完全合憲的,這種輔助性的、第二性的調(diào)控并沒有損害各個聯(lián)邦州的自主權(quán)。
[Abstract]:In Germany, water supply, as part of regional autonomy, is protected by article 28, paragraph 2, of the German basic Law. For example, in the form of a limited liability company, the water supply is provided by signing a water supply contract with the water user. Of course, the water supplier may also choose the public law organization for the water supply, for example, in the form of a municipal enterprise, and in this case, Water users charge water users, which is an administrative charge. However, the high water prices and the huge price differences between regions show that, In Germany, where there has been a long lack of effective cartel regulation on water prices, this has led directly to the fact that water prices in Germany are almost the highest in industrialized countries in the West. And the price difference between different regions has even reached three times. Although there has always been a regulation of price abuse in the German Anti-restrictive Competition Law. This is mainly to avoid the occurrence of the following situations. The occupants of a dominant position of the market set prices at their discretion by exploiting their dominant position, They gain high profits while making the other side of their trade suffer financial losses. However, For decades, these articles have not played a practical role in controlling the price of water, especially in the area of water charges in the form of public law. People have been based on the view that administrative expenses are levied on the basis of public law, such as administrative law. Is governed only by regional administrative law and not by cartel law, which is essentially private law. But in the recent "Niederbamimer Wasserverband" judgment, The Supreme Court has raised the question of whether costs of a public law nature are also regulated by cartel law. In its legal opinion on the case decision, the Federal Supreme Court expressed such a tendency that even water charges of an administrative nature have no natural immunity to the cartel law. This decision has aroused strong repercussions throughout Germany. There has also been a heated debate among the parties. The core of the argument is whether cartel law can regulate this kind of administrative fee imposed by the nature of public law. According to the traditional idea, Costs of public law are regulated only by regional administration. The price that cartel law can regulate is limited to private law, that is, the price established through equal civil contractual relations. However, the drawbacks of water prices in practice show that regional administrative regulation and control is inefficient and insufficient. Faced with such high water prices in Germany, The district administration that has the right to supervise water charges is often not an act of action. As a result, water charges are in fact not subject to any supervision. Accordingly, in the case of inefficient and inadequate regional administrative supervision, Water charges should be regulated by the cartel law, and all federal state and federal cartel departments should be held accountable. Especially consumers of water need the protection provided by the cartel law. Water users have always been in a weak position. The monopolistic position of water suppliers leaves them powerless to influence the formation of prices. For this purpose of protecting vulnerable consumers, cartel laws are also required. It is necessary to have parallel regulation and control by cartel law in addition to regional administrative regulation. At the constitutional level, considering the economic power of the Federation and regional autonomy, we can also get the following result: we can regulate water prices through the cartel law. Fully constitutional, this complementary, secondary regulation does not undermine the autonomy of federal states.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D951.6;DD912.29

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