本文關(guān)鍵詞： 自然災(zāi)害 農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈 農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn) 公平關(guān)切 協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化　出處：《鄭州大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自然災(zāi)害的頻繁發(fā)生,嚴(yán)重影響了農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈的平穩(wěn)健康發(fā)展,給國(guó)家及農(nóng)戶(hù)也造成了巨大損失。隨著2017年中央一號(hào)文件的發(fā)布,農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)已連續(xù)11年“入駐”中央一號(hào)文件,可見(jiàn)農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)在中央一號(hào)文件中承擔(dān)的重要角色。供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)及其成員在決策中經(jīng)常遇到的棘手問(wèn)題,而農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)作為一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理工具和農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分散機(jī)制,是彌補(bǔ)農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)損失的一種手段,對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展和農(nóng)民的增收起到了積極作用,被越來(lái)越多的學(xué)者引入到供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)與優(yōu)化研究中。在對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)與優(yōu)化的研究中,現(xiàn)有研究的主要出發(fā)點(diǎn)是決策者的公平中性,并且主要集中在二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈的研究上,但這種研究并不能很好的反映現(xiàn)實(shí)生活。本文基于公平關(guān)切及農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的三級(jí)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)及優(yōu)化進(jìn)行研究,以期為供應(yīng)鏈成員的合理決策及供應(yīng)鏈研究領(lǐng)域相關(guān)學(xué)者提供參考。本文采用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、運(yùn)籌學(xué)、保險(xiǎn)學(xué)及金融學(xué)等相關(guān)理論,分析行為運(yùn)作管理及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的國(guó)內(nèi)外現(xiàn)狀研究,圍繞著自然風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下市場(chǎng)需求為隨機(jī)不確定的三級(jí)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)模型來(lái)展開(kāi)分析。通過(guò)對(duì)供應(yīng)商及分銷(xiāo)商公平關(guān)切及公平中性?xún)煞N情況進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)商及分銷(xiāo)商具有公平關(guān)切行為可以消除雙重邊際化效應(yīng),供應(yīng)鏈能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)。在供應(yīng)鏈中引入農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)后,供應(yīng)鏈不僅實(shí)現(xiàn)了協(xié)調(diào),而且起到了優(yōu)化的作用。通過(guò)對(duì)零售商及分銷(xiāo)商公平關(guān)切及公平中性?xún)煞N情況的對(duì)比分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)零售商及分銷(xiāo)商公平關(guān)切與公平中性下,供應(yīng)鏈均無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)。引入農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)后,供應(yīng)鏈依然無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào),但是農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)增加了供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的利潤(rùn)。用MATLAB對(duì)理論部分的結(jié)論做進(jìn)一步的數(shù)值仿真。驗(yàn)證了不同供應(yīng)鏈成員的公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的不同影響,同時(shí)說(shuō)明了農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)確實(shí)起到了優(yōu)化供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的作用。本文研究還表明:供應(yīng)鏈中收益較高的成員應(yīng)時(shí)刻關(guān)注那些收益較低且具有公平關(guān)切行為的成員,并通過(guò)采取一定的措施來(lái)穩(wěn)定各成員之間的合作,使得供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)更加穩(wěn)定;而對(duì)于自然災(zāi)害高發(fā)區(qū),農(nóng)戶(hù)可通過(guò)加入農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)來(lái)規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn),減少自然災(zāi)害帶來(lái)虧損,保障供應(yīng)鏈的穩(wěn)定。
[Abstract]:The frequent occurrence of natural disasters has seriously affected the steady and healthy development of agricultural supply chain and caused huge losses to the country and farmers. Agricultural insurance has been in the first document of the Central Committee for 11 consecutive years. It can be seen that agricultural insurance plays an important role in the first document of the Central Committee. Supply chain risk is a thorny problem often encountered by supply chain system and its members in decision-making. As a risk management tool and agricultural risk dispersal mechanism, agricultural insurance is a means to compensate for the loss of agricultural risk, which plays a positive role in the stable development of agriculture and the increase of farmers' income. More and more scholars have introduced into the supply chain coordination and optimization research. In the supply chain coordination and optimization research, the main starting point of the existing research is the fairness and neutrality of decision makers. And mainly focused on the secondary supply chain research, but this research can not reflect the real life well. This paper based on equity concerns and agricultural insurance three-level agricultural supply chain coordination and optimization research. In order to provide a reference for the rational decision-making of supply chain members and supply chain research related scholars. This paper uses economics, operational research, insurance and finance and other related theories. To analyze the current situation of behavioral operation management and risk management at home and abroad. This paper analyzes the profit model of three-level agricultural product supply chain based on the random uncertainty of market demand under natural risk. Through the comparative analysis of supplier and distributor fair concern and fairness neutral two situations are analyzed. It is found that the supplier and distributor have fair concern behavior can eliminate the double marginalization effect, the supply chain can achieve coordination. After the introduction of agricultural insurance in the supply chain, the supply chain not only realizes coordination. Through the comparative analysis of retailer and distributor fair concern and fair neutral, we find that retailers and distributors are fair concern and fair neutral. Supply chain can not achieve coordination. After the introduction of agricultural insurance, supply chain still can not achieve coordination. But agricultural insurance increases the profit of the supply chain system. Further numerical simulation of the conclusion of the theoretical part is made by MATLAB. It is verified that the fairness concern behavior of different supply chain members has different influence on supply chain coordination. Ring. At the same time, it shows that agricultural insurance does play an important role in optimizing the supply chain system. This study also shows that the members with higher returns in the supply chain should always pay attention to those members with low returns and fair concern behavior. And by taking certain measures to stabilize the cooperation among members, make the supply chain system more stable; For the areas with high incidence of natural disasters, farmers can avoid risks by joining agricultural insurance, reduce losses caused by natural disasters, and ensure the stability of supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F323.7;F842.66

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