本文關(guān)鍵詞：內(nèi)生主導型農(nóng)村金融體系構(gòu)建問題研究，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

        “三農(nóng)”問題是中國當前最大的問題,而“三農(nóng)”問題歸根結(jié)底就是農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展問題。現(xiàn)階段我國農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的真正“瓶頸”是資金問題。而農(nóng)村金融是農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中最為重要的資本要素配置制度,是農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的核心問題之一。科學有序的金融活動是繁榮農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟必不可少的重要條件。改革開放以來,農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟制度、組織形式和法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)生了深刻變化,極大地促進了農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展,但是農(nóng)村金融制度卻少有革命性變革。國家為了給農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展提供有效的金融支持而設立的政策性功能、商業(yè)性功能和合作性功能相區(qū)別的三類金融機構(gòu)并沒有解決農(nóng)村資金缺口問題,卻有資金缺口擴大的趨勢。反倒是農(nóng)村的民問借貸在滿足農(nóng)戶與農(nóng)村中小企業(yè)資金需求上發(fā)揮了較大的作用,這與國家一直試圖建立的以合作金融為基礎,商業(yè)性金融、政策性金融分工協(xié)作的農(nóng)村金融體系南轅北轍。簡單的市場化和商業(yè)化使農(nóng)村金融并沒有發(fā)生實質(zhì)性的變革,簡單的機構(gòu)分設和業(yè)務重新劃分并未從根本上解決農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟主體信貸需求難的問題。國家仍然沒有為小農(nóng)提供合適的金融服務機構(gòu),也沒有對農(nóng)村金融服務提供相應的援助和支持,國家僅僅通過增加農(nóng)村貸款量的方式并不能解決農(nóng)村金融問題。縱觀農(nóng)村金融制度的歷次變遷,可以看出其中的兩個明顯特征：(1)農(nóng)村金融體制和制度的每次變遷均是自上而下的政府強制性外部行為,而非自下而上的誘發(fā)性行為,更不是農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟主體自主性內(nèi)生行為。(2)農(nóng)村金融體制和制度的每次變遷均是法人地位和權(quán)利的易位,而非組織結(jié)構(gòu)形式的變動以及金融產(chǎn)權(quán)主體的讓渡。也就是說,都是形式上的變化,而非經(jīng)營管理模式以及金融效率提高等實質(zhì)上的變革。改革開放以來,農(nóng)村金融改革低效的根本原因在于政府主導的強制性改革模式。該模式是在延續(xù)傳統(tǒng)外生主導型金融供給制度框架下的“技術(shù)性努力”,反映的仍然是國家的利益偏好�！凹夹g(shù)性改進”只能產(chǎn)生短期變革效應,無法從根本上改善農(nóng)村金融運行的總體環(huán)境,無法給農(nóng)村金融成長提供一個嶄新的制度環(huán)境。因此必須改革農(nóng)村金融改革的路徑：即從由上而下的反應政府利益偏好的強制性改革模式轉(zhuǎn)化為由下而上的體現(xiàn)需求主體利益偏好的誘致性改革模式,也即農(nóng)村金融成長方式須由外生主導型轉(zhuǎn)變成內(nèi)生主導型。農(nóng)村內(nèi)生主導型金融制度具有利益誘致、內(nèi)生主導、需求追隨等特征,強調(diào)微觀需求主體的利益與偏好。這種現(xiàn)代意義的農(nóng)村金融體系包括需求方、供給方與監(jiān)管方三個方面,即：農(nóng)村微觀經(jīng)濟組織及其結(jié)構(gòu)(農(nóng)戶與農(nóng)村中小企業(yè)),農(nóng)村金融組織及其結(jié)構(gòu),農(nóng)村金融的宏觀監(jiān)管主體。因此農(nóng)村內(nèi)生主導型金融體系的構(gòu)建既包括農(nóng)村金融需求主體的塑造,也包括農(nóng)村金融供給主體的改造,還包括金融監(jiān)管主體的再造。截止到目前,對農(nóng)村金融體系的研究與改革實踐,大部分都是從金融機構(gòu)和金融供給的角度出發(fā)的。從功能與需求角度研究農(nóng)村金融體系容易把握所存在問題的本質(zhì)特征,有助于彌補傳統(tǒng)研究視角的不足。本研究將吸收機構(gòu)觀點的優(yōu)點,發(fā)展的運用功能觀點,充分利用其現(xiàn)實之處探討我國農(nóng)村金融體系建設的方法；從需求結(jié)合供給的角度,來分析我國農(nóng)村金融體系的歷史變遷、運行現(xiàn)狀,研究農(nóng)村金融體系變遷的特征、深層次原因及其對農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的影響,旨在探求適應農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟運行特點的金融體系及其重構(gòu)路徑。論文可分為四部分：第一部分為導言,進行理論假設(提出問題)；第二部分即第一、二章是假設的理論依據(jù)；第三部分是第三章,對理論假設進行歷史實踐考察(實踐依據(jù))；第四部分包括四至九章,探討“怎么做”也就是研究如何建立農(nóng)村內(nèi)生主導型金融體系。即問題“是什么”,“為什么”(理論與實踐),“怎么做”。緒論。主要包括研究的背景與意義、國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀、研究工具和方法、基本思路和邏輯結(jié)構(gòu)等。指出改革開放以來農(nóng)村金融改革低效的根本原因在于政府主導的強制性改革模式,必須改革農(nóng)村金融改革的路徑：即從由上而下的反應政府利益偏好的強制性改革模式轉(zhuǎn)化為由下而上的體現(xiàn)需求主體利益偏好的誘致性改革模式,也即農(nóng)村金融長成方式須由外生主導型轉(zhuǎn)變成內(nèi)生主導型。第一章,農(nóng)村金融長成方式的區(qū)分與比較�；仡櫋敖鹑诔砷L”理論的產(chǎn)生與發(fā)展,對其進行界定。將金融成長分為質(zhì)性成長與量性成長兩種形成與抑制、約束、深化三個階段。劃分農(nóng)村金融成長方式的類型,并利用模型對兩種成長方式進行分析,指出外生主導型農(nóng)村金融成長方式的弊端。第二章,農(nóng)村金融成長方式轉(zhuǎn)化的理論基礎。之一：制度變遷與制度創(chuàng)新理論。制度變遷與制度創(chuàng)新的動力在于經(jīng)濟主體期望獲得最大的外部利潤,初始制度選擇會強化現(xiàn)存制度的刺激和慣性：誘致性制度變遷與強制性制度變遷是新制度經(jīng)濟學制度變遷的兩種模式；新制度經(jīng)濟家運用供求理論來研究制度供求及均衡。之二：金融制度變遷的階段與周期。金融產(chǎn)權(quán)的安排可分為初始狀態(tài)：金融制度僵滯階段；演進狀態(tài)：金融制度創(chuàng)新階段；最優(yōu)狀態(tài)：金融制度成熟階段。金融制度變遷就是一個由主導型利益集團推動的階段性周期演進過程。在上一個周期完成后,又進入下一個周期的變遷過程。每個階段由于供求力量的不同對比,導致了不同的制度變遷模型。每階段不同的產(chǎn)權(quán)安排導致不同的效率。第三章,中國農(nóng)村金融成長方式的歷史變遷。第一階段：中央集權(quán)計劃經(jīng)濟時期(19561978)的典型外生主導型成長方式�；仡櫽媱澖�(jīng)濟時期我國農(nóng)村金融工作與金融體制的發(fā)展,從工業(yè)化的角度研究農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟體制的變遷,指出外生主導型農(nóng)村金融成長方式的根源與背景,并對外生主導型農(nóng)村金融成長方式進行解釋。第二階段：改革開放以來(1978——至今)的政府主導型農(nóng)村金融改革與農(nóng)村金融成長內(nèi)生機制的萌芽。回顧改革開放以來農(nóng)村金融的改革與發(fā)展,對農(nóng)村金融體系的嬗變進行考察,分析政府主導型農(nóng)村金融改革低效的原因,描述農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展體制障礙的突破與農(nóng)村金融成長內(nèi)生機制的萌芽。第四章,農(nóng)村信用社合作制體制改革的可行性研究。當前理論界關(guān)于我國農(nóng)村信用合作社改革問題爭論的焦點是產(chǎn)權(quán)制度安排,爭論的本質(zhì)主要集中在要不要堅持合作制和在多大程度上堅持合作制。合作金融是農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟體制的現(xiàn)實需求,農(nóng)村的金觸需求本來應該是農(nóng)村信用社正確定位的基點,但是由于信用社既得利益的存在,政府和信用社之間合作制規(guī)范博弈的納什均衡是信用社抵制合作制規(guī)范以及政府放棄合作制規(guī)范；政府和農(nóng)民之間合作制規(guī)范博弈的納什均衡是農(nóng)民不參與合作制規(guī)范以及政府放棄合作制規(guī)范。因此,在現(xiàn)有信用社基礎上的合作制規(guī)范不可能成功,中國的農(nóng)村合作金融必須另起爐灶。內(nèi)生的農(nóng)村合作金融是一個市場自然選擇過程,隨著市場力量的增強和制度約束條件的改變,會逐漸打破外生的政府強制性制度安排的路徑依賴,最終外生的政府強制性制度安排會被內(nèi)生的誘致性市場交易制度所替代。第五章,中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行體制改革問題。目前,農(nóng)村政策性金融理論的研究總的來說是分歧多、爭論多,爭論焦點是政策性銀行的職能定位與出路。農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行面臨的最直接和最外在的問題是持續(xù)性問題,深層的問題包括制度、功能和機制等方面的缺陷�；谡咝糟y行的特點,我們建立起關(guān)于政策性銀行的制度總函數(shù),并以對于制度函數(shù)的解釋作為關(guān)于中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行體制改革的基本主張,包括：金融市場有效性與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的改革目標；國家效用與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的業(yè)務范圍等。第六章,民間金融的范疇、土壤、運行與發(fā)展趨勢。研究如何構(gòu)建民間金融制度以規(guī)范發(fā)展民間金融具有重大的理論意義與現(xiàn)實意義。目前學術(shù)理論界的主流思想是民間金融的生存發(fā)展是合理且必要的,應為其正名,明確其合法地位,并給予其相應的生存發(fā)展空間。農(nóng)村民間金融的存在和發(fā)展已有幾千年的歷史,其存在有其深層次的必然性：農(nóng)村“生存經(jīng)濟”與農(nóng)村金融的財政性質(zhì)；農(nóng)業(yè)的弱質(zhì)性更多地需要國家的扶持,具有準財政的性質(zhì)：正規(guī)農(nóng)村金融機構(gòu)運作具有高昂的成本與高風險性；非正規(guī)金融利用社會關(guān)系這一重要資本,大大節(jié)約了信息和交易成本,具有正規(guī)金融所不具備的優(yōu)勢。應當正視非正規(guī)金融背后的深層次原因,從降低這些風險和成本著手來引導非正規(guī)金融的正常發(fā)展。民間金融運行機制具有良好的內(nèi)、外部風險控制機制,宏觀與微觀效率很高,對金融機構(gòu)的競爭格局、經(jīng)濟總量和經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)都發(fā)生了不可低估的作用。至于中國民間金融的未來,我們不主張把現(xiàn)有民間金融的所有形式都“強制性地迅速”轉(zhuǎn)化為現(xiàn)代金融體系的一部分,而應著重考慮建立真正的內(nèi)生性的民營金融體系。第七章,中國農(nóng)戶的金融偏好與信貸安排——基于農(nóng)戶行為特征的一個理論框架。研究農(nóng)戶行為的經(jīng)典文獻有“理性小農(nóng)”、“道義小農(nóng)”以及黃宗智的“拐杖邏輯”。深入了解我國“馬鞍型”社會架構(gòu)、農(nóng)村家庭圈層結(jié)構(gòu)與關(guān)系型信任有助于我們進一步解讀農(nóng)戶金融偏好。另外,在中國,長期以來,國家與農(nóng)戶在分割有限農(nóng)村剩余過程中存在一種脆弱的平衡,而國家農(nóng)貸制度的基本功能則是維持這種平衡。通過解讀中國農(nóng)戶的行為我們發(fā)現(xiàn),中國農(nóng)戶金融偏好(融資次序)耐人尋味,主要表現(xiàn)為,在農(nóng)業(yè)收入不足以抵補維生成本時,首先考慮增加非農(nóng)收入,其次才尋求信貸支持。就信貸支持而言,先爭取國家農(nóng)貸,再謀求民間熟人信貸,最后是高利信貸。相關(guān)的實證分析也驗證了上述結(jié)論。農(nóng)戶“借貸難”問題產(chǎn)生的根源是信任匱乏。中國目前以民間借貸為主的農(nóng)貸格局具有很強的內(nèi)生性、路徑依賴性和合理性,在政策上切忌采用自上而下的方式對其進行改造。第八章,中小企業(yè)融資困境：本質(zhì)解讀與破解思路。中間層的缺失導致中國社會的制度演進陷入了二重結(jié)構(gòu)困境。儒教倫理充當了中間層的社會均衡與協(xié)調(diào)角色,但使得社會蛻變?yōu)橐约彝楹诵牡娜咏Y(jié)構(gòu),由此決定我國農(nóng)村的非制度關(guān)系型信任結(jié)構(gòu)。這種信任結(jié)構(gòu)與建立在制度信任基礎上的商業(yè)借貸相排斥,因此商業(yè)借貸在中國大部分農(nóng)村缺乏存在的信任基礎�？梢�,植根于農(nóng)村信任體系的中小企業(yè)的金融困境本質(zhì)上是一種信用困境。以民間資本為依托,構(gòu)建中小企業(yè)內(nèi)生性關(guān)系型借貸制度是破解中小企業(yè)融資困境的新思路,但必須堅持自主性與內(nèi)生性原則,同時要特別防止兩種可能導致誤入歧途的傾向。第九章,農(nóng)村內(nèi)生主導型金融監(jiān)管主體的再造：政府參與的方式與途徑。在市場失靈存在的情況下,政府的作用是必不可少的,但政府的作用應該是有條件的,即以不損害微觀金融主體利益為前提：同時,政府的作用也應該是適度的,其作用范圍應該限制在維護農(nóng)村金融成長的大環(huán)境和存在市場失靈的政策性金融領(lǐng)域,并進而對內(nèi)生性成長模式下政府監(jiān)管的適度性提出了自己的看法。本文可能的創(chuàng)新按照重要程度,從重到輕排列,主要有以下四個方面：(一)選題創(chuàng)新。將“金融成長方式”理論引入農(nóng)村金融改革的研究領(lǐng)域,選擇了這一全新的視角解剖建國后農(nóng)村金融改革歷程,并從這一角度探討農(nóng)村金融體系的再造。(二)體系創(chuàng)新。已有的有關(guān)農(nóng)村金融體系改造的研究基本上是在橫向上展開,即只研究農(nóng)村金融的供給主體,也就是研究如何建立和完善以合作金融為基礎,商業(yè)金融和政策性金融分工協(xié)作的農(nóng)村金融服務體系以及相關(guān)的擔保、保險組織。很少涉及農(nóng)村金融的微觀經(jīng)濟組織,即農(nóng)村金融的需求主體(農(nóng)戶與農(nóng)村中小企業(yè))以及農(nóng)村金融的宏觀監(jiān)管主體的行為分析與重塑。本研究將農(nóng)村金融體系分為需求、供給與監(jiān)管三個層面,即：農(nóng)村微觀經(jīng)濟組織及其結(jié)構(gòu)(需求方),農(nóng)村金融組織及其結(jié)構(gòu)(供給方),政府或中央銀行等機構(gòu)對農(nóng)村金融的監(jiān)督與調(diào)節(jié)(協(xié)調(diào)方)。因此農(nóng)村內(nèi)生主導型金融體系的構(gòu)建既包括農(nóng)村金融需求主體偏好的解讀,也包括農(nóng)村金融供給主體的改造,還包括金融監(jiān)管主體的再造。(三)視角(理論支持)創(chuàng)新。目前農(nóng)村金融的經(jīng)典派研究主要工具是新制度經(jīng)濟學、信息成本理論,這些研究給了我們不同于調(diào)研派的深度與整體,但這一方法如果脫離了中國農(nóng)村的社會文化結(jié)構(gòu),解釋力尚顯不足。我們是社會結(jié)構(gòu)派,確立了歷史演進、社會文化視角,從總體上把握農(nóng)村金融制度結(jié)構(gòu)。我們在充分借鑒新制度學派、信息成本理論的基礎上,從中國農(nóng)村的社會結(jié)構(gòu)與信用結(jié)構(gòu)的特殊性出發(fā)探討農(nóng)村金融制度安排的社會經(jīng)濟基礎。(四)觀點創(chuàng)新。①“解放”比“改革”更具現(xiàn)實性、緊迫性。農(nóng)村會融困境的現(xiàn)實出路是放松政府對金融的壟斷,規(guī)范而不是打壓現(xiàn)存非正規(guī)金融,政府不應該越位替農(nóng)村金融的需求主體選擇金融供給的具體形式。②農(nóng)村信用社的改革具有“不可逆性”。農(nóng)村信用社在建國后經(jīng)歷了“合作升級”即銀行化,但現(xiàn)有的農(nóng)村信用社卻不能改回合作金融。因此農(nóng)村信用社改革方向是商業(yè)金融或政策金融。合作金融在中國農(nóng)村仍具有現(xiàn)實基礎,但其成長方式是新發(fā)育而不是對現(xiàn)有金融機構(gòu)的改造。③民間金融的現(xiàn)實出路應該是合法化規(guī)范化而不是急于升級或銀行化。④目前政府主導籌建的中小銀行無論是改造的還是新建的均不能根本解決中小企業(yè)融資難題,適合中小企業(yè)資金需求的供給主體必須內(nèi)生。

    The problem of the problems of agriculture, farmers and rural areas is the biggest problem, which is the problem of rural economic development. China’s current stage of development of the rural economy really "bottleneck" is funding. And the rural financial development of the rural economy is the most important capital allocation system; rural economic development is one of the core issues. Scientific and orderly financial activities are the essential conditions of a prosperous rural economy.Since reform and opening up,the rural economic system, forms of organization and corporate governance structure has undergone profound changes, and greatly promoted the rural rapid economic development, but the rural financial system has few revolutionary changes. To develop the rural economy, state was to provide effective financial support based on financial cooperation, which fails to solve the problem of rural funding gap. There are inadequate funds to expand. Conversely, rural loan to meet farmers and the rural financial needs of SMEs plays a larger role. This country has been trying to establish the basis for cooperation in the financial, commercial finance, financial policy division of the rural cooperative financial system. Simple market and the commercialization of the rural financial and has not undergone substantial changes. The simply set-up and operational agencies redrawing have not fundamentally solve the economic mainstay of rural credit demand to the problem. State still fails to offer financial services sector for ordinary farmers, nor do rural financial services offer assistance and support. Only through increased volume of loans in rural areas, state does not solve the financial problems in rural areas.Taking a panoramic view of the rural financial system in the successive changes, which can be seen in two distinct features:(1) rural financial system and each system is top-to-bottom changes in the mandatory external behavior rather than bottom-up orientation or ontogenesis behavior.(2) the change of rural financial system is that of legal status and translocation of the rights, rather than that of organizational structure or the form of financial and property rights of expropriation, in other words, all forms of change, rather than management patterns, and improve the efficiency of financial and other substantive changes.Since reform and opening up, fundamental reason of inefficiency of the rural financial reform lies in the government-led reform of the mandatory mode. The model is the continuation of traditional exogenous supply-oriented financial system under the framework of "technical efforts," is reflected in the national interest preferences."Technical improvements" can only have short-term effects of change. They are not enough to improve rural financial operations of the overall environment or unable to provide rural finance development of a new system environment. Therefore the need to reform the rural financial reform path:from the top-down model reflecting government interests reform into a bottom-up one adjusting to the demand of farmers. nonagricultural industries, that is, changing from rural financial means to be grown up exogenous led into endogenous-oriented.Endogenous rural-based financial system has the characteristics of induced interests, which stressed the micro needs of the main interests and preferences. This modern sense of the rural financial system, including the demand side, the supply side and the regulatory side three aspects, namely:rural micro-economic organization and its structure (farmers and the rural SMEs), and the rural financial organizations and their structure, rural financial macro-control of the main. So finance of ontogenesis with the rural areas includes the construction of rural financial needs of the main mold, the main supply of rural financial reform, and financial supervision main recycling.Up to now, the rural financial system and the practice of reform, most are from the financial institutions and financial supply perspective. From the functional point of view and the needs of the rural financial system easy to grasp the problems which exist in nature, help fill the traditional perspective deficiencies. The body will absorb the advantages of view, the use of functional perspective, make full use of its real opportunity to explore China’s rural financial system in the way; demand from the perspective of supply, analysis of China’s rural financial system of historic changes, the operation status on rural financial system changing characteristics, the deep-seated reasons for the development of the rural economy, and adaptation to explore rural economic characteristics of the operation of the financial system and the remodeling path.This thesis can be divided into four parts:the first part of the introduction, theoretical assumptions (questions); the second part is theoretical assumptions of chapter1and chapter2; the third part is the third chapter, the hypothetical historical practice of inspection (practical basis); Part four includes from chapter four to chapter9, exploring "how to do" that is to study how to establish a rural health-oriented within the financial system. That is,"What" and "why"(theory and practice),"how to do."Introduction includes the background to the study and the significance of the research status, research tools and methods, the basic ideas and logical structure. It points out that since the reform and opening up of rural financial reform, inefficient fundamental reason lies in the government-led reform of the mandatory mode must reform of the rural financial reform path:from the top-down government response to the interests of the mandatory preference reform model into a bottom-up demand for the main manifestation (farmers, nonagricultural industries) preferred interests induced reform model, that is, the means of growth of rural finance changes from exogenous to endogenous-oriented.The first chapter is the distinction and comparison of the way of growth of rural finance. Monetary growth is qualitative and quantitative growth of both formation and growth inhibition and restraint, deepening the three stages. Divided the rural financial growth means the type and model of growth both ways, that external-oriented rural financial growth of the disadvantages.Chapter two is the theoretical foundation of the rural financial growth mode.1.Institutional Change and Innovation Theory:Institutional Change and Innovation is the driving force of economic subjects expect to get the biggest external profits the initial choice of system will strengthen the existing system of incentives and inertia; induced institutional change and the mandatory system changes the new system is changing economics of the two systems model; The new system economists use to study the supply and demand theory of supply and demand and balance system.2. The financial system changes with the stage cycle. Financial ownership arrangements can be divided into initial state, stagnation stage of the financial system; evolution of the state, the financial system innovation stage; optimal conditions, mature stage of the financial system. Changes in the financial system are by-oriented interest groups to promote the process of evolution cycle stages. In-cycle completed, and then enters the next cycle of a process of change. Each stage of the different forces resulted in a contrast-species model-based system changes. Each phase of different ownership arrangements resulted in a different efficiency.Chapter three is historical change of rural financial growth mode. The first stage:a centralized planned economy period (1956--1978) typical exogenous growth-oriented way. Recalling the period of the planned economy of China’s rural financial work and the development of the financial system, from the perspective of industrialization in rural economic structure changes, it analyzes external-led growth of the rural way of financial sources and backgrounds, as well as external-led growth of the rural financial means for explanations. The second stage: Since the reform and opening up (1978--date) of the government-led reform of the rural financial growth and rural financial mechanism within the bud. Recalling since the reform and opening up of rural financial reform and development of the rural financial system without authorization to conduct the study, it analyzes the government-led reform of the rural financial inefficient, and describes the development of the rural economy institutional barriers breakthrough with the development of the rural financial mechanism within the seeds.Chapter four is study of rural credit cooperatives or cooperative system feasibility. Theoretical circles on the reform of China’s rural credit cooperatives major debate on the issue of property rights. The discussion also focused on the institutional arrangements. The essence of the argument focused on not to uphold the cooperative system and the extent to uphold the cooperative system. Rural financial cooperation is the reality of the economic system needs. The rural demand should have been inconsistent with the rural credit cooperatives, which is the basis for the correct positioning. Because the vested interests of the credit unions exist, the Nash equilibrium game between the government and credit cooperative system regulating is cooperative credit unions resist norms. Government is to abandon cooperative norms. Nash equilibrium game between the government and the farmers cooperative is not in the farmers cooperative norms, and government is to abandon cooperative norms. Therefore, the existing credit cooperatives on the basis of cooperative norms can not succeed. So China’s rural financial cooperation has to build a second stove. Finance of ontogenesis with the rural areas is a natural selection process. Along with the strengthening of market forces and institutional conditions for change will gradually break exogenous mandatory system arrangements path dependence, and ultimately exogenous mandatory system will be arranged within the Health induced market trading system has been replaced.Chapter five is about reform issues of Agricultural Development Bank of China. Currently, the policy-oriented financial theoretical research in general differences, disputes, is the focus of the debate in policy-oriented banks and the functions way. Agricultural Development Bank of the most direct and external issues is a continuous problem, the underlying issues, including system function and mechanism of the defects. Based on the policy of banks characteristics, we build on the policy of total banking system function, and for the system to function as an explanation of the China Agricultural Development Bank, the basic reform advocates, which includes:effectiveness of the financial markets in China and the Agricultural Development Bank of reform goals; State Utility and the China Agricultural Development Bank, the scope of business.Chapter six is about civil finance:areas, soil, and operation and development trends. The study on how to build a private banking system to finance the development of civil norms is of great theoretical significance and practical significance. Current academic theorists are the mainstream thinking of private banking for the survival and development is reasonable and necessary, so they should be renamed in terms of clear legal status, and gives the corresponding room for survival and development. Rural finance development and the existence there had been several thousand years of history, there are deep rooted inevitability: Rural "economic survival" and the rural financial nature; The Fragility of Agriculture needs more state support. Quasi-fiscal nature; formal rural financial institutions operate with the high cost and high-risk; non-formal financial relationship between the use of social capital important to a significant reduction in information and transaction costs, is the formal financial did not have the advantage. Should look squarely at the non-formal financial behind the deep-seated reasons, from reduce these risks and costs begin to guide the non-formal financial normal development. Private banking operation mechanism has good internal and external risk control mechanism, macro-and microeconomic efficiency high, for financial institutions competition pattern, with the overall economy and the structure of the economy has undergone a role should not be underestimated. As for Chinese civic financial future, we are not in favor of the existing private banking in all its forms is "mandatory rapidly" into a modern financial system part should consider the establishment of a genuine focus on the endogeneity of the private financial system.Chapter seven is about Chinese farmers’financial preferences and credit arrangements--Based on the behavior characteristics of farmers a theoretical framework. It is the research on farmers of classic literature as a "rational small farmers","moral small farmers", Philip Huang’s "logic crutches", and in-depth understanding of China’s "saddle" social structure. Rural families layered structure and the trust-based relationship will help us further interpretation farmers’ financial preferences. Meanwhile, in China, a long time, the state and farmers in rural surplus limited segmentation process there is a delicate balance State subsidies system and the basic function is to maintain this balance. Interpretation of the Chinese farmers through the acts we discovered that Chinese farmers financial preferences (for financing) intriguing, mainly for the agricultural income were insufficient to cover living costs. First consider increasing the non-agricultural income. Secondly seek credit support. On the credit support, first for national subsidies, and to seek civil acquaintances credit, is the last of higher interest credit. Positive correlation analysis also validates these conclusions. Farmer "hard to borrow" the root cause is lack of trust. China’s current non-borrowing mainly to the pattern of subsidies has strong endogenous, path dependence and rationality policy to avoid using the top-down approach for its transformation.Chapter eight is about SME financing difficulties:the essence of Reading and the Solutions. The middle layer to the lack of social evolution of the system into a two focuses on structural difficulties. Confucian ethics act as a middle layer of social balance and coordination role, but make social change to the family as the core of the layered structure. This determines China’s rural non-institutional relations-trust structure. This trust structure conflicts with the establishment of trust in the system on the basis of commercial lending exclusive. Therefore commercial lending accounts for the majority of rural Chinese lack of trust. Visibility, rooted in the rural trust’s SME financial plight is essentially a credit difficulty. To rely on private capital, construction SMEs endogenous relationship lending system is break the plight of the SME financing new ideas, However, we must adhere to independence and endogenous principle, and in particular to prevent two may lead to the tendency to go astray.Chapter nine:Health within the rural-based financial regulatory main recycling:participation in the ways and means. Market Failure in the circumstances, the government’s role is indispensable:But the role of government should be conditional, which is not prejudicial to the interests of micro-finance for the main premise; meanwhile, the role of government should also be appropriate. Its scope should be limited role in maintaining the growth of the rural financial environment and the existence of market failures of policy-oriented financial field, and proceed to endogenous growth model under government supervision moderation of his views.This paper may be an important innovation in accordance with the degree of severity of light arranged mainly in the following four aspects:1. Topic innovation."Monetary growth mode" is introduced into the theory of rural financial reform areas of research and this new perspective anatomy after the founding of the rural financial reform process from the perspective of the rural financial system and recycling.2. System innovation. The transformation of the rural financial system is the basic research on the horizontal commence that the only study the supply of rural financial mainstay, and is to study how to establish and perfect a cooperative financial basis, commercial and financial policies and financial cooperation division of the rural financial service system and the related guarantees, and insurance organizations. Few are involved in the micro-finance rural economic organizations, so that the rural financial demands main (farmers and rural small and medium enterprises) and rural financial macro-control subjects of analysis and remodeling. The rural financial system is divided into demand, supply and supervision of three levels, namely:rural micro-economic organization and its structure (the demand side), and the rural financial organization and structure (the supply side), government or institutions such as the Central Bank of rural financial supervision and regulation (coordinator). So within the rural health-based financial system includes the construction of rural financial needs of the main preference interpretation, the main supply of rural financial reform, and financial supervision main recycling.3. Perspective (theoretical support) Innovation:the current rural financial allocation classic study of the new institutional economics tools, cost information theory has given us different depth investigation camp and the whole. But this approach if it is separated from China’s rural social and cultural structure of explanation were not yet adequate. We send our social structure, and established the historical evolution and the social and cultural perspective, grasp the overall structure of the rural financial system. We fully from the school system, information costs on the basis of theory, from the rural community Guitar credit structure with the particularity of the rural financial system to explore arrangements for the economic base.4. New Ideas:"Reform" is more realism and urgent than "Liberation". Rural financial predicament is a realistic way to relax the government’s monopoly on the financial, rather than suppressing standardizes existing informal finance. The government should not overrun for the financial needs of rural main supply choose the specific financial forms, o two of the reform of rural credit cooperatives is "irreversible." After experiencing a "cooperation escalation" that the banks, the existing rural credit cooperatives can not be converted back to financial cooperation, but follow the direction of reform of rural credit cooperatives financial or commercial financial policy. Financial cooperation in China’s rural areas still has a practical basis, but its growth is a new development mode instead of the existing financial institutions reforms. Non-financial realities solution is the legalization of standardization instead of rushing to upgrade or banks of. o four government-led planning of small and medium sized banks is modified or new will not solve the fundamental financing difficulties for SMEs that suitable for the SME funding needs to be the main supply endogenous Keywords rural financial system, recycling, long into the rural financial, led by exogenous and endogenous-oriented

內(nèi)生主導型農(nóng)村金融體系構(gòu)建問題研究

內(nèi)容摘要4-10Abstract10-17前言24-48    0.1 研究的背景與意義24-29    0.2 國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀29-42    0.3 研究工具和方法42-44    0.4 基本思路和邏輯結(jié)構(gòu)44-45    0.5 可能的創(chuàng)新45-47    0.6 需要同讀者交待的與論文有關(guān)的其它問題47-481. 農(nóng)村金融成長方式的區(qū)分與比較48-62    1.1 經(jīng)濟學對“金融成長”的發(fā)現(xiàn)與界定48-50        1.1.1 經(jīng)濟學對“金融成長(Finance Maturity)”的發(fā)現(xiàn)48-50        1.1.2 “金融成長”(Finance Maturity)界說50    1.2 金融成長的形成與階段50-55        1.2.1 金融成長的形式與階段50-55    1.3 農(nóng)村金融成長方式的類型55-61        1.3.1 內(nèi)生主導型農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長方式55-56        1.3.2 外生主導型農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長方式56        1.3.3 兩種成長方式的模型分析56-58        1.3.4 外生主導型農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長方式的弊端分析58-60        1.3.5 對假設前提的放松60-61    1.4 小結(jié)61-622. 農(nóng)村金融成長方式轉(zhuǎn)化的理論基礎62-91    2.1 農(nóng)村金融成長方式轉(zhuǎn)化的理論基礎之一：制度變遷與制度創(chuàng)新理論62-70        2.1.1 制度變遷與創(chuàng)新的動力機制63-64        2.1.2 制度變遷與創(chuàng)新的路徑依賴64-65        2.1.3 誘致性制度變遷與強制性制度變遷65-66        2.1.4 制度需求與制度供給66-69        2.1.5 理論小結(jié)69-70    2.2 農(nóng)村金融成長方式轉(zhuǎn)化的理論基礎之二：金融制度變遷的階段與周期70-91        2.2.1 金融制度安排的初始狀態(tài)：僵滯階段70-76        2.2.2 金融制度安排的演進狀態(tài)：創(chuàng)新階段76-84        2.2.3 金融制度安排的最優(yōu)狀態(tài)：成熟階段84-913. 中國農(nóng)村金融成長方式的歷史變遷91-114    3.1 中央集權(quán)計劃經(jīng)濟時期(1956——1978)的典型外生主導型成長方式91-100        3.1.1 農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟基本制度實證考察91-93        3.1.2 從工業(yè)化的角度看農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟體制的變遷：外生主導型農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長方式的根源和背景93-98        3.1.3 外生主導型農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長方式的解釋98-100    3.2 改革開放以來的中國農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長方式嬗變100-114        3.2.1 農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟制度的擅變：農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟發(fā)展體制障礙的突破和農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長內(nèi)生機制的萌生100-105        3.2.2 農(nóng)業(yè)金融體系的擅變105-109        3.2.3 工農(nóng)業(yè)關(guān)系的演變：對于農(nóng)業(yè)金融成長轉(zhuǎn)換過程的促進與制約并存109-1144. 農(nóng)村信用社合作制體制改革的可行性研究114-146    4.1 我國農(nóng)村信用社產(chǎn)權(quán)改革問題的觀點綜述114-121        4.1.1 農(nóng)村合作金融概念認定114-115        4.1.2 合作制還是股份制的爭論115-117        4.1.3 股份制與非股份制觀點的爭論117-118        4.1.4 股份合作制與非股份合作制觀點的爭論118-119        4.1.5 不同產(chǎn)權(quán)制度模式的比較分析119-121    4.2 農(nóng)村的金觸需求：農(nóng)村信用社正確定位的基點121-130        4.2.1 制度需求122-125        4.2.2 合作制是農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟體制的現(xiàn)實要求125-128        4.2.3 合作制度的效率128-130    4.3 農(nóng)村信用社合作制規(guī)范的博弈分析130-137        4.3.1 政府同信用社之間的博弈131-134        4.3.2 政府同農(nóng)民之間的博弈134-135        4.3.3 結(jié)論135-137    4.4 農(nóng)村信用社制度的變遷：農(nóng)村信用社合作制規(guī)范可行性的進一步分析137-146        4.4.1 一般描述：“Z”型演變軌跡137-138        4.4.2 制度變遷分析：農(nóng)戶作為制度“邊緣人”,中央政府與地方政府之間的強權(quán)政治博弈138-142        4.4.3 結(jié)論與政策建議：內(nèi)生誘致性市場交易替代外生強制性政府行為142-1465. 中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行體制改革問題146-168    5.1 農(nóng)業(yè)政策性銀行研究的焦點及爭論146-150        5.1.1 關(guān)于政策性銀行的職能定位146-147        5.1.2 關(guān)于政策性銀行的出路147-148        5.1.3 關(guān)于政策性與銀行性的關(guān)系148-149        5.1.4 關(guān)于農(nóng)村金融機構(gòu)的相互關(guān)系149-150    5.2 主要問題150-152    5.3 農(nóng)村政策性銀行制度函數(shù)152-164        5.3.1 農(nóng)村政策性銀行的地位(制度函數(shù))152-155        5.3.2 農(nóng)村政策性銀行的性質(zhì)155-157        5.3.3 農(nóng)村政策性銀行的目標157-159        5.3.4 農(nóng)村政策性銀行的功能159-163        5.3.5 農(nóng)村政策性銀行的公信力163-164    5.4 制度函數(shù)的解釋(改革主張)164-168        5.4.1 金融市場有效性與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的改革目標164        5.4.2 國家效用與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的業(yè)務范圍164-166        5.4.3 金融供給與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的經(jīng)營方式166        5.4.4 金融有效需求與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的金融創(chuàng)新166        5.4.5 國家成本與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的經(jīng)營條件166-167        5.4.6 公信力與中國農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展銀行的內(nèi)控和激勵機制167-1686. 民間金融：范疇、土壤、運行與發(fā)展趨勢168-217    6.1 我國民間金融研究現(xiàn)狀概述168-172        6.1.1 民間金融的合理性與必要性研究168-170        6.1.2 民間金融發(fā)展的障礙分析170        6.1.3 民間金融發(fā)展的前景及對策研究170-172    6.2 國內(nèi)外民間金融研究的范疇比較172-179        6.2.1 民間金融與非正式金融172-174        6.2.2 民間金融、官辦金融與民營金融174-177        6.2.3 民間金融的界定177-179    6.3 農(nóng)村民間金融發(fā)展與創(chuàng)新的歷史脈絡和政策法規(guī)背景179-182    6.4 我國農(nóng)村民間金融存在和發(fā)展的深層次原因182-191        6.4.1 “生存經(jīng)濟”與農(nóng)村金融的財政性質(zhì)182-184        6.4.2 農(nóng)業(yè)與非農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟的區(qū)別184        6.4.3 高昂的成本184-186        6.4.4 農(nóng)村金融的高風險性186-189        6.4.5 社會資本的存在189-191    6.5 非正規(guī)金融運行機制和內(nèi)、外部風險控制分析191-201        6.5.1 運行機制分析191-196        6.5.2 風險源和內(nèi)部風險控制分析196-199        6.5.3 一個案例的實證分析199-201    6.6 民間金融效率的分析201-206        6.6.1 金融市場與金融效率的互動機制201-202        6.6.2 農(nóng)村民間金融效率分析202-206    6.7 民間金融的發(fā)展趨勢206-211    6.8 政策建議211-2177. 中國農(nóng)戶的金融偏好與信貸安排——基于農(nóng)戶行為特征的一個理論框架217-242    7.1 引言：視角、單元與路徑217-219    7.2 中國農(nóng)戶：行為解讀219-225        7.2.1 認識農(nóng)戶：經(jīng)典理論與評析219-222        7.2.2 農(nóng)戶與國家222-224        7.2.3 農(nóng)戶與家庭224-225    7.3 我國農(nóng)戶的特征225-227    7.4 農(nóng)戶“借貸難”問題產(chǎn)生的根源——信任匱乏227-231    7.5 農(nóng)戶金融偏好：籌資次序231-233    7.6 中國農(nóng)戶借貸來源的選擇與使用行為——實證分析233-237        7.6.1 全國典型調(diào)查農(nóng)戶借貸來源構(gòu)成233-235        7.6.2 全國典型調(diào)查農(nóng)戶借貸使用行為235-237    7.7 中國農(nóng)戶的金融需求與信貸安排237-240    7.8 一些說明240-2428. 中小企業(yè)融資困境：本質(zhì)解讀與破解思路——基于農(nóng)村信任結(jié)構(gòu)視角的研究242-258    8.1 相關(guān)研究回顧242-244    8.2 二重結(jié)構(gòu)與特殊主義244-246    8.3 中國農(nóng)村社會的家庭圈層結(jié)構(gòu)與信任結(jié)構(gòu)246-248    8.4 中小企業(yè)融資困境的本質(zhì)：信用困境248-250    8.5 內(nèi)生性關(guān)系型貸款：破解中小企業(yè)融資困境新思路250-258        8.5.1 關(guān)系型貸款250-251        8.5.2 關(guān)系型貸款在我國的實踐251-253        8.5.3 我國中小企業(yè)關(guān)系型借貸制度的構(gòu)建原則253-255        8.5.4 我國中小企業(yè)內(nèi)生性關(guān)系型借貸制度的構(gòu)建思路255-2589. 農(nóng)村內(nèi)生主導型金融金融監(jiān)管主體的再造：政府參與的方式與途徑258-273    9.1 政府參與的邊界：產(chǎn)生外部性的金融公共領(lǐng)域與信息問題引起的市場失靈260-263        9.1.1 金融物品：公共物品還是私人物品260-262        9.1.2 信息不對稱造成的市場失靈262-263    9.2 農(nóng)村金融制度演變中政府的作用國際經(jīng)驗263-264    9.3 政府在內(nèi)生主導金融體系的作用：我國農(nóng)村金融成長中政府定位264-269        9.3.1 “硬政府”、“軟政府”與“適度政府”265        9.3.2 “適度政府”與我國農(nóng)村金融增長265-267        9.3.3 合理界定政府、商業(yè)性金融和合作金融組織的行為邊界267-268        9.3.4 保持農(nóng)村金融成長中政府行為適度性的政策建議268-269    9.4 政府對內(nèi)生性金融成長模式運行的適度監(jiān)管269-273參考文獻273-279后記279-280致謝280-281在讀期間科研成果目錄281-282

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