本文選題：股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán) + 對內(nèi)效力�。� 參考：《浙江大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)作為特殊法定優(yōu)先權(quán)的一種,通過對股東轉(zhuǎn)讓股權(quán)的自由進行限制來保護有限責(zé)任公司的人合性。股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)糾紛頻繁發(fā)生,該類案件在司法實踐中常出現(xiàn)同案不同判的困境。筆者對相關(guān)案件裁判從對內(nèi)、對外效力兩個角度進行梳理,對內(nèi)效力糾紛主要集中在其他股東作出行使優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的意思表示,是否能夠直接與轉(zhuǎn)讓股東之間形成股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓合同,在法院判決撤銷轉(zhuǎn)讓股東與第三人間的股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議或者轉(zhuǎn)讓股東與第三人協(xié)商解除轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議之后,其他股東是否還能行使優(yōu)先購買權(quán)。對外效力糾紛主要集中在股東未履行公司法或者章程規(guī)定的程序與第三人簽訂的股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議的效力如何,若第三人已經(jīng)在股東名冊上被記載為股東,且股東變更事宜已經(jīng)辦理工商變更登記,其他股東是否還能主張行使優(yōu)先購買權(quán)。司法實踐難以作出相對統(tǒng)一的判決,根源在于立法供應(yīng)不足。通過司法解釋來補足相關(guān)制度是目前比較合適的解決路徑,只有對股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)法律效力相關(guān)問題進行全面梳理,才可能制定出可以妥當(dāng)解決糾紛的司法解釋。股權(quán)的性質(zhì)和股權(quán)變動模式是解決股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)問題的關(guān)鍵。筆者從股權(quán)性質(zhì)出發(fā),股權(quán)是個體性權(quán)利和團體性權(quán)利的統(tǒng)一,兼有請求權(quán)和支配權(quán)的屬性,對股權(quán)變動模式有至關(guān)重要影響。從規(guī)范和學(xué)理角度進行分析股權(quán)變動形式主義模式和單純的意思主義模式都存在問題,筆者認(rèn)為把其他股東同意和放棄優(yōu)先購買權(quán)作為股權(quán)變動生效要件修正的意思主義模式才是合理選擇。在此基礎(chǔ)上,筆者對股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)對內(nèi)、對外效力進行規(guī)范和學(xué)理分析。在對內(nèi)效力方面,股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)在性質(zhì)上應(yīng)采納形成權(quán)說的觀點,其他股東主張優(yōu)先購買權(quán)的,能夠直接與轉(zhuǎn)讓股東之間形成股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓合同,在法院判決撤銷轉(zhuǎn)讓股東與第三人間的股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議或者轉(zhuǎn)讓股東與第三人協(xié)商解除轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議之后,其他股東原則上可以行使優(yōu)先購買權(quán)。在對外效力方面,股東未履行公司法或者章程規(guī)定的程序與第三人簽訂的股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議的效力并不因此而無效,若不存在一般合同無效事由,應(yīng)為有效。若未經(jīng)其他股東同意和放棄優(yōu)先購買權(quán),卻已經(jīng)進行股東名冊變更和工商登記變更,應(yīng)屬錯誤登記,其他股東仍可以行使優(yōu)先購買權(quán)。最后,筆者對股東優(yōu)先購買權(quán)對內(nèi)、對外效力問題進行總結(jié),也對(《公司法》司法解釋四)的相關(guān)規(guī)定進行梳理與反思,提出自己的建議,希望能夠為相關(guān)案件裁判提供參考。
[Abstract]:As a kind of special legal priority, the shareholders' preemption right protects the human nature of limited liability companies by restricting the freedom of shareholders to transfer shares. Shareholders' preemptive right disputes occur frequently, such cases in judicial practice often appear the dilemma of different judgments in the same case. The author combs the judgment of relevant cases from two angles of internal and external effectiveness. The dispute on internal effectiveness mainly focuses on other shareholders' intention to exercise the preemptive right. Whether an equity transfer contract can be formed directly between the transferring shareholder and the transferring shareholder, after the court has decided to revoke the equity transfer agreement between the transferring shareholder and the third party, or after the transferring shareholder has negotiated with the third party to terminate the transfer agreement, Whether other shareholders can still exercise the preemptive right. The dispute over external effectiveness mainly focuses on the effectiveness of the equity transfer agreement signed by the third party with a third party, if the third party has already been recorded as a shareholder in the register of shareholders, if the shareholder has not fulfilled the procedures prescribed in the Company Law or the articles of Association. And the change of shareholders has been registered for industrial and commercial change, other shareholders can also claim to exercise the preemptive right. Judicial practice is difficult to make a relatively uniform decision, the root of which lies in the insufficient supply of legislation. To complement the relevant system through judicial interpretation is a more appropriate way to solve the problem. Only through a comprehensive analysis of the legal effect of shareholders' preemptive right can we formulate a judicial interpretation that can properly resolve disputes. The nature of equity and the mode of equity change are the key to solve the problem of shareholders' preemption right. Starting from the nature of equity, equity is the unity of individual right and group right, which has the attributes of both claim right and control right, which has a vital influence on the mode of stock right change. From the angle of normative and theoretical analysis, there are problems in both the formalism mode of equity change and the pure intention doctrine model. The author thinks that it is the reasonable choice to take the consent of other shareholders and the waiver of the preemption right as the amendment of the effective elements of the stock change. On this basis, the author makes normative and theoretical analysis on the internal and external effectiveness of shareholders' preemption right. In terms of internal effectiveness, shareholders' preemption rights should adopt the viewpoint of forming rights in nature. If other shareholders advocate preemption rights, they can form a contract for the transfer of shares directly with the transferring shareholders. Other shareholders may, in principle, exercise the preemptive right after the court has decided to revoke the equity transfer agreement between the transferring shareholder and the third party or the transfer shareholder to negotiate with the third party to terminate the transfer agreement. In the aspect of external effectiveness, the shareholder's failure to perform the procedure stipulated in the Company Law or the procedure stipulated in the articles of Association and the effect of the equity transfer agreement signed by the third party are not invalidated because of this. If there is no reason for the general contract to be invalid, it shall be valid. If the prior purchase right has been changed without the consent of other shareholders and the change of business registration has been made, it should be wrong to register, and other shareholders can still exercise the preemptive right. Finally, the author summarizes the issues of the shareholder's preemptive right to domestic and external effectiveness, and also combs and reflects on the relevant provisions of (the fourth judicial interpretation of Company Law), and puts forward his own suggestions, hoping to provide a reference for the relevant cases adjudication.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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