本文選題：上市公司 + 大股東��； 參考：《安徽大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：大股東及高管減持股份在股權(quán)分置改革完成后已成為了中國股市的新常態(tài),但對于眾多中小投資者來說,大股東近乎瘋狂減持套現(xiàn)卻是股市的一道噩夢,也嚴重動搖了市場信心。同時,它也折射出了我國證券立法的一些缺陷。分析上市公司大股東及高管惡性減持現(xiàn)象現(xiàn)有的法律規(guī)制情況,完善上市公司大股東及高管減持行為相關(guān)法律制度已成為我國證券市場亟需加以解決的一個重要問題。對大股東及高管減持行為進行分析是解決問題的前提和基礎(chǔ)。包括需對大股東及高管的定義進行界定,對大股東與相關(guān)概念進行區(qū)別,以及界定需要法律規(guī)制的惡性減持。明確大股東及高管減持行為的相關(guān)概念是分析上市公司大股東減持法律規(guī)制理論的基礎(chǔ)。在厘清相關(guān)概念、對大股東及高管減持行為有了全面的把握后,研究大股東減持的動因;進而分析大股東及高管減持行為的消極效應(yīng)與積極效應(yīng),得出對其進行法律規(guī)制的必要性。我國現(xiàn)行的關(guān)于規(guī)制大股東及高管減持行為的法律規(guī)范雖然總量較多,但是仍存在規(guī)制不到位的情況。目前可能存在的問題主要表現(xiàn)為信息披露制度不完善如減持披露未形成統(tǒng)一規(guī)則;內(nèi)幕交易制度不完善如違規(guī)減持與內(nèi)幕交易難以區(qū)分界定;高管減持法律規(guī)制的不到位如減持鎖定期規(guī)定單一;以及協(xié)議交易制不完善如對大宗交易減持缺乏限制規(guī)定,協(xié)議轉(zhuǎn)讓方式減持存在漏洞。從域外來看,美國及我國臺灣地區(qū)都構(gòu)建了一套相對比較完善的制度來規(guī)制大股東及高管減持。鑒此,有必要在借鑒域外先進立法例的基礎(chǔ)上提出完善我國上市公司大股東及高管減持行為法律規(guī)制的建議。首先完善信息披露制度如建立嚴格的大股東及高管減持預(yù)披露制度;其次完善內(nèi)幕交易的相關(guān)規(guī)定如完善推定原則;再次完善高管離職減持的相關(guān)規(guī)定,如完善高管離職減持的鎖定期;最后完善協(xié)議交易制的相關(guān)規(guī)定,如完善大宗交易及協(xié)議轉(zhuǎn)讓的相關(guān)規(guī)定。
[Abstract]:Major shareholders and senior executives have become the new normal in China's stock market after the completion of the split share structure reform. However, for many small and medium-sized investors, the near-frenzied reduction of large shareholders' holdings is a nightmare for the stock market. Also seriously shaken the market confidence. At the same time, it also reflects some defects of China's securities legislation. It has become an important problem for the securities market of our country to analyze the existing legal regulations on the malignant reduction of large shareholders and executives of listed companies and to improve the legal system related to the behavior of major shareholders and senior executives of listed companies. It is the premise and foundation to solve the problem by analyzing the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives. It includes the definition of large shareholders and executives, the difference between major shareholders and related concepts, and the definition of malignant reduction that needs legal regulation. It is the basis of analyzing the legal regulation theory of large shareholder reduction in listed companies to clarify the related concepts of the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives. After clarifying the relevant concepts and having a comprehensive grasp of the behavior of major shareholders and senior executives, this paper studies the motivation of the reduction of large shareholders, and then analyzes the negative and positive effects of the reduction of large shareholders and senior executives. It comes to the necessity of legal regulation. Although there are more legal regulations to regulate the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives in our country, there are still some problems in the regulation. At present, the possible problems are that the information disclosure system is not perfect, such as the reduction of information disclosure is not a uniform rule, the insider trading system is not perfect, such as illegal reduction and insider trading is difficult to be defined. If the legal regulation of senior management reduction is not in place, such as the reduction lock period regulation is single, and the agreement trading system is not perfect, such as the lack of restrictions on the bulk trading reduction, there are loopholes in the way of agreement transfer reduction. Outside China, both the United States and Taiwan have established a relatively perfect system to regulate the reduction of large shareholders and senior executives. In view of this, it is necessary to put forward some suggestions to perfect the legal regulation of the behavior of large shareholders and senior executives of listed companies in China on the basis of drawing lessons from foreign advanced legislation. First of all, improve the information disclosure system, such as the establishment of a strict system of major shareholders and executives to reduce the pre-disclosure system; secondly, improve the relevant provisions of insider trading such as perfecting the principle of presumption; third, improve the relevant provisions of senior management turnover and reduction of holdings, Such as perfecting the lock-up period of senior management turnover reduction and finally perfecting the relevant provisions of the agreement trading system, such as perfecting the relevant provisions of bulk trading and agreement transfer.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D922.287

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