【摘要】：近年來,在我國建筑業(yè)迅速發(fā)展的同時,建筑市場信用秩序混亂,市場主體信用意識薄弱,信用環(huán)境惡化等問題日益顯現(xiàn),導致整個社會資源使用效率降低。監(jiān)理工程師是建筑市場重要的參與主體之一,其失信行為嚴重威脅了建設工程的質(zhì)量和安全,擾亂了建筑市場秩序。因此,如何約束和規(guī)范監(jiān)理工程師的市場行為,構(gòu)建有效的信用治理體系顯得尤為重要。本文以監(jiān)理工程師為研究對象,針對當前執(zhí)業(yè)資格人員信用體系不完善、委托人監(jiān)督效率低等問題,運用區(qū)間直覺模糊集、模糊偏好語言、委托代理模型、博弈論、心理契約等理論知識,從顯性激勵與隱性激勵相結(jié)合的角度,對監(jiān)理工程師的信用行為進行短期治理和長期治理,論文的主要內(nèi)容和創(chuàng)新概括如下:(1)考慮各利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)重不同,分別基于區(qū)間直覺模糊集和二元語義模糊偏好評價集構(gòu)建監(jiān)理工程師信用評價模型,結(jié)果表明區(qū)間直覺模糊集可以較好地反映各信用指標信息之間的差異程度,避免各利益相關(guān)者由于內(nèi)在主觀性所導致的偏差;二元語義模糊偏好評價集更貼近評審專家的思維過程和自然語言表達方式。(2)在監(jiān)理工程師自利偏好基礎(chǔ)上,運用靜態(tài)博弈構(gòu)建業(yè)主與監(jiān)理工程師之間的多任務協(xié)調(diào)均衡激勵模型,模型分析表明,業(yè)主對監(jiān)理工程師激勵強度的設定受其風險規(guī)避度、努力水平的可觀測度及邊際成本、信用偏好的影響;另外,通過構(gòu)建業(yè)主、監(jiān)理工程師和承包商間的三方博弈模型,發(fā)現(xiàn)監(jiān)理工程師是否選擇守信,與業(yè)主的監(jiān)督成本、監(jiān)督概率、業(yè)主對其違規(guī)行為進行懲罰的金額有關(guān)。(3)在監(jiān)理工程師公平心理偏好基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建業(yè)主和監(jiān)理工程師間的最優(yōu)風險分擔與激勵契約模型,探究公平心理偏好和信用偏好對最優(yōu)風險分擔與激勵契約的影響。研究結(jié)果表明:監(jiān)理工程師風險分擔與其公平心理偏好正相關(guān),與信用偏好負相關(guān),若保持公平心理偏好和信用偏好適度均衡,則業(yè)主只需對監(jiān)理工程師提供固定薪酬契約即可達到帕累托最優(yōu)。(4)考慮監(jiān)理工程師的異質(zhì)性心理特征,構(gòu)建心理契約與其信用行為作用機理的結(jié)構(gòu)方程模型,從隱性契約的視角對監(jiān)理工程師進行長期信用治理。研究結(jié)果表明,心理契約、組織承諾和組織公平感由工作滿意度間接影響監(jiān)理工程師的信用行為;工作滿意度對監(jiān)理工程師的信用行為有正向顯著影響。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of the construction industry in China, the credit order of the construction market is chaotic, the credit consciousness of the main body of the market is weak, and the credit environment is deteriorating, which leads to the decrease of the utilization efficiency of the whole social resources. The supervision engineer is one of the important participants in the construction market, whose dishonesty seriously threatens the quality and safety of the construction project and disturbs the order of the construction market. Therefore, how to restrict and standardize the market behavior of supervision engineers and build an effective credit management system is particularly important. This paper takes supervisory engineer as the research object, aiming at the problems of imperfect credit system and low efficiency of client supervision, using interval intuitionistic fuzzy set, fuzzy preference language, principal-agent model, game theory, etc. From the angle of combination of explicit incentive and implicit incentive, the theory of psychological contract is used to deal with the credit behavior of supervision engineer in the short and long term. The main contents and innovations of this paper are summarized as follows: (1) considering the different weights of stakeholders, the credit evaluation model of supervision engineer is constructed based on interval intuitionistic fuzzy set and binary semantic fuzzy preference evaluation set, respectively. The results show that interval intuitionistic fuzzy sets can better reflect the degree of difference between credit index information and avoid the deviation caused by internal subjectivity of stakeholders. The binary semantic fuzzy preference evaluation set is closer to the process of thinking and natural language expression of the evaluation experts. (2) based on the self-interest preference of the supervision engineer, A multi-task coordinated and balanced incentive model between the owner and the supervisory engineer is constructed by using static game. The model analysis shows that the incentive intensity of the employer is set by its risk aversion, the observability of the effort level and the marginal cost. In addition, by constructing the tripartite game model between the owner, the supervision engineer and the contractor, the author finds out whether the supervision engineer chooses to keep his word, the supervision cost with the owner, and the supervision probability. (3) on the basis of the supervision engineer's fair psychological preference, the optimal risk sharing and incentive contract model between the owner and the supervision engineer is constructed. This paper probes into the influence of fairness psychological preference and credit preference on optimal risk sharing and incentive contract. The results show that the risk sharing of supervision engineers is positively correlated with their fair psychological preferences and negatively correlated with their credit preferences. Then the employer can achieve the Pareto optimum only by offering the fixed salary contract to the supervision engineer. (4) considering the heterogeneous psychological characteristics of the supervision engineer, the structure equation model of the psychological contract and its credit action mechanism is established. From the perspective of recessive contract, the supervision engineer has long-term credit management. The results show that psychological contract, organizational commitment and sense of organizational fairness indirectly affect the credit behavior of supervisory engineer by job satisfaction, and job satisfaction has a positive and significant effect on the credit behavior of supervisory engineer.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F426.92

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