本文選題：農(nóng)村生活垃圾 + 集中處理　； 參考：《西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展和城鎮(zhèn)化水平的不斷提高,農(nóng)村地區(qū)生活垃圾處理問題日益受到各界廣泛關(guān)注。我國農(nóng)村人口占全國人口總數(shù)達45%,農(nóng)村垃圾產(chǎn)生量為年均1.5億噸左右,其中只有50%的垃圾得到處理,而未經(jīng)處理的垃圾則隨意堆放,垃圾污染狀況日益嚴重。據(jù)住房和城鄉(xiāng)建設(shè)部初步統(tǒng)計,截至2013年底,全國58.8萬個行政村中,對生活垃圾進行處理的有21.8萬個,僅占37%。農(nóng)村垃圾治理面臨著極其艱巨的任務(wù)。農(nóng)村生活垃圾的隨意排放導(dǎo)致鄉(xiāng)村自然環(huán)境受到較大影響,而且對居民身體健康、生態(tài)環(huán)境的持續(xù)發(fā)展造成巨大威脅,不利于農(nóng)村居民生活質(zhì)量的改善和農(nóng)村地區(qū)資源環(huán)境與經(jīng)濟的協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展。2016年中央一號文件指出,繼續(xù)推進農(nóng)村環(huán)境綜合整治,開展農(nóng)村人居環(huán)境治理。實施農(nóng)村生活垃圾治理5年專項行動,采取城鎮(zhèn)管網(wǎng)延伸、集中處理和分散處理等多種方式,加快農(nóng)村生活垃圾處理和改廁。農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理不但有利于垃圾綜合治理、減少處置費用,還可以提高垃圾資源化水平,從而達到垃圾減量化、資源循環(huán)化的終極目標。在理論上,西方學(xué)者提出了形形色色的治理理論,這就需要結(jié)合我國農(nóng)村社區(qū)的實際情況,對這些新理論進行分析和甄別,用以解決我國農(nóng)村生活垃圾處理問題。而在我國,隨著政府職能從經(jīng)濟建設(shè)型政府向公共服務(wù)型政府的轉(zhuǎn)變,有些地方已對農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理處理機制與環(huán)境管理模式進行了創(chuàng)新性的實驗,需要對這些實踐探索進行理論反思和論證。目前,國內(nèi)學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)于農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理的理論成果多數(shù)基于西方發(fā)達國家的背景,或是參考城市生活垃圾處理模式設(shè)計農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理機制,如何針對我國農(nóng)村社區(qū)生活垃圾產(chǎn)生特點及其處理所面臨的問題尋找解決途徑和對策,形成農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理處理機制的相關(guān)理論和創(chuàng)新方案,是農(nóng)村環(huán)境管理與公共政策研究的當務(wù)之急。因此,本研究基于集體行動視角,在對環(huán)境公共服務(wù)及農(nóng)戶合作行為等相關(guān)文獻進行全面分析的前提下,研究農(nóng)戶層面生活垃圾集中處理合作的困境、農(nóng)戶參與行為、合作供給的效果評價以及合作制度的創(chuàng)新,為促進農(nóng)村環(huán)境改善與環(huán)境公共物品供給模式創(chuàng)新提供理論與實證依據(jù)。首先,系統(tǒng)梳理公共物品、集體行動以及農(nóng)戶行為等參考文獻,分析我國農(nóng)村生活垃圾處理狀況,考察調(diào)研區(qū)農(nóng)戶參與生活垃圾集中處理的現(xiàn)狀。其次,針對生活垃圾集中處理存在的現(xiàn)實問題,分析農(nóng)村生活垃圾處理合作供給中農(nóng)戶的意愿與行為,從農(nóng)戶意愿與行為悖離的角度,探求導(dǎo)致集體行動困境的成因。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),合作困境主要是由社會環(huán)境與農(nóng)戶自身因素導(dǎo)致。因此,從農(nóng)戶所處社會環(huán)境視角,分析公共空間、社會資本對農(nóng)戶參與生活垃圾集中處理合作行為的影響,分析農(nóng)戶參與生活垃圾集體行動的合作行為。在此基礎(chǔ)上,從農(nóng)戶自身異質(zhì)性的視角,采用logit模型測度社會資本異質(zhì)性、人力資本異質(zhì)性、偏好異質(zhì)性等因素對生活垃圾集中處理農(nóng)戶合作行為的影響。構(gòu)建農(nóng)戶合作參與農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理效果的綜合評價指標體系,采用模糊綜合評價法分析生活垃圾集中處理農(nóng)戶合作的效果,最后提出提高農(nóng)戶合作行為、促進農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理合作供給制度創(chuàng)新的政策建議,為政府環(huán)境公共政策創(chuàng)新提供決策參考。本文研究的主要結(jié)論如下:第一,農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理是解決農(nóng)村環(huán)境公共物品集體行動困境的有效方式。農(nóng)村生活垃圾的集中處理,是一種與農(nóng)民生產(chǎn)生活休戚相關(guān)的小規(guī)模公共物品,具有非排他性與非競爭性等特征。由于政府供給低效率與市場供給缺乏動力等原因,合作供給模式不僅在實現(xiàn)上成為可能,而且由于是一種自下而上的自主行為,在效率上能有效克服交易成本過高或供給不足的問題,很適合于農(nóng)村公共產(chǎn)品的供給。值得注意的是這種模式容易發(fā)生“集體行動的困境”。實現(xiàn)農(nóng)村人居環(huán)境協(xié)同治理,需要農(nóng)戶、社區(qū)與政府的共同參與,實現(xiàn)個體利益與集體利益的兼容,而農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理正是實現(xiàn)集體行動的理想模式。因此,探究農(nóng)戶合作行為,分析農(nóng)戶在組織發(fā)起以及合作過程中的參與邏輯就成為促成生活垃圾集中處理合作供給的關(guān)鍵。第二,意愿與行為的悖離往往導(dǎo)致農(nóng)村環(huán)境治理集體行動的困境。實證分析結(jié)果表明集體與個體之間的利益扭曲是導(dǎo)致集體行動困境的根本原因。從不同影響因素的重要程度與相互作用關(guān)系來看,農(nóng)戶認知和農(nóng)戶個人特征是表層、中層影響因素,社會因素是悖離的深層影響因素。對于這種層次結(jié)構(gòu)的形成原因,主要是由于生活垃圾的集中處理作為準公共物品,根據(jù)農(nóng)戶的“理性”,往往采取“搭便車”的策略以獲取收益最大化。因而在悖離的表層及中層因素中,其最直接的影響因素即為根據(jù)自身狀況和自身特征所考慮的經(jīng)濟因素。生活垃圾的集中處理本質(zhì)上是以一定場域為基礎(chǔ)的農(nóng)戶公共物品的合作供給行為,其動態(tài)均衡是個體因素與農(nóng)戶決策社會環(huán)境因素相互作用的結(jié)果。農(nóng)戶意愿與行為的悖離正是由于合作行為的關(guān)鍵環(huán)境變量,農(nóng)戶交往的橫向結(jié)構(gòu)關(guān)系以及縱向治理關(guān)系改變導(dǎo)致,是社會轉(zhuǎn)型期國家、集體以及個人關(guān)系結(jié)構(gòu)嬗變的結(jié)果。第三,小范圍、高頻、半開放的公共空間對農(nóng)戶生活垃圾集中處理合作供給的形成具有積極影響。實證分析結(jié)果表明,小范圍、半開放以及高頻空間對農(nóng)戶合作意愿的產(chǎn)生以及合作行為的實現(xiàn)具有重要的支撐性作用;社會資本在公共空間引致農(nóng)戶合作行為的過程中具有中介作用,社會資本其本質(zhì)是通過社會中個人和組織的網(wǎng)絡(luò)構(gòu)建及長期的信任規(guī)范約束來實現(xiàn)個人或組織的效益目標。證實了鄉(xiāng)村公共空間——社會資本——集體行動這一鏈條機制的存在。而當前政府、市場、社會彼此之間良性互動是農(nóng)村自主性公共空間發(fā)展的有效途徑。農(nóng)村社區(qū)生活垃圾集中處理存在內(nèi)源性激勵強度不足的問題,外源性激勵制度的引進成為一種必要,即需要依靠正式制度安排和社區(qū)非正式制度安排實現(xiàn)農(nóng)村集體行動的成本分擔與收益分享、對合作行為給予鼓勵以及對機會主義行為給予懲罰。第四,異質(zhì)性對農(nóng)戶參與生活垃圾集中處理的影響主要體現(xiàn)在農(nóng)戶基于自身資源稟賦、偏好、人力資本以及社會資本異質(zhì)性,對集體行動參與的成本——收益進行評估,并將個體的異質(zhì)性嵌入群體的社會結(jié)構(gòu)中,從而形成共享的或互補的利益格局促使集體行動的不斷持續(xù)。因而,農(nóng)戶合作行為是個人特征、社區(qū)因素、制度環(huán)境以及社會資本等個體與環(huán)境約束相互作用的結(jié)果。從農(nóng)戶異質(zhì)性視角探討集體行動的農(nóng)戶參與邏輯,研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)資源稟賦異質(zhì)性與農(nóng)戶的參與行為負相關(guān);人力資本異質(zhì)性對農(nóng)戶的合作參與行為影響并不顯著;社會資本異質(zhì)性各維度中,網(wǎng)絡(luò)異質(zhì)性與農(nóng)戶的合作參與行為正相關(guān),而信任異質(zhì)性與農(nóng)戶的合作參與行為負相關(guān)。此外,性別、村中職務(wù)及垃圾處理的及時程度均對農(nóng)戶的生活垃圾合作參與行為產(chǎn)生顯著影響。第五,對農(nóng)戶合作參與農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理效果的分析結(jié)果表明,村莊的自然條件、經(jīng)濟水平與社會資本是生活垃圾集中處理效果的外部主要影響因素。環(huán)保意識與集體行動的參與水平是保障農(nóng)村生活垃圾治理效果的關(guān)鍵因素,而受教育程度的提升與家庭經(jīng)濟狀況的改善有利于提高農(nóng)戶的參與水平�？傮w而言,垃圾處理清潔程度仍需提高,加強對環(huán)境的治理力度是下一步的努力方向。不同治理主體之間由于資源因素、信息溝通、利益紐帶不同而導(dǎo)致行動的組織成本較高,不同主體決策目標的差異導(dǎo)致治理行為中資源配置方式與組織效率的下降,從而一定程度上降低了集體行動的效果。因此,應(yīng)從供給決策、資金籌集和合作維持三個方面構(gòu)建提高農(nóng)村生活垃圾集中處理供給效果的政策保障機制。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the rural economy and the continuous improvement of the level of urbanization, the problem of garbage disposal in rural areas is increasingly concerned by all walks of life. China's rural population accounts for 45% of the total population of the country, and the amount of rural garbage is about 1.5 million tons per year, of which only 50% of the garbage is treated, while the untreated garbage is randomly stacked. According to the preliminary statistics of the Ministry of housing and urban and rural construction, as of the end of 2013, 218 thousand of the 588 thousand administrative villages in the country have been treated for domestic waste, and only 37%. rural garbage disposal is facing extremely arduous tasks. The free discharge of rural domestic waste leads to the greater impact of the rural natural environment. Moreover, it poses a great threat to the health of the residents and the sustainable development of the ecological environment. It is not conducive to the improvement of the quality of life of the rural residents and the coordinated development of the resources, environment and economy in rural areas. It is pointed out in the central No. 1 document of.2016 that the comprehensive renovation of the rural environment and the management of the rural residential environment should be continued. In the 5 year special action, a variety of ways, such as urban pipe network extension, centralized treatment and dispersion treatment, are adopted to accelerate the treatment of rural domestic waste and change the toilet. The centralized treatment of rural domestic garbage can not only benefit the comprehensive treatment of garbage, reduce the cost of disposal, but also improve the level of garbage resources, thus achieving the ultimate waste reduction and the ultimate recycling of resources. In theory, western scholars have put forward a variety of governance theories, which need to be analyzed and discriminated against the actual situation of rural communities in China to solve the problem of rural domestic waste treatment in our country. In China, with the government function from the economic construction government to the public service government, the government functions in China. In some places, some innovative experiments have been carried out on the centralized disposal and environmental management mode of rural domestic waste, and the theoretical reflection and demonstration of these practical exploration are needed. At present, most of the theoretical results about the centralized treatment of rural domestic waste are based on the background of the western developed countries, or the reference to urban students. The mode of living garbage disposal is designed to design the centralized disposal mechanism of rural domestic waste, and how to find solutions and Countermeasures against the problems faced by the rural community living garbage in our country and the countermeasures to form the centralized disposal mechanism of rural domestic waste, which is the study of rural environmental management and public policy. Therefore, based on the collective action perspective, this study is based on the comprehensive analysis of the relevant literature on environmental public services and farmers' cooperative behavior, and studies the dilemma of the centralized disposal of domestic waste at the peasant household level, the participation of farmers, the evaluation of the effect of Cooperative Supply and the innovation of the cooperative system, in order to promote the Rural ring. The improvement of environment and the innovation of environmental public goods supply model provide theoretical and empirical basis. First, it systematically combs the reference documents of public goods, collective action and farmers' behavior, analyzes the status of rural household garbage disposal in China, and inspects the present situation of farmers' participation in the concentration of domestic garbage in the investigation area. Secondly, the centralized disposal of domestic waste is carried out. In the real problem, we analyze the farmers' will and behavior in the cooperative supply of rural domestic waste, and find out the causes of the dilemma of collective action from the angle of farmers' willingness and behavior. The research finds that the cooperation dilemma is mainly caused by the social environment and the farmers' own factors. Therefore, the analysis of the public from the perspective of the social environment of the peasant household is to analyze the public. On the basis of the heterogeneity of farmers, logit model is used to measure the heterogeneity of social capital, heterogeneity of human capital and preference heterogeneity to the collection of domestic garbage on the basis of the heterogeneity of farmers. The comprehensive evaluation index system of farmers' cooperative participation in the centralized treatment of rural domestic waste is constructed, and the effect of living garbage concentrating on the cooperation of farmers is analyzed by the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method. Finally, it is proposed to improve the cooperative behavior of farmers and promote the centralized treatment of rural domestic waste by the cooperative supply system. The new policy recommendations provide a reference for the government's environmental public policy innovation. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the centralized treatment of rural domestic waste is an effective way to solve the dilemma of collective action of rural environmental public goods. The centralized treatment of rural domestic waste is a small scale that is closely related to the production and life of farmers. Public goods have the characteristics of non exclusiveness and non competition. Because of the low efficiency of government supply and the lack of power of the market supply, the cooperative supply mode is not only possible in the realization, but also because it is a bottom-up act of autonomy, which can effectively overcome the problem of high transaction cost or insufficient supply in efficiency. It is important to pay attention to the supply of rural public goods. It is worth noting that this model is easy to take place "the dilemma of collective action". To realize the cooperative governance of rural human living environment, it is necessary for farmers, community and government to participate together to realize the compatibility of individual interests and collective interests, and the centralized treatment of rural domestic waste is an ideal model for the realization of collective action. Therefore, exploring the cooperative behavior of farmers, analyzing the participation logic in the process of organization and cooperation, is the key to promote the centralized management of the supply of domestic waste. Second, the contradiction between willingness and behavior often leads to the dilemma of collective action in rural environmental governance. The results of empirical analysis show the interest distortion between the collective and the individual. It is the fundamental cause of the dilemma of collective action. From the perspective of the importance and interaction of different factors, the cognition of farmers and the individual characteristics of farmers are surface, middle level, and social factors are the deep influence factors. The primary cause of the formation of this hierarchy is mainly due to the centralized disposal of domestic waste. For the quasi public goods, the "hitchhiker" strategy is often adopted to maximize the income of the farmers. Therefore, the most direct influencing factors are the economic factors which are considered according to their own conditions and their own characteristics in the contrary surface and middle level factors. The concentration treatment of the domestic waste is essentially a certain field. The dynamic equilibrium is the result of the interaction between the individual factors and the social environmental factors of the farmers. The contradiction between the farmers' willingness and behavior is due to the key environmental variables of the cooperative behavior, the horizontal structure relationship of the peasant household and the change of the vertical governance relationship, which is the social transformation period. Third, small scope, high frequency and semi open public space have a positive impact on the formation of Cooperative Supply for household garbage disposal. The results of empirical analysis show that small scope, semi open and high frequency space for farmers' cooperative willingness to produce and the realization of cooperative behavior are achieved. The social capital plays an intermediary role in the process of the cooperative behavior of farmers in public space. The essence of social capital is to realize the benefit goal of individual or organization through the network construction of individual and organization in the society and the long-term trust regulation, which proves the rural public space - social capital - The mechanism of collective action is a chain mechanism. And the current government, the market, the social interaction between each other is an effective way for the development of the rural autonomous public space. The centralized treatment of rural community living garbage has the problem of insufficient endogenous incentive intensity. The introduction of exogenous incentive system is necessary, that is, it needs to rely on the formal system. Degree arrangement and informal community system arrangement to share the cost sharing and income sharing in rural collective action, encourage the cooperative behavior and punish the opportunism. Fourth, the influence of heterogeneity on the centralized disposal of household garbage is mainly reflected in the peasant household's natural resource endowment, preference, human capital and society. With the heterogeneity of capital, it evaluates the cost and income of collective action, and embeds individual heterogeneity into the social structure of the group, thus forming a shared or complementary interest pattern that encourages the continuous continuation of collective action. Therefore, the cooperative behavior of farmers is a personal characteristic, community factor, institutional environment and social capital. The result of the interaction between the body and the environment constraints. From the perspective of farmers' heterogeneity, the paper explores the logic of farmers' participation in collective action. The results show that the heterogeneity of resource endowment is negatively related to the participation behavior of farmers; the heterogeneity of human capital has no significant influence on the cooperative participation behavior of the farmers; the heterogeneity of the social capital heterogeneity and the network heterogeneity The behavior of farmers' cooperation and participation is positively related, and the heterogeneity of trust is negatively related to the cooperative participation of farmers. In addition, gender, the timely degree of village duties and garbage disposal have a significant impact on the cooperative participation of farmers' living garbage. Fifth, the result of farmers' cooperative participation in the centralized treatment of rural household garbage disposal results. The natural conditions of the village, the economic level and the social capital are the main external factors of the concentrated treatment effect of the living garbage. The awareness of the environmental protection and the participation level of the collective action are the key factors to guarantee the effect of the rural domestic waste treatment, and the promotion of education and the improvement of the family economic conditions are beneficial to the improvement of the participation of the farmers. Level. In general, the cleaning degree of garbage disposal still needs to be improved, and the strengthening of environmental governance is the next step. The organizational cost of the action is higher because of the resource factors, information communication, and the different interest ties. The difference of the decision goals of different subjects leads to the allocation of resources in the governance behavior. With the decline of organizational efficiency, the effect of collective action is reduced to a certain extent. Therefore, we should construct policy guarantee mechanism to improve the supply effect of rural domestic waste centralized treatment from three aspects: supply decision, fund raising and cooperation maintenance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：X799.3;F323.6
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本文編號：1922445