本文關(guān)鍵詞：不完全契約理論視角下的農(nóng)戶信用行為研究　出處：《西北大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 不完全契約 農(nóng)戶 信用行為 財(cái)富 自我履約機(jī)制 再談判機(jī)制

【摘要】：農(nóng)村金融肩負(fù)著為“三農(nóng)”發(fā)展提供金融服務(wù)的重要使命,但是受到農(nóng)民財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)利不完全的束縛,農(nóng)村信貸制度存在著供需匹配錯(cuò)位問(wèn)題,制約著農(nóng)民收入增長(zhǎng)和農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化發(fā)展。在2016年中央一號(hào)文件中提出“加快構(gòu)建多層次、廣覆蓋、可持續(xù)的農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)體系,發(fā)展農(nóng)村普惠金融,降低融資成本,全面激活農(nóng)村金融服務(wù)鏈條”。普惠金融的“機(jī)會(huì)平等”體現(xiàn)在農(nóng)戶的貸款申請(qǐng)權(quán)利和貸款內(nèi)容上,普惠金融“商業(yè)上的可持續(xù)性”需要控制債務(wù)人違約行為,但是由于缺少可抵押財(cái)產(chǎn),農(nóng)戶的違約機(jī)會(huì)成本低,債權(quán)人對(duì)農(nóng)戶違約行為控制困難。通過(guò)對(duì)已有農(nóng)戶信用行為研究文獻(xiàn)的分析,文獻(xiàn)研究多從信用行為的影響因素進(jìn)行分析,缺乏從農(nóng)戶債務(wù)契約的角度分析農(nóng)戶信用行為。契約治理機(jī)制的研究文獻(xiàn)集中在某一種機(jī)制的研究,沒(méi)有對(duì)契約治理機(jī)制與行為進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)性研究；自我履約機(jī)制和再談判機(jī)制在農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中多集中在農(nóng)業(yè)合作組織和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品銷售行為領(lǐng)域,在農(nóng)戶信用行為的研究中應(yīng)用較少,上述機(jī)制在農(nóng)戶缺少可抵押財(cái)產(chǎn)時(shí)有助于實(shí)現(xiàn)契約的事后效率。由于契約初始階段存在著不可證實(shí)信息,不可能締結(jié)完全契約,本文基于不完全契約理論的視角,將農(nóng)戶的信用行為分為農(nóng)戶的締約行為和農(nóng)戶的履約行為兩階段,構(gòu)建了一個(gè)農(nóng)戶信用行為的理論分析框架,通過(guò)委托代理模型,分別探討農(nóng)戶信用行為的影響因素及其對(duì)契約治理機(jī)制的行為反應(yīng),并基于農(nóng)戶調(diào)研數(shù)據(jù)和案例進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。為解決農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)化的金融支持問(wèn)題,以及保障普惠金融的落實(shí)提供理論上的決策依據(jù)。本文的主要研究結(jié)論有：1.受到財(cái)富約束影響的農(nóng)戶的實(shí)際債務(wù)契約融資成本高于預(yù)期水平,雖然長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)契約關(guān)系有利于農(nóng)戶和債權(quán)人,但是受到勞動(dòng)力轉(zhuǎn)移的影響,債務(wù)契約關(guān)系的短期化加劇農(nóng)戶的融資成本的增加；2.農(nóng)戶的借款決策和借款能力與農(nóng)戶家庭人口數(shù)量正相關(guān),農(nóng)戶經(jīng)濟(jì)作物的土地面積、社會(huì)資本與農(nóng)戶的借款決策正相關(guān),但是影響程度低于家庭人口數(shù)量,農(nóng)戶的借款金額與農(nóng)戶債務(wù)關(guān)系持續(xù)期正相關(guān),農(nóng)戶在借款渠道上仍以正規(guī)金融機(jī)構(gòu)為主,農(nóng)資賒購(gòu)行為雖然普遍存在,但是在回歸分析中沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)對(duì)農(nóng)戶借款決策有影響;3.在自我履約機(jī)制中,聲譽(yù)資本由于受到外生金融制度和社會(huì)保障制度供給不足的限制,影響到自我履約機(jī)制的效率,有抵押物的懲罰對(duì)互惠行為有效,但是在農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保小組內(nèi)的互惠行為效力有限,信貸員工資激勵(lì)制度對(duì)自我履約機(jī)制起到輔助激勵(lì)的作用；4.不同融資渠道的債務(wù)契約彈性不同,農(nóng)戶與債權(quán)人在再談判機(jī)制中受到談判力、對(duì)談判破裂擔(dān)心的程度的影響,達(dá)成的談判結(jié)果不同,契約彈性越大,農(nóng)戶越容易采取侵害債權(quán)人利益的行為,但是自身利益也不能得到保障。
[Abstract]:Rural finance shoulders the important mission of providing financial services for the development of agriculture, rural areas and farmers. However, due to the imperfection of the farmers' property rights, the rural credit system has the problem of mismatch between supply and demand. In the first document of the Central Committee in 2016, "accelerating the construction of a multi-level, broad-based and sustainable rural financial service system, and developing rural inclusive finance" is a constraint on the growth of farmers' income and the development of agricultural industrialization. Reduce the financing cost, activate the rural financial service chain in an all-round way. The "equal opportunity" of inclusive finance is embodied in the farmers' right to apply for loans and the content of loans. Inclusive finance's "commercial sustainability" requires controlling debtors' default, but farmers' opportunity costs for default are low due to a lack of mortgaged property. It is difficult for creditors to control the farmers' breach of contract. Through the analysis of the existing research literature on the credit behavior of farmers, the literature research mostly analyzes the influencing factors of the credit behavior. The research literature of contract governance mechanism focuses on one kind of mechanism, and there is no systematic research on contract governance mechanism and behavior. Self-implementation mechanism and renegotiation mechanism in rural economic research focus on agricultural cooperation organizations and agricultural products sales behavior field, but in the research of farmers' credit behavior, the application is less. The above mechanism is helpful to realize the post-contract efficiency when farmers lack mortgaged property. Due to the existence of unverifiable information in the initial stage of the contract, it is impossible to conclude a complete contract. Based on the perspective of incomplete contract theory, this paper divides the credit behavior of farmers into two stages: the contracting behavior of farmers and the performance behavior of farmers, and constructs a theoretical analysis framework of farmers' credit behavior. Through the principal-agent model, this paper discusses the influencing factors of farmers' credit behavior and their behavior response to the mechanism of contract governance. And based on the survey data and cases of farmers to carry out empirical tests to solve the problem of financial support for agricultural industrialization. And guarantee the implementation of inclusive finance to provide a theoretical basis for decision-making. The main conclusions of this paper are: 1. The actual cost of debt contract financing of farmers affected by wealth constraints is higher than expected. Although long-term debt contract relationship is beneficial to farmers and creditors, but affected by labor transfer, the short-term debt contract relationship intensifies the increase of farmers' financing cost. 2.The borrowing decision and borrowing ability of farmers are positively related to the number of household population, the land area of cash crops and social capital are positively related to the decision-making of borrowing, but the influence degree is lower than the number of household population. The amount of loans of farmers is positively related to the duration of the relationship between farmers' debt. Farmers still rely on formal financial institutions to borrow money, although the behavior of credit purchase of agricultural materials is widespread. But in the regression analysis, there is no influence on the farmers' loan decision; 3. In the self-compliance mechanism, reputation capital is restricted by the insufficient supply of exogenous financial system and social security system, which affects the efficiency of self-implementation mechanism, and the punishment of collateral is effective for reciprocal behavior. However, the effectiveness of reciprocal behavior in the farmers' protection group is limited, and the credit officer's salary incentive system plays an auxiliary role in the self-implementation mechanism. 4. The debt contract elasticity of different financing channels is different. Farmers and creditors are affected by negotiating power in the renegotiation mechanism, and the degree of worry about the breakdown of the negotiations is affected by the different negotiation results, the greater the contractual flexibility is. Farmers are more likely to act against creditors' interests, but their own interests can not be protected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F323.6;F832.43

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