本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于博弈論的居住區(qū)共享停車?yán)碚撆c方法研究　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2017年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 城市交通 共享停車 雙層規(guī)劃 嵌套優(yōu)化算法 停車誘導(dǎo) 居住區(qū)停車

【摘要】：城市機(jī)動(dòng)車保有量劇增與原有停車設(shè)施規(guī)劃不足、配建標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏低、停車管理技術(shù)和方法落后的矛盾導(dǎo)致城市停車?yán)щy。因停車擁擠導(dǎo)致車輛巡游時(shí)間過長、出入口排隊(duì)、違規(guī)占道停車,進(jìn)而引發(fā)交通糾紛、能源消耗和環(huán)境保護(hù)等一系列問題。與此同時(shí),因不同類型建筑物停車吸引特性不同導(dǎo)致停車設(shè)施利用不均衡的問題同樣嚴(yán)重。雖然咪表、VMS等現(xiàn)代化停車裝備的引入和停車換乘、階梯式計(jì)價(jià)等停車管理措施的實(shí)施一定程度可以緩解停車問題,但停車位不足的根源性問題依然無法解決。停車位共享指具有不同屬性的相鄰?fù)恋亻g共用停車場(chǎng)地,以降低單獨(dú)使用的總量的一種手段,也是抑制性停車需求控制背景下的產(chǎn)物。但是居住區(qū)停車位因其特殊的歸屬權(quán)和管理權(quán)問題一直沒有被作為共享資源考慮,只有在面臨嚴(yán)重的城市停車問題,以及土地資源限制性使用的條件下才開始受到關(guān)注。居住區(qū)停車位共享策略是利用居住區(qū)停車位與其它類型停車位在時(shí)間利用方面的互補(bǔ)性來實(shí)現(xiàn)停車資源的共享共用,因其龐大的數(shù)量和時(shí)間方面的特殊優(yōu)勢(shì)成為緩解社會(huì)停車難的最有利資源。但是居住區(qū)停車位又因其特殊的歸屬權(quán),在共享實(shí)施中難免會(huì)出現(xiàn)各種各樣的問題。本文在前人的研究基礎(chǔ)上,將博弈論和共享停車?yán)碚撓嘟Y(jié)合,從分析駕駛?cè)恕⑼＼囄粨碛姓�、停車設(shè)施管理者偏好入手,研究居住區(qū)停車位參與下的共享停車問題。主要包括以下幾方面內(nèi)容:(1)考慮到傳統(tǒng)群體式停車誘導(dǎo)容易導(dǎo)致局部停車擁擠的問題,提出了個(gè)性化停車誘導(dǎo)的定義和服務(wù)流程,結(jié)合居住區(qū)共享停車的需求,設(shè)計(jì)了基于APP的個(gè)性化停車誘導(dǎo)系統(tǒng)物理架構(gòu)和功能框架。在此基礎(chǔ)上,研究該框架的幾個(gè)核心問題。(2)針對(duì)居住區(qū)停車位能否實(shí)現(xiàn)共享這一問題,收集共享停車和博弈理論在交通方面的應(yīng)用成果,結(jié)合國內(nèi)外共享停車實(shí)踐,分析論證居住區(qū)停車位實(shí)施共享的可行性。通過對(duì)居住區(qū)車輛出行特性的調(diào)查分析,研究居住區(qū)停車位閑置特性;結(jié)合居住區(qū)停車位對(duì)外共享意愿調(diào)研結(jié)果,分析居住區(qū)停車位實(shí)施共享需解決的關(guān)鍵性技術(shù)問題、設(shè)計(jì)規(guī)劃問題、管理問題和意識(shí)問題;在此基礎(chǔ)上,建立了居住區(qū)停車位對(duì)外共享的服務(wù)能力評(píng)估模型,對(duì)模型相關(guān)參數(shù)進(jìn)行標(biāo)定,并提供了可參考數(shù)據(jù)和模型應(yīng)用實(shí)例,用于評(píng)估居住區(qū)現(xiàn)有條件下的最大對(duì)外共享服務(wù)能力,為實(shí)時(shí)共享停車提供理論基礎(chǔ)。(3)由于居住區(qū)停車位共享涉及駕駛?cè)�、停車位提供者和城市停車設(shè)施管理者等多方利益,因停車選擇過程中各方的偏好不同,某種程度上會(huì)出現(xiàn)利益的分歧,因此引入博弈論對(duì)停車選擇過程中各方的博弈關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。文中首先利用共享停車調(diào)查結(jié)果對(duì)影響停車場(chǎng)選擇的要素進(jìn)行分析,從而確立了居住區(qū)共享停車中的三方博弈關(guān)系,并對(duì)博弈模型進(jìn)行簡化處理。分析了幾種典型的停車博弈,包括:(1)共享平臺(tái)和駕駛?cè)酥g的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈,給出了停車高峰期二者博弈的基本式,分析了博弈的納什均衡解;(2)高峰停車中n個(gè)駕駛?cè)酥g的擁擠停車博弈,通過四個(gè)推論分析了由擁擠停車向共享停車轉(zhuǎn)化的基本條件;擁擠停車博弈分析結(jié)果表明,擁擠停車產(chǎn)生的根源之一在于違章停車的收益大于共享停車。因此,共享停車的實(shí)施務(wù)必研究停車秩序管理和違章處罰的閾值。(3)文中通過建立停車秩序管理者和違章駕駛?cè)瞬┺哪Ｐ?研究停車秩序管理者和駕駛?cè)瞬┺牡木鈼l件。利用案例對(duì)幾個(gè)模型的應(yīng)用和價(jià)值進(jìn)行說明。針對(duì)共享停車中的幾種博弈現(xiàn)象,研究了共享停車的博弈均衡:包括n個(gè)停車駕駛?cè)说募{什均衡,共同決策下的Cournot均衡,理想狀況下的壟斷博弈和共享停車動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的Stackelberg均衡。(4)根據(jù)博弈分析結(jié)果,重點(diǎn)研究個(gè)性化共享停車誘導(dǎo)之下的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈行為,利用共享停車選擇核心要素構(gòu)建共享平臺(tái)和駕駛?cè)酥g的Stackelberg博弈雙層規(guī)劃模型,描述二者停車選擇博弈行為。重點(diǎn)是基于一定的居住區(qū)共享停車假設(shè)條件,定義了高峰泊位溢出指數(shù)、居住區(qū)停車場(chǎng)實(shí)際泊位空閑率、居住區(qū)停車位高峰對(duì)外共享率等評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo),分別以駕駛?cè)斯蚕硗＼囀找孀畲蠡凸蚕砥脚_(tái)協(xié)調(diào)控制的停車管理效果最佳為目標(biāo),建立二者博弈的雙層規(guī)劃模型。通過博弈模型的協(xié)調(diào)控制,實(shí)現(xiàn)二者博弈的均衡,達(dá)到區(qū)域范圍停車場(chǎng)的均衡利用。根據(jù)模型的求解條件,設(shè)計(jì)了基于變形粒子群算法的嵌套優(yōu)化算法求解博弈模型的均衡解,并以某市商業(yè)中心區(qū)及周邊居住小區(qū)為例進(jìn)行模型仿真分析。本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)包括:(1)構(gòu)建了居住區(qū)停車位對(duì)外共享服務(wù)能力評(píng)估模型,用于描述居住區(qū)參與共享停車的服務(wù)能力;(2)研究了居住區(qū)停車位參與下的共享停車選擇行為核心影響要素,分析了駕駛?cè)�、停車位供�?yīng)者和共享停車管理平臺(tái)之間的博弈關(guān)系、博弈模型基本式和博弈均衡解;(3)構(gòu)建了基于APP共享停車管理框架下的居住區(qū)共享停車服務(wù)模型,為實(shí)現(xiàn)居住區(qū)共享停車和停車資源的均衡協(xié)調(diào)利用提供理論依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:City vehicle quantity increase with the original planning of parking facilities, with the construction of low standard, the contradiction between parking management techniques and methods behind difficult to city parking. Due to congestion because of the parking vehicle cruising time is too long, the entrance line, illegal parking, causing a traffic dispute, a series of problems of energy consumption and environmental protection. At the same time. Because of the different types of parking parking facilities with different characteristics to attract the unbalanced problem as serious. Although the meter, VMS and other modern parking equipment and the introduction of park and ride, the implementation of the ladder pricing and parking management measures in a certain extent can alleviate the parking problem, but the shortage of parking spaces of the root causes of the problem still can not solve the parking space sharing. Refers to the adjacent land with different attributes shared parking, a means to reduce the amount of used alone, but also suppression Control of the product under the background of system of parking demand of residential parking spaces. But because of the special ownership and management right has not been considered as a shared resource, only in the face of city parking problem is serious, and the limited land resources use conditions began to attention. Residential area parking sharing strategy the use of residential parking spaces and other types of parking spaces in time by using the complementary aspects of sharing to achieve parking resources, because of the special advantage of its large quantity and time become the most favorable social resources to ease parking difficulties. But the residential parking spaces and because of its special ownership, implementation is in the shared there will be a variety of problems. On the basis of previous research, game theory and shared parking theory, from the analysis of the driver, parking owners, parking facilities management Study on the preference of residential parking spaces in the parking sharing problem. It mainly includes the following aspects: (1) considering the crowded parking problems easily lead to local traditional group parking guidance, put forward the definition of personalized parking guidance and service processes, combined with the residential areas sharing parking demand, design and the function of personalized APP parking guidance system based on the framework of physical architecture. Based on this, several key problems of the framework of the research. (2) for residential parking spaces can realize the sharing, sharing and collecting parking game theory applications in terms of traffic, combined with the practice of parking sharing at home and abroad, analysis of residential area parking space sharing implementation feasibility. Through the investigation on the travel characteristics of residential vehicle analysis of residential area parking idle property; combination of residential parking spaces on the willingness of sharing The results of the survey, the analysis of residential parking implementation of key technical problems needed to be solved sharing, planning, management and awareness of the problem; on this basis, establishes an evaluation model of foreign shared service capacity of residential parking, the relative parameters of the model calibration, and provides reference data and model application for the evaluation of existing residential conditions, the largest foreign share service ability, provide a theoretical basis for the real-time sharing of parking. (3) the residential parking space sharing involves driving, parking providers and city parking facilities management interests, for parking in the process of selecting preferences of different parties, the interests of some the extent of the differences, so the introduction of game theory to study the relationship between the parties in the process of parking choice game. Firstly, using the shared parking survey results on the impact of parking lot. Analysis of optional elements, thus establishing the residential areas sharing three party game relationship in the parking, and the game model is simplified. The analysis of several typical parking game, including: (1) sharing the dynamic game between the platform and the driver, the basic parking peak two game are given, analyzed the game Nash equilibrium solution; (2) the crowded parking game between the N driver in the peak parking, through four deduction analysis by the crowded parking to share the basic conditions of the crowded parking parking transformation; game analysis shows that one of the causes of congestion is the parking parking income is greater than the shared parking. Therefore, you must Study on parking order management and the implementation of shared parking violation penalty threshold. (3) through the establishment of parking order management and illegal driving game model in this paper, study on parking order managers and drivers The equilibrium condition of the game. The application and value of several models by using case. Aiming at sharing several game phenomenon in the parking, the parking sharing game equilibrium: Nash equilibrium includes N parking drivers, Cournot equilibrium joint decision-making under ideal conditions, monopoly game and dynamic game equilibrium parking sharing Stackelberg. (4) according to the results of the game analysis, focus on personalized shared parking guidance under the dynamic game behavior, using shared parking choice key factor in the development of Stackelberg game bi level programming model between the sharing platform and the driver, describe the two parking choice game behavior. The focus is on shared parking residential area based on certain assumptions, the definition of peak berth overflow index, parking lot actual berth idle rate of residential area, residential area parking peak shared rate index, respectively. In order to maximize the revenue sharing drivers parking and sharing platform for coordination and control of parking management is best for the target, bi level planning model is established. Through the coordination of two game control game model, achieve two balance and achieve the balance of the use of area parking lot. According to the solution conditions of the model, is designed based on the deformation of particle swarm algorithm nested optimization algorithm for solving game equilibrium solutions, and a city in central business district and the surrounding residential area as an example for simulation analysis. The innovation of this paper includes: (1) construction of residential parking spaces shared service capacity evaluation model, used to describe the residential area in shared parking service capabilities (; 2) of residential parking spaces in the parking choice behavior of sharing core factors, analyzes the driving, parking and parking management platform providers sharing between Game relations, game models and game equilibrium solutions. (3) a shared parking service model based on APP shared parking management framework is constructed to provide theoretical basis for the balanced and coordinated utilization of shared parking and parking resources in residential areas.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：U491.7

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