【摘要】：在現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭中，裝甲兵以其兼具火力、機動力和裝甲防護力的特點，作為陸軍最重要的突擊力量，在合同戰(zhàn)斗中遂行機動作戰(zhàn)任務(wù)。1939——1941年在歐洲戰(zhàn)火四起的局面下，蘇聯(lián)將裝甲兵列為其著重發(fā)展的軍事力量。本文以這一時期蘇軍裝甲兵的發(fā)展為研究對象，重點介紹了蘇軍裝甲兵在二戰(zhàn)前的基本狀況、所存在的問題，以及蘇軍發(fā)展裝甲兵的戰(zhàn)略決策過程和蘇軍裝甲兵在蘇德戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前有針對性的發(fā)展等內(nèi)容。研究這一問題，有利于我們更加深入了解二戰(zhàn)前蘇聯(lián)的戰(zhàn)備工作。 本文分為五個部分對1939——1941年蘇軍裝甲兵部隊的發(fā)展進行研究： 第一部分，主要介紹了1939年以前的蘇軍裝甲兵部隊。蘇聯(lián)作為陸軍大國，早期高級將領(lǐng)又多成長于騎兵部隊，國防的需要使其急需發(fā)展進攻性地面作戰(zhàn)力量。隨著軍事工業(yè)的發(fā)展和外國技術(shù)經(jīng)驗的引進，蘇聯(lián)裝甲兵部隊在二戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)前已經(jīng)成為世界上規(guī)模最大的裝甲部隊。 第二部分，主要分析了二戰(zhàn)前蘇軍裝甲兵部隊所存在的問題。蘇軍裝甲兵部隊雖然在規(guī)模上無人能及，但其在理論上與西歐陸軍強國存在差距，在技術(shù)兵器、部隊編制和戰(zhàn)略戰(zhàn)術(shù)等方面也都存在問題。因此，其戰(zhàn)斗力不能有效發(fā)揮，在實戰(zhàn)中屢遭敗績。 第三部分，主要論述了1939——1941年間蘇聯(lián)在是否重點發(fā)展裝甲兵問題上進行的討論和最終的決策。在1939年蘇芬戰(zhàn)爭和1940年西線戰(zhàn)役的軍事實踐中，蘇軍認識到在陸軍諸兵種中重點發(fā)展裝甲兵的必要性。 第四部分，主要闡明了蘇軍裝甲兵在這一階段各方面的發(fā)展。尤其是針對上文所提到的諸多問題，，蘇軍在戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前有限的時間內(nèi)進行了有針對性的調(diào)整和改進。在技術(shù)上，采用了新型坦克裝甲車輛；在編制上，組建裝甲和機械化快速集群；在戰(zhàn)術(shù)思想上也進行了調(diào)整。 第五部分，通過分析蘇軍裝甲兵在這一階段的發(fā)展，客觀的看待這一階段的發(fā)展對于蘇軍裝甲兵產(chǎn)生的影響，蘇軍裝甲兵對于二戰(zhàn)的影響以及蘇軍裝甲兵在世界軍事發(fā)展史中的地位。 論文認為，蘇軍裝甲兵在蘇德臨戰(zhàn)前夕，在技術(shù)上趕上并超過了世界先進水平；采用了從理論上講十分先進甚至超前的編制；相應(yīng)調(diào)整了其戰(zhàn)術(shù)思想。這些方面的發(fā)展都在一定程度上增強了蘇軍裝甲兵的戰(zhàn)斗力，并且在二戰(zhàn)乃至戰(zhàn)后產(chǎn)生了深遠的影響。但是，所有這些措施受限于準(zhǔn)備時間、工業(yè)生產(chǎn)能力、傳統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)略思想等方面因素，沒有能及時發(fā)揮其最大效力，因此在蘇德戰(zhàn)爭初期的逆境中，還沒有發(fā)揮出扭轉(zhuǎn)戰(zhàn)局的作用。
[Abstract]:In modern warfare, armored forces, with their characteristics of firepower, aircraft power and armored protection, are the most important assault forces of the army, carrying out mobile combat tasks in contractual combat. Under the circumstances of the four wars in Europe from 1939 to 1941, The Soviet Union listed armored forces as its development-oriented military force. In this paper, the development of Soviet armored forces in this period as the research object, focusing on the Soviet armored forces in the pre-World War II basic situation, the existing problems, The strategic decision-making process of Soviet armored forces and the development of Soviet armored forces before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war were also discussed. Studying this issue will help us to understand the Soviet Union's war preparedness work before World War II. This paper is divided into five parts to study the development of Soviet armored forces from 1939 to 1941. The first part mainly introduces the Soviet armored forces before 1939. The Soviet Union, as a large army country, grew up in cavalry troops in the early years, and the need for national defense made it urgent to develop offensive ground combat forces. With the development of military industry and the introduction of foreign technological experience, the Soviet armored forces had become the largest armored forces in the world before the outbreak of World War II. The second part mainly analyzes the problems of Soviet armored forces before World War II. Although no one can match the Soviet armored forces in terms of scale, there is a gap in theory between the Soviet armored forces and the western European army powers, as well as problems in technical weapons, troop establishment, strategy and tactics, and so on. Therefore, its combat effectiveness can not be effectively brought into play, in actual combat repeatedly suffered defeat. The third part mainly discusses the Soviet Union's discussion and final decision on whether to develop armored forces from 1939 to 1941. In the military practice of the Sufen War of 1939 and the Battle of the Western Front in 1940, the Soviet Army realized the necessity of developing armored troops in all arms of the army. The fourth part mainly expounds the development of the Soviet armored forces in this stage. In particular, in response to the problems mentioned above, the Soviet Army made targeted adjustments and improvements in the limited time before the outbreak of the war. Technically, a new type of tank armored vehicle was adopted; in terms of configuration, an armored and mechanized fast cluster was formed; and tactical ideas were adjusted. In the fifth part, by analyzing the development of the Soviet armored forces at this stage, the influence of the development of this stage on the Soviet armored forces is viewed objectively. The influence of Soviet armored forces on World War II and the position of Soviet armored forces in the history of world military development. The paper holds that the Soviet armored forces caught up with and surpassed the advanced level of the world technically on the eve of the Soviet Union and Germany's impending war; adopted a very advanced or even advanced system in theory; and adjusted their tactical thinking accordingly. To a certain extent, these developments strengthened the combat effectiveness of the Soviet armored forces, and had a profound impact in World War II and even after the war. However, all these measures were limited by the preparation time, industrial production capacity, traditional strategic thinking and other factors, and failed to give full play to their maximum effectiveness in time. Therefore, in the early adversity of the Soviet and German wars, they had not yet played a role in reversing the war situation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：E512;K512.54

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