戰(zhàn)后美國對印度尼西亞外交政策與隱蔽行動研究（1945—1966年）
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-13 14:38
【摘要】： 迫使印度尼西亞服從并服務(wù)于美國遏制共產(chǎn)主義的冷戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)略，是戰(zhàn)后美國對印度尼西亞政策構(gòu)建的出發(fā)點(diǎn)。印度尼西亞特殊的地理位置、豐富的戰(zhàn)略資源和眾多的人口是美國意將其作為“亞洲反共橋頭堡”的必然邏輯。戰(zhàn)后蘇加諾執(zhí)政時期(1945-1966年)的印度尼西亞堅(jiān)持在東西方集團(tuán)之間尋求中間路線。這既是曾長期遭受西方殖民壓迫的印尼國家的本能反應(yīng)，也是其民族領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人蘇加諾現(xiàn)實(shí)主義政治觀的直接體現(xiàn)。 蘇加諾政權(quán)的意識形態(tài)走向與美國對其政策的轉(zhuǎn)與變處在同一曲線上。印尼獨(dú)立革命給了最好的解釋。當(dāng)印尼的獨(dú)立訴求破壞了美國與荷蘭的同盟關(guān)系時，杜魯門政府選擇了沉默。但當(dāng)冷戰(zhàn)已經(jīng)爆發(fā)，遏制共產(chǎn)主義的擴(kuò)張成為美國的當(dāng)務(wù)之急，而蘇加諾政權(quán)在“茉莉芬事件”中又恰恰表現(xiàn)出對左翼力量的排斥，美國轉(zhuǎn)而支持其完全政治獨(dú)立。美國相信，支持構(gòu)建一個具有反共性質(zhì)的新興獨(dú)立國家，無疑將給自己帶來豐厚的政治回報。 但是美國不能理解一個長期遭受殖民壓迫的國家對主權(quán)的珍視和對領(lǐng)土完整的渴望。在印尼最為關(guān)心的西伊里安問題上，美國消極的中立態(tài)度破壞了美國與印尼關(guān)系親密發(fā)展的可能。這也使得艾森豪威爾極力拉攏印尼進(jìn)入西方陣營的努力成為徒勞。印尼高舉中立主義外交的旗幟是歷史傳統(tǒng)和維護(hù)民族獨(dú)立發(fā)展現(xiàn)實(shí)對策的必然結(jié)果。如何扭轉(zhuǎn)印尼的發(fā)展方向?美國在印尼要實(shí)現(xiàn)怎樣的目標(biāo)?艾森豪威爾政府在戰(zhàn)后美國針對印尼的首個外交政策文件——NSC5518號文件中給出答案，即促使印尼走向反共并最終構(gòu)筑一個穩(wěn)定的、親西方政權(quán)。通過這個文件，艾森豪威爾給后幾任美國政府的印尼政策定下了基調(diào)。 在實(shí)現(xiàn)這個目標(biāo)的過程中，迫于特殊的冷戰(zhàn)對峙，美國不得不為自己有限的軍事和外交手段而苦惱。但在和印尼情況類似的伊朗和危地馬拉，美國中央情報局策劃的一系列顛覆左翼政府建立反共親美政權(quán)的隱蔽行動卻捷報頻傳，這給了美國在印尼復(fù)制其行動的遐想空間。 1956-1958年爆發(fā)的印尼外島危機(jī)給了美國中情局施行隱蔽行動來影響印尼政治走向的機(jī)會。在外島危機(jī)中，中情局秘密地為叛軍提供各種支持，最終導(dǎo)致印尼內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的爆發(fā)。由于叛軍低下的軍事素質(zhì)，加之美國秘密支持的杯水車薪，，中情局的隱蔽行動宣告失敗。中情局的失敗暴露了艾森豪威爾政府這一時期對印尼認(rèn)識及決策機(jī)制的缺陷。 自1958年起，艾森豪威爾政府的印尼政策開始回歸內(nèi)島，容忍了蘇加諾及其中立主義外交的傾向，把反共作為一個長遠(yuǎn)的目標(biāo)，并確定把印尼陸軍作為其新反共代理人。艾森豪威爾政府在1959年和1960年相繼出臺的NSC5901和NSC6023號文件中貫徹了這一思路。美國政府為修復(fù)與蘇加諾的裂痕，恢復(fù)了對印尼政府的各種援助，繼任的肯尼迪政府還積極促成了西伊里安問題的最終解決。 60年代中期印尼陸軍內(nèi)部爆發(fā)了“翁東政變”，即“九·三零運(yùn)動”�！拔號|政變”的發(fā)生及被鎮(zhèn)壓打開了印尼社會政治矛盾的潘多拉魔盒，但同時也給因?yàn)橛∧崤c馬來西亞沖突逐步惡化的美印關(guān)系一個轉(zhuǎn)變的契機(jī)。翁東被鎮(zhèn)壓后，美國認(rèn)識到以蘇哈托為首的新陸軍集團(tuán)有可能主導(dǎo)未來印尼的發(fā)展方向，隨即中情局聯(lián)合其他部門對印尼發(fā)動了新一輪的隱蔽行動，秘密地為陸軍提供各種援助，促使陸軍對印尼共產(chǎn)黨和進(jìn)步人士進(jìn)行大規(guī)模屠殺。隨后蘇哈托在美國支持下罷黜了蘇加諾，執(zhí)掌印尼政權(quán)，而全面倒向西方。美國最終實(shí)現(xiàn)其對印尼政策的長遠(yuǎn)目標(biāo)——構(gòu)建一個非共產(chǎn)主義和親西方的政權(quán)。 本文循著這一思路，主要分為四章進(jìn)行論述，即：戰(zhàn)后美國對印尼政策的形成與確立；中情局隱蔽行動與1956-1958年印尼外島叛亂；回到內(nèi)島：拉攏陸軍與修復(fù)裂痕；“九·三零事件”與美國的隱蔽行動。文章在理論視角和研究方法上首次把美國對印尼外交政策與隱蔽行動進(jìn)行互動研究，認(rèn)為隱蔽行動是冷戰(zhàn)期間美國實(shí)現(xiàn)對外政策目標(biāo)的重要戰(zhàn)略工具抑或有效途徑。同時首次把美國戰(zhàn)后幾任總統(tǒng)的印尼政策聯(lián)系起來進(jìn)行整體研究，從而更全面深刻地揭示了美國對印尼政策的實(shí)質(zhì)和發(fā)展演變。在資料運(yùn)用和論證上通過對美國最新解密檔案資料的查閱、對比與甄別，對印尼外島叛亂和“九·三零事件”與美國的隱蔽行動作了系統(tǒng)梳理，提出了自己的新觀點(diǎn)。
[Abstract]:Indonesia's special geographical position, abundant strategic resources and large population are the inevitable logic for the United States to regard Indonesia as the "bridgehead of anti-communism in Asia". During the political period (1945-1966), Indonesia insisted on seeking a middle line between the East and West. This was not only the instinctive reaction of Indonesia, which had been oppressed by the Western colonies for a long time, but also the direct embodiment of its national leader Sukarno's realistic political outlook.
The ideological trend of the Sukarno regime is on the same curve as the U.S. policy shift. The Indonesian Revolution of Independence gave the best explanation. The U.S. turned to support its full political independence. The U.S. believed that its support for the establishment of a new independent state with an anti-Communist character would undoubtedly bring substantial political returns to itself.
But the United States can't understand the value of sovereignty and the desire for territorial integrity of a long-time colonial oppressed country. On Indonesia's most concerned West Irian issue, the negative neutrality of the United States undermined the possibility of a close relationship between the United States and Indonesia. Efforts to become futile. Indonesia holds high the banner of neutralism diplomacy is the inevitable result of historical tradition and realistic countermeasures to safeguard national independence. How to reverse Indonesia's development direction? What goals should the United States achieve in Indonesia? The Eisenhower administration's first foreign policy document for Indonesia after the war, NSC 5518 Through the document, Eisenhower set the tone for the Indonesian policies of the subsequent U.S. governments.
In the process of achieving this goal, the United States had to fret about its limited military and diplomatic means because of the special Cold War confrontation. But in Iran and Guatemala, like Indonesia, the CIA plotted a series of covert actions to subvert the left-wing government and establish an anti-Communist and pro-American regime, which were quickly reported. The United States copied its daydream space in Indonesia.
The outbreak of the 1956-1958 Outer Islands Crisis in Indonesia gave the CIA the opportunity to conduct covert operations to influence Indonesia's political direction. In the Outer Islands Crisis, the CIA secretly provided various kinds of support to the rebels, which eventually led to the outbreak of the Indonesian civil war. The failure of the CIA exposed the defects of the Eisenhower administration's understanding of Indonesia and its decision-making mechanism during this period.
Since 1958, the Eisenhower Administration's Indonesian policy has returned to the island, tolerated Sukarno and his neutral diplomacy, made anti-Communist a long-term goal, and established the Indonesian Army as its new anti-Communist agent. In order to repair the rift with Sukarno, the U.S. government resumed all kinds of aid to the Indonesian government. The successor Kennedy government also actively contributed to the final settlement of the Sierra Leone issue.
In the mid-1960s, the "Wengdong coup" broke out within the Indonesian army, namely the "Nine-Thirty Movement". The occurrence and suppression of the "Wengdong coup" opened the Pandora magic box of Indonesian social and political contradictions, but also gave a turning point to the US-Indonesian relations, which gradually deteriorated because of the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. Recognizing that the new army group headed by Suharto might lead the way for the future of Indonesia, the CIA, in conjunction with other departments, launched a new round of covert operations against Indonesia, secretly providing various assistance to the Army, prompting the Army to massacre the Communist Party of Indonesia and progressives on a large scale. Subsequently, Suharto branch in the United States. The United States eventually achieved its long-term goal of policy toward Indonesia - to build a non-communist and pro-Western regime.
Following this train of thought, this article mainly divides into four chapters, namely: the formation and establishment of the US policy toward Indonesia after the war; the CIA's covert operations and the 1956-1958 rebellion on the Indonesian outer island; returning to the inner island: drawing up the army and repairing the rift; the "September 30 incident" and the concealed actions of the United States. It is the first time to study the interaction between US foreign policy towards Indonesia and covert action, and to consider covert action as an important strategic tool or an effective way for the US to achieve its foreign policy objectives during the cold war. This paper reviews the essence and evolution of Indonesian policy, compares and discriminates the latest declassified archives in the United States, systematically combs the rebellion on Indonesia's outer islands, the September 30th Incident and the concealed actions of the United States, and puts forward some new viewpoints.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：K342.2;K712.54
本文編號：2241461
[Abstract]:Indonesia's special geographical position, abundant strategic resources and large population are the inevitable logic for the United States to regard Indonesia as the "bridgehead of anti-communism in Asia". During the political period (1945-1966), Indonesia insisted on seeking a middle line between the East and West. This was not only the instinctive reaction of Indonesia, which had been oppressed by the Western colonies for a long time, but also the direct embodiment of its national leader Sukarno's realistic political outlook.
The ideological trend of the Sukarno regime is on the same curve as the U.S. policy shift. The Indonesian Revolution of Independence gave the best explanation. The U.S. turned to support its full political independence. The U.S. believed that its support for the establishment of a new independent state with an anti-Communist character would undoubtedly bring substantial political returns to itself.
But the United States can't understand the value of sovereignty and the desire for territorial integrity of a long-time colonial oppressed country. On Indonesia's most concerned West Irian issue, the negative neutrality of the United States undermined the possibility of a close relationship between the United States and Indonesia. Efforts to become futile. Indonesia holds high the banner of neutralism diplomacy is the inevitable result of historical tradition and realistic countermeasures to safeguard national independence. How to reverse Indonesia's development direction? What goals should the United States achieve in Indonesia? The Eisenhower administration's first foreign policy document for Indonesia after the war, NSC 5518 Through the document, Eisenhower set the tone for the Indonesian policies of the subsequent U.S. governments.
In the process of achieving this goal, the United States had to fret about its limited military and diplomatic means because of the special Cold War confrontation. But in Iran and Guatemala, like Indonesia, the CIA plotted a series of covert actions to subvert the left-wing government and establish an anti-Communist and pro-American regime, which were quickly reported. The United States copied its daydream space in Indonesia.
The outbreak of the 1956-1958 Outer Islands Crisis in Indonesia gave the CIA the opportunity to conduct covert operations to influence Indonesia's political direction. In the Outer Islands Crisis, the CIA secretly provided various kinds of support to the rebels, which eventually led to the outbreak of the Indonesian civil war. The failure of the CIA exposed the defects of the Eisenhower administration's understanding of Indonesia and its decision-making mechanism during this period.
Since 1958, the Eisenhower Administration's Indonesian policy has returned to the island, tolerated Sukarno and his neutral diplomacy, made anti-Communist a long-term goal, and established the Indonesian Army as its new anti-Communist agent. In order to repair the rift with Sukarno, the U.S. government resumed all kinds of aid to the Indonesian government. The successor Kennedy government also actively contributed to the final settlement of the Sierra Leone issue.
In the mid-1960s, the "Wengdong coup" broke out within the Indonesian army, namely the "Nine-Thirty Movement". The occurrence and suppression of the "Wengdong coup" opened the Pandora magic box of Indonesian social and political contradictions, but also gave a turning point to the US-Indonesian relations, which gradually deteriorated because of the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. Recognizing that the new army group headed by Suharto might lead the way for the future of Indonesia, the CIA, in conjunction with other departments, launched a new round of covert operations against Indonesia, secretly providing various assistance to the Army, prompting the Army to massacre the Communist Party of Indonesia and progressives on a large scale. Subsequently, Suharto branch in the United States. The United States eventually achieved its long-term goal of policy toward Indonesia - to build a non-communist and pro-Western regime.
Following this train of thought, this article mainly divides into four chapters, namely: the formation and establishment of the US policy toward Indonesia after the war; the CIA's covert operations and the 1956-1958 rebellion on the Indonesian outer island; returning to the inner island: drawing up the army and repairing the rift; the "September 30 incident" and the concealed actions of the United States. It is the first time to study the interaction between US foreign policy towards Indonesia and covert action, and to consider covert action as an important strategic tool or an effective way for the US to achieve its foreign policy objectives during the cold war. This paper reviews the essence and evolution of Indonesian policy, compares and discriminates the latest declassified archives in the United States, systematically combs the rebellion on Indonesia's outer islands, the September 30th Incident and the concealed actions of the United States, and puts forward some new viewpoints.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號】：K342.2;K712.54
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本文編號：2241461
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