【摘要】：1929-1933年的世界經(jīng)濟(jì)大危機(jī)使日本陷入絕境,日本統(tǒng)治階級迫切需要尋找原料產(chǎn)地和消費(fèi)市場來擺脫經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)。而物產(chǎn)富饒的東北恰好滿足這個(gè)條件,更為重要的是華盛頓《九國公約》并沒有對東北作出明確的規(guī)定,它成了華盛頓體系中最薄弱的環(huán)節(jié)。所以,日本軍國主義者就把它看做是摧毀華盛頓體系的突破口。 日本發(fā)動“九·一八”事變的時(shí)機(jī)是經(jīng)過精心選擇的,自從經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)發(fā)生后,美國政府忙于應(yīng)付國丙的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī),對世界上除經(jīng)濟(jì)以外的事務(wù)顯得力不從心。由于美國在中國的投資在他所有的對外投資中所占比例本來就小,在滿洲的投資更是微乎其微,所以日本判斷如果它在中國東北進(jìn)行侵略,美國進(jìn)行干涉的可能性是非常小的。在各種因素的推動下,日本發(fā)動了“九·一八”事變。后來,日本為了配合其在滿洲的侵略轉(zhuǎn)移國際視線,鎮(zhèn)壓中國民間的反日運(yùn)動,威逼國民政府承認(rèn)日本侵略的既成事實(shí),又發(fā)動了“一·二八”事變,“一·二八”事變后日本又試圖著手把華北從中國分裂出去。 “九·一八”事變發(fā)生后基于以下原因?qū)е铝嗣绹磻?yīng)緩慢,偏向軟弱。首先,隨著二十年代和平運(yùn)動的興起,國際間一些和平協(xié)定的簽訂,美國的統(tǒng)治者思想麻痹了,他們沉浸在虛幻的和平中,對突發(fā)事變的準(zhǔn)備不足。再者,事變發(fā)生后,美國政府一度產(chǎn)生誤判,認(rèn)為這只是地方?jīng)_突而已,是關(guān)東軍擅自采取的行動,日本政府并沒有參與。美國高層幻想依靠日本的文官政府制止軍部的冒險(xiǎn),因而事變之初美國沒有采取具體的行動,而是采取靜觀其變的方針,失去了最佳的干預(yù)時(shí)機(jī)。還有不容忽視的是,美國政府內(nèi)部的不同意見也耽誤了危機(jī)的處理。只是在日軍轟炸錦州后,美國對日本的態(tài)度才開始趨于強(qiáng)硬,而所謂的強(qiáng)硬也只限于口頭上和道義上的譴責(zé)。當(dāng)日本攻占錦州,形成入關(guān)之勢時(shí),考慮到這有可能嚴(yán)重?fù)p害美國的利益,美國發(fā)出了“九·一八”事變發(fā)生以來最強(qiáng)硬的照會——“不承認(rèn)主義”照會,表示美國政府不承認(rèn)日本通過武力非法改變的遠(yuǎn)東秩序,。 嚴(yán)格的說,“一·二八”事變是”九·一八”事變的一部分。日本發(fā)動“一·二八”事變的主要目的是為了轉(zhuǎn)移世界對東北的關(guān)注,好讓滿洲國粉末登場。針對日本發(fā)動“一·二八”事變美國反應(yīng)迅速,它一方面迅速出面進(jìn)行調(diào)解,并向日本抗議。另一方面不斷調(diào)集兵力以防不測兼給日本施加壓力。另外,和“九·一八”發(fā)生時(shí)美國的反應(yīng)不一樣的是,美國注意聯(lián)合其他列強(qiáng)和國聯(lián)給日本施加強(qiáng)大的國際壓力�？傊�,美國這次反應(yīng)和行動是迅速的、直接的和果斷的,并且能夠主動利用國際社會的力量,給日本施加壓力,但是還不夠強(qiáng)硬,沒有采取經(jīng)濟(jì)制裁等有力手段對日本的侵略加以遏制。 “一·二八”事變后,隨著李頓調(diào)查團(tuán)報(bào)告書的出爐,中日兩國圍繞著調(diào)查團(tuán)報(bào)告書在國聯(lián)展開斗爭。就在英國想要和日本妥協(xié)時(shí),史汀生在征得新總統(tǒng)羅斯福的同意后發(fā)表了有利于中國的照會。這則照會在世界上引起了強(qiáng)烈的反響,此舉使國聯(lián)避免了向日本妥協(xié)的危險(xiǎn)。 此后,日本加緊侵略中國北方,造成華北事變,中國為了贏得備戰(zhàn)的時(shí)間在不斷抵抗的同時(shí)又不斷妥協(xié)。美國也在此期間加緊支持中國,比如通過棉麥貸款增強(qiáng)中國的國力。但是美國又是利己主義的國家,它為了一己私利不顧中國的反對通過《購銀法案》,人為地抬高銀價(jià),造成中國白銀嚴(yán)重外流,給中國經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來了極大地?fù)p害。羅斯�？偨y(tǒng)上臺后,為了集中精力解決經(jīng)濟(jì)問題,在遠(yuǎn)東問題上采取了,少說多做的方針。在避免與日本發(fā)生正面沖突的前提下,繼續(xù)實(shí)行“不承認(rèn)主義”政策。在羅斯福主政的前幾年美國遠(yuǎn)東政策一直是比較保守的,但保守中也蘊(yùn)含著變化。為了應(yīng)付日后可能發(fā)生的美日太平洋爭霸,美國一方面加強(qiáng)其軍事實(shí)力特別是海軍的實(shí)力,另一方面,為了延緩日美沖突的到來和制衡日本,美國政府采取睦鄰政策改善同日本以及蘇俄的關(guān)系。
[Abstract]:The Great World Economic Crisis of 1929-1933 put Japan in a desperate position. The ruling class of Japan urgently needed to find the source of raw materials and consumer markets to get rid of the economic crisis. The weakest link. So the Japanese militarists saw it as a breakthrough to destroy the Washington system.
The timing of the September 18th Incident in Japan was carefully chosen. Since the economic crisis, the U.S. government has been busy dealing with the economic crisis of the third country, which makes it difficult to deal with the world's economic affairs except economic affairs. Japan judged that if it invaded Northeast China, the possibility of American intervention was very small. Under the impetus of various factors, Japan launched the September 18th Incident. The people's government acknowledged the fait accompli of Japanese aggression and launched the "January 28" Incident. After the "January 28" Incident, Japan tried to split North China from China.
First of all, with the rise of the peace movement in the 1920s and the signing of some international peace agreements, the rulers of the United States were paralyzed. They were immersed in illusory peace and were not prepared for emergencies. At one point, the U.S. government misjudged it as a local conflict, an unauthorized action by the Kwangtung Army, and the Japanese government did not participate. It is also important to note that differences within the U.S. government also delayed the handling of the crisis. It was only after the Japanese bombing of Jinzhou that the U.S. attitude towards Japan began to become tough, and so-called toughness was limited to verbal and moral condemnation. Can seriously harm the interests of the United States, the United States issued the strongest note since the September 18th Incident - "non-recognition" note, indicating that the United States Government does not recognize Japan through force to illegally change the Far East order.
Strictly speaking, the Jan. 28 Incident was part of the September 18 Incident. The main purpose of the Jan. 28 Incident was to divert the world's attention from the Northeast so that Manchukuo powder could be put on the scene. The United States reacted quickly to the Jan. 28 Incident. On the one hand, it mediated quickly and went to Japan for mediation. This protest. On the other hand, the United States is constantly mobilizing its forces to prevent accidental and concurrent pressure on Japan. In addition, unlike the response of the United States at the time of September 18th, the United States pays attention to bringing together other powers and the League of Nations to exert strong international pressure on Japan. It can take the initiative to use the strength of the international community to exert pressure on Japan, but it is not strong enough to take economic sanctions and other powerful means to contain Japan's aggression.
After the January 28 Incident, with the release of the report of the Lighton Mission, China and Japan fought against the League of Nations around the report of the Lighton Mission. Just as Britain wanted to compromise with Japan, Stimson issued a note in favour of China with the consent of the new President Roosevelt. The note aroused strong repercussions around the world, and this was the case. The union avoided the danger of compromise with Japan.
Since then, Japan has stepped up its aggression against northern China, causing the North China Incident. China has been resisting and compromising in order to win the time to prepare for war. The United States has also stepped up its support for China during this period, such as strengthening China's national strength through cotton and wheat loans. After President Roosevelt took office, he adopted the policy of doing more than saying on the Far East in order to concentrate on solving economic problems. On the premise of avoiding a positive conflict with Japan, he continued to implement the policy of "no recognition". In the early years of Roosevelt's administration, the Far East policy of the United States was conservative, but conservative also implied changes. In order to cope with the possible future U.S. -Japan Pacific hegemony, the United States on the one hand strengthened its military strength, especially the naval strength, on the other hand, in order to delay the arrival of the Japanese-American conflict and balance Japan. The US government has adopted a good neighbourly policy to improve relations with Japan and Russia.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：K712

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