發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-05 01:00

  本文選題：美國外交政策 + 中美關(guān)系��； 參考：《東北師范大學(xué)》2006年碩士論文

【摘要】： 本文以美國解密文件和檔案為基礎(chǔ),以1969年中蘇邊界爆發(fā)的沖突事件為出發(fā)點(diǎn),力圖揭示19世紀(jì)60年代末美國對(duì)華政策緩和的思考過程與對(duì)華政策實(shí)質(zhì)。自中蘇發(fā)生分歧以來,一直沒有找到一個(gè)很好的切入點(diǎn)來研習(xí)其對(duì)華新政策,從而使其在對(duì)華政策方面逐步陷入了困境,而1969年珍寶島邊界沖突的爆發(fā)為美國開展對(duì)華新政策提供了機(jī)會(huì),尼克松政府開始積極運(yùn)用靈活的三角外交與中國緩和關(guān)系。但是這種緩和實(shí)質(zhì)是在美蘇關(guān)系緩和的前提下進(jìn)行的,美國仍然以對(duì)蘇關(guān)系為第一要素,這無疑使中美關(guān)系緩和過程受到阻礙和局限,也為中美關(guān)系的發(fā)展埋下了隱患。 全文共由三部分組成: 引言:主要介紹國內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)于美國對(duì)華關(guān)系問題的研究現(xiàn)狀及意義。 正文:具體闡述美國對(duì)華政策的思考和發(fā)展歷程,以及1969年中蘇邊界沖突為美國制定對(duì)外新戰(zhàn)略所提供的機(jī)會(huì)。 第一部分:先簡要回顧60年代初期以來,美國對(duì)于中蘇分歧的看法和對(duì)策。然后重點(diǎn)分析美國出于對(duì)當(dāng)時(shí)國際上關(guān)注的中國核問題、臺(tái)灣問題和越南問題這三大問題的考慮,所制定的對(duì)華政策,及其所陷入的困境。到了尼克松政府時(shí)期,在大三角外交理論的指導(dǎo)下,美國制定新的對(duì)華政策已經(jīng)勢在必行。 第二部分:1969年發(fā)生的珍寶島事件,是中蘇邊界沖突中最大的一起,為美國提供了在對(duì)待中國和蘇聯(lián)關(guān)系上的一次轉(zhuǎn)折的契機(jī)。這一事件的發(fā)生,對(duì)美國來說既是危機(jī)也是時(shí)機(jī)。美國既面臨著中蘇爆發(fā)全面戰(zhàn)爭,甚至是核戰(zhàn)爭的危險(xiǎn),也擁有著利用這次沖突積極改善對(duì)華關(guān)系,使自己占據(jù)美中蘇大三角關(guān)系中最有利位置的機(jī)會(huì)。正是抱著這樣的想法,尼克松打開了對(duì)華關(guān)系的大門。 第三部分:美國對(duì)華緩和政策的理論基礎(chǔ)和局限性。受地緣政治理論的影響,尼克松政府完全接受了三角外交思想,在不利的國際環(huán)境中通過打“中國牌”逐步擺脫困境。因此,在這一思想下建立起來的中美關(guān)系,必然也會(huì)受到這一思想的制約。 結(jié)論:簡要概括美國對(duì)華政策演變的脈絡(luò),以及在三角外交理論指導(dǎo)下的中美關(guān)系的局限性。
[Abstract]:Based on the documents and archives declassified by the United States and the conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, this paper tries to reveal the thinking process of the relaxation of American policy towards China in the late 1860s and the essence of the policy towards China. Since the differences between China and the Soviet Union, they have not found a good entry point to study their new policy towards China, which has gradually led them into a dilemma in terms of China policy. The outbreak of the border conflict in 1969 provided an opportunity for the United States to carry out a new policy towards China, and the Nixon administration began to actively use flexible triangular diplomacy to ease relations with China. However, the essence of this detente is carried out under the premise of the relaxation of US-Soviet relations, and the United States still regards the relations with the Soviet Union as the first element, which undoubtedly hinders and restricts the process of the relaxation of Sino-US relations, and also buries hidden dangers for the development of Sino-US relations. The full text consists of three parts: introduction: mainly introduces the current situation and significance of the research on American relations with China in academic circles at home and abroad. This paper expounds the thinking and development of American policy toward China and the opportunity provided by the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 for the United States to formulate a new strategy for foreign affairs. The first part briefly reviews the views and countermeasures of the United States on the differences between China and the Soviet Union since the early 60's. Then it focuses on the analysis of the United States' China policy and its predicament in view of the three major issues, namely, the nuclear issue of China, the Taiwan issue and the Vietnam issue, which were concerned by the international community at that time. By the Nixon Administration, under the guidance of the Great Triangle diplomacy theory, it was imperative for the United States to formulate a new China policy. The second part: the incident of Treasure Island in 1969 was the largest in the border conflict between China and the Soviet Union, which provided a turning point for the United States in dealing with the relations between China and the Soviet Union. The event was both a crisis and an opportunity for the United States. The United States is faced with the danger of a full-scale war between China and the Soviet Union, even a nuclear war, and also has the opportunity to make use of this conflict to actively improve relations with China, so that it can occupy the most advantageous position in the US-Soviet Triangle relationship. It was with this in mind that Nixon opened the door to relations with China. The third part: the theoretical basis and limitation of the American detente policy towards China. Under the influence of geopolitical theory, Nixon administration accepted the triangular diplomatic thought and gradually got rid of the predicament by playing the "China card" in the unfavorable international environment. Therefore, Sino-American relations established under this thought are bound to be restricted by this thought. Conclusion: the evolution of America's China policy and the limitation of Sino-US relations under the guidance of triangular diplomacy theory are briefly summarized.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2006
【分類號(hào)】：K153

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 胡曉麗;中蘇關(guān)系中的美國因素（1949-1989）[D];山東師范大學(xué);2008年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 左健;肯尼迪時(shí)期的軍工復(fù)合體及其對(duì)美國對(duì)華政策的影響[D];遼寧大學(xué);2012年

，

本文編號(hào)：2098223