發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-29 09:49

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 1971 英國(guó) 南亞危機(jī)　出處：《華東師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：1971年南亞危機(jī)是冷戰(zhàn)轉(zhuǎn)型時(shí)期的一次重要的地區(qū)性危機(jī)。此次危機(jī)不僅造就了南亞次大陸的新型政治格局,同時(shí)也是美蘇兩國(guó)在冷戰(zhàn)格局下的又一次精彩角逐。戰(zhàn)后,在以美蘇對(duì)峙為基本特征的東西方關(guān)系中,英國(guó)已經(jīng)無(wú)可挽回地成為一個(gè)“中等強(qiáng)國(guó)”,其在世界外交中的活動(dòng)天地和國(guó)際地位與19世紀(jì)相比更是不可同日而語(yǔ)。不過(guò)即便如此,戰(zhàn)后英國(guó)外交仍具特色,主要表現(xiàn)為“審時(shí)度勢(shì)”,在被動(dòng)中爭(zhēng)取盡可能多的主動(dòng),且從不放棄任何表現(xiàn)主動(dòng)性的機(jī)會(huì)。具有重要戰(zhàn)略、經(jīng)濟(jì)意義的南亞次大陸歷來(lái)是英國(guó)的重點(diǎn)關(guān)注地區(qū),南亞的穩(wěn)定與否與英國(guó)的海外利益緊密相連,1971年的南亞危機(jī)自然引起了英國(guó)的高度重視。本文正是從這一角度入手,以英國(guó)對(duì)1971年南亞危機(jī)的反應(yīng)和政策為研究重點(diǎn),意圖分析在國(guó)際冷戰(zhàn)格局下,作為中等強(qiáng)國(guó)的英國(guó)是怎樣利用其老練的外交手段,謹(jǐn)慎處理其與美蘇兩個(gè)超級(jí)大國(guó)尤其是與美國(guó)的微妙關(guān)系,并在最大程度上繼續(xù)維持其在第三世界的利益與影響。本文認(rèn)為,現(xiàn)實(shí)主義與國(guó)家利益是英國(guó)對(duì)外政策的根本準(zhǔn)則。盡管英國(guó)在南亞危機(jī)中的角色及地位略顯尷尬,但其依然在危機(jī)進(jìn)程中努力地表現(xiàn)出積極主動(dòng)性,并堅(jiān)定了自己的政策變化,即“由危機(jī)初期的中立不干涉最終轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槲C(jī)升級(jí)后對(duì)印度的偏袒”,這是由其現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的外交政策決定的。 文章主體部分共有三章。第一章主要是對(duì)1971年南亞危機(jī)的整體概述。其內(nèi)容包括危機(jī)爆發(fā)的背景——巴基斯坦內(nèi)部矛盾與印巴矛盾,危機(jī)經(jīng)過(guò)——東巴危機(jī)至印巴危機(jī),以及危機(jī)的影響——巴基斯坦的肢解與印度的勝利。此外,主要大國(guó)即美蘇中在此次危機(jī)中的態(tài)度(美中支持巴基斯坦,蘇聯(lián)偏袒印度)也是本章的內(nèi)容之一。 第二章主要講述了英國(guó)在危機(jī)初期的考慮與政策。這一章首先分析了英國(guó)在危機(jī)初期的考慮因素,即戰(zhàn)后英國(guó)對(duì)南亞政治影響的有限性與其在印巴經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的繼續(xù)訴求。第二部分主要介紹英國(guó)政府對(duì)危機(jī)的關(guān)注與重視,包括英國(guó)駐南亞當(dāng)?shù)貦C(jī)構(gòu)在危機(jī)初期的報(bào)告與英國(guó)主要決策部門(mén)的政策商討。第三部分是對(duì)英國(guó)在危機(jī)初期不干涉政策實(shí)施的具體闡述。 第三章的核心內(nèi)容是論述英國(guó)在危機(jī)升級(jí)后的政策變化。其中亦分為兩個(gè)部分。一是具體講述英國(guó)在危機(jī)升級(jí)后的政策變化,主要表現(xiàn)為對(duì)巴基斯坦的譴責(zé)與援助終止以及對(duì)印度的逐步偏袒。隨后即是對(duì)英國(guó)政策變化原因的詳細(xì)分析,包括英國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)東巴暴力的輿論壓力、英國(guó)對(duì)印巴重要性的權(quán)衡與對(duì)危機(jī)發(fā)展趨勢(shì)的考慮及其對(duì)70年代初英美、英蘇關(guān)系的考慮。 文章最后對(duì)1971年英國(guó)南亞危機(jī)政策進(jìn)行梳理和總結(jié),并得出結(jié)論：不論是英國(guó)政府在危機(jī)初期的“不干涉”政策,還是其在危機(jī)升級(jí)后的“偏袒”印度政策,都是以英國(guó)的國(guó)家利益為基準(zhǔn)的。此外,結(jié)語(yǔ)部分還概述了英國(guó)政策對(duì)其與南亞次大陸國(guó)家以及美蘇關(guān)系發(fā)展的影響。
[Abstract]:The 1971 Asian crisis is an important area of the cold war crisis during the period of transformation. The crisis not only created a new political landscape in the South Asian subcontinent, but also the United States and the Soviet Union in the cold war pattern of another wonderful competition. After the war, in the East West relations with the us Soviet confrontation as the basic characteristics, the UK has no save to become a "middle power", the world and the international status is compared with nineteenth Century cannot be mention in the same breath in world diplomacy. But even so, the postwar British diplomacy is still unique, mainly for the "situation", for as much as possible in the active passive, and never give up any active performance the opportunity has important strategic and economic significance of the subcontinent has always been the focus area of the United Kingdom, South Asia and the stability of the British overseas interests are closely linked, South Asia in 1971 The crisis naturally attracted the attention of the UK. Starting from this point of view, in the United Kingdom in 1971 the South Asia crisis response and policy as the research focus, intention analysis in the international cold war, as the British middle power is how to use its sophisticated diplomatic means, and careful handling the two super powers especially the delicate relationship with the United States, and continue to maintain its interests and influence in the third world to the maximum extent. This paper argues that realism and national interests is the fundamental principle of British foreign policy. Although the crisis in South Asia in the role and status of a bit awkward, but it is still in the process of trying to show the crisis positive initiative and strengthen its policy change, namely "the crisis of the early neutral interference is finally transformed into favour" on India after the escalation of the crisis, this is the realistic outside The policy is decided.
The main body of this paper consists of three chapters. The first chapter is an overview of the whole South Asia crisis in 1971. Its content includes the background of the outbreak of the crisis, Pakistan's internal contradictions and conflict between India and Pakistan, after the crisis, the Dongba crisis to the India Pakistan crisis, as well as the impact of the crisis, the victory of Pakistan dismemberment and India. In addition, the major powers in that attitude the crisis in the United States and the Soviet Union (the United States in support of Pakistan, the Soviet Union favored India) is one of the contents of this chapter.
The second chapter is mainly about the British policy and considerations in the early days of the crisis. This chapter first analyzes the factors in Britain in the early days of the crisis are considered, namely limited impact on postwar British South Asian political and economic interests in the India Pakistan continue to appeal. The second part mainly introduces the concern and attention of the British government to the crisis, including the report of the British Embassy in South Asia local authorities in the early days of the crisis with Britain's main decision-making departments to discuss policy. The third part is to elaborate the British in the early days of the crisis did not interfere with the implementation of the policy.
The core content of the third chapter is the discussion of British policy after the escalation of the crisis. Which can be divided into two parts. One is specific about Britain after the escalation of the crisis policy changes, mainly for the condemnation and aid to Pakistan termination and gradually favoritism to India. Then there is a detailed analysis of British policy changes the British public opinion on the domestic pressure Dongba violence, the British balance on India and Pakistan and the importance of considering the development trend and the common crisis at the beginning of 70s, the Anglo Soviet relations into account.
At the end of this paper, and summarizes the 1971 British South Asian crisis policy, and draw the conclusion: whether the British government in the early days of the crisis of "non intervention" policy, or the escalation of the crisis after the "biased" India policy is based on the British national interest as a benchmark. Besides, the part also gives an overview of influence the British policy on the subcontinent and the US Soviet relations development.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：D856.1;K561.5;K35

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