本文選題：雙重代表訴訟 + 股東派生訴訟�。� 參考：《中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】： 當(dāng)控制公司利用被控制公司進(jìn)行不法行為,使被控制公司的資產(chǎn)遭受損害時(shí),被控制公司少數(shù)股東可以依據(jù)中國《公司法》第152條規(guī)定,對控制公司、控制公司的負(fù)責(zé)人及獲利的其它被控制公司提起派生訴訟,追究不法行為人的損害賠償責(zé)任。但控制公司自身既然對被控制公司持有相當(dāng)數(shù)量的股份,最終還是由控制公司的全體股東來承受被控制公司的損失。然而,當(dāng)被控制公司的股東怠于行使其訴權(quán)時(shí),現(xiàn)行法并沒有賦予利益受損的控制公司少數(shù)股東有效救濟(jì)的手段,此類股東難以獲得有效的權(quán)益保障。反觀美國判例法及日本判例法上的相關(guān)判例,當(dāng)關(guān)系公司發(fā)生掏空公司資產(chǎn)事實(shí)時(shí),享有發(fā)動(dòng)派生訴權(quán)的主體,除被控制公司少數(shù)股東外,也應(yīng)該包含控制公司的少數(shù)股東,承認(rèn)后者有權(quán)為被控制公司的利益而提起雙重代表訴訟,積極參與公司的監(jiān)督。基于比較法觀點(diǎn)而言,中國現(xiàn)行公司法對于控制公司的少數(shù)股東的權(quán)利規(guī)范上,仍有檢討與完善的空間。 股東雙重代表訴訟的意義在于通過二次代位訴權(quán)的行使,賦予控制公司的少數(shù)股東權(quán)利為被控制公司的利益而提起代位訴訟,由于該制度衍生于股東派生訴訟制度,其部分性質(zhì)與股東派生訴訟有相同之處,法理研討及法律規(guī)范適用上仍然需要從一般股東派生訴訟制度開始。然而中國現(xiàn)行公司立法引進(jìn)的股東派生訴訟制度,但為了強(qiáng)調(diào)防止少數(shù)股東濫訟,在持股比例及持股時(shí)間上有諸多限制,而且對訴訟擔(dān)保,原告資格,公司地位等問題上沒有規(guī)定或規(guī)定不明確,在實(shí)體法和程序法都有許多缺陷,造成司法實(shí)踐中法院適用股東派生訴訟制度時(shí)的意見不統(tǒng)一。如果對該制度不進(jìn)行檢討完善,引進(jìn)雙重代位訴訟制度則存在極大的困難。比較那些已經(jīng)在實(shí)踐上承認(rèn)雙重代表訴訟的國家而言,中國現(xiàn)行公司法的股東派生訴訟的被告適格主體范圍較小,如果不對此進(jìn)行修改,將會(huì)限制雙重代表訴訟的適用范疇。 目前,雙重代表訴訟的理論基礎(chǔ)部分還有待厘清之處,但這不應(yīng)成為妨礙此理論進(jìn)行深入研究,也不應(yīng)成為引進(jìn)該理論的障礙。為明確控股公司間利益受損時(shí)的損害賠償及遏止不法行為,保護(hù)控制公司架構(gòu)下控制公司的中小股東間接投資利益,在中國將來立法中引進(jìn)雙重代表訴訟是十分必要的。因此,本文嘗試就現(xiàn)行股東派生訴訟制度中的不足之處提出若干立法上的修正建議并予以論證,供立法機(jī)關(guān)和司法部門參考,希望能健全中國控制公司的股東代位訴訟求償法律機(jī)制,進(jìn)一步完善中國公司治理,以期保護(hù)控制公司架構(gòu)下的中小股東利益。
[Abstract]:When a controlling company makes use of the controlled company to commit an unlawful act and causes damage to the assets of the controlled company, the minority shareholders of the controlled company may, in accordance with Article 152 of the Company Law of China, control the company,The person in charge of the controlling company and other controlled companies making profits bring derivative action to investigate the liability of the wrongdoer for damages.However, since the controlling company itself holds a considerable amount of shares in the controlled company, it is ultimately the shareholders of the controlled company to bear the losses of the controlled company.However, when the shareholders of the controlled company are lazy to exercise their right of action, the current law does not give the minority shareholders of the controlled company with damaged interests an effective means of relief, which is difficult for such shareholders to obtain effective protection of their rights and interests.Looking back at the relevant cases in the case law of the United States and the case law of Japan, when the fact that the company concerned empties the assets of the company, the subject who enjoys the right of initiating derivative action should include the minority shareholders of the controlled company as well as the minority shareholders of the controlled company.Recognize the latter's right to initiate dual representation actions for the benefit of the controlled company and to participate actively in the supervision of the company.From the point of view of comparative law, there is still room for review and improvement on the regulation of the rights of minority shareholders in China's current company law.The significance of the double representative action of shareholders lies in that, through the exercise of the right of secondary subrogation, the minority shareholders of the controlling company are given the right to initiate subrogation for the benefit of the controlled company, because the system is derived from the system of shareholder derivative action.Some of its properties are similar to those of shareholders' derivative action, so the study of legal theory and the application of legal norms still need to start with the general shareholder derivative litigation system.However, the shareholder derivative litigation system introduced by the current company legislation in China, in order to emphasize the prevention of excessive litigation by minority shareholders, has many restrictions on the shareholding ratio and holding time, and the plaintiff's qualification for the litigation guarantee.There are many defects in substantive law and procedural law, which result in disunity of opinions when the court applies shareholder derivative litigation system in judicial practice.If the system is not reviewed and perfected, there are great difficulties in introducing double subrogation litigation system.Compared with those countries that have admitted dual representative litigation in practice, the scope of the defendant subject in shareholder derivative litigation in China's current company law is relatively small. If this is not amended, the scope of application of double representation litigation will be limited.At present, the theoretical basis of dual representative litigation still needs to be clarified, but this should not be an obstacle to the further study of this theory, nor should it be an obstacle to the introduction of the theory.It is necessary to introduce double representative litigation in future legislation in China in order to make clear the compensation for the damage caused by the interests of the holding companies and to stop the illegal behaviors and to protect the indirect investment interests of the minority shareholders of the controlling companies.Therefore, this paper attempts to put forward a number of legislative amendments to the deficiencies of the current shareholder derivative litigation system for the reference of the legislature and the judicial department.The author hopes to perfect the legal mechanism of shareholder subrogation litigation in China control company and further improve the Chinese corporate governance in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders under the control company structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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本文編號(hào)：1754764