【摘要】：本文主要分為三個(gè)部分:第一部分(第一章)對(duì)尋租理論及政商關(guān)系的國(guó)內(nèi)外理論和研究成果進(jìn)行了深入挖掘與梳理;第二部分包括第二章和第三章,探索了俄羅斯社會(huì)尋租現(xiàn)象的原因,分析了俄羅斯社會(huì)的尋租結(jié)構(gòu),并解析了尋租如何影響政商關(guān)系及俄羅斯經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展;第三部分(第四章)從實(shí)證的角度評(píng)價(jià)了俄羅斯社會(huì)尋租對(duì)企業(yè)表現(xiàn)和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的影響。俄羅斯社會(huì)政商尋租水平在30個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)型國(guó)家中處于較高的位置,且腐敗已經(jīng)成為直接阻礙俄羅斯企業(yè)發(fā)展的重要因素之一。俄羅斯社會(huì)中尋租行為廣泛存在,一方面是由于尋租產(chǎn)生的必然性,另一方面則是由俄羅斯轉(zhuǎn)型過程中的私有化改革及其特定的歷史條件所決定,其尋租又具有特殊性。尋租結(jié)果與政商關(guān)系有關(guān)。大型企業(yè)和寡頭與政府官員的關(guān)系更接近合作關(guān)系,通常都在聯(lián)邦一級(jí)擁有代言人,能夠在一定程度上影響聯(lián)邦層面的決策;中小型企業(yè)與官員的關(guān)系則不是對(duì)等的,談判力和話語權(quán)都比較弱,也無法影響高層政府的決策。本文從不同角度對(duì)俄羅斯社會(huì)尋租的機(jī)理及影響進(jìn)行分析后,得出以下結(jié)論:1)尋租廣泛分布于食品、紡織、機(jī)械、交通那等各個(gè)行業(yè)。尋租代價(jià)與是否與政府有交易關(guān)系無關(guān),與行業(yè)性質(zhì)有關(guān);不同所有權(quán)類型企業(yè)尋租情況不同,有國(guó)有資本成分的企業(yè)與政府合作最緊密,其次是民營(yíng)資本,再次是外國(guó)資本。2)尋租并不會(huì)為企業(yè)帶來顯著的業(yè)績(jī)?cè)鲩L(zhǎng),其銷售增長(zhǎng)率顯著低于低政府俘獲國(guó)家的總體平均值,這一點(diǎn)在俄羅斯的高政府俘獲企業(yè)和低政府俘獲企業(yè)的對(duì)比中更加突出,所以在過去三年中,俄羅斯企業(yè)并未從高政府俘獲中獲得相應(yīng)的回報(bào),并且造成了資源的浪費(fèi)。
[Abstract]:This paper is mainly divided into three parts: the first part (chapter one) deeply excavates and combs the domestic and foreign theories and research results of rent-seeking theory and the relationship between politics and business, the second part includes the second chapter and the third chapter. This paper probes into the causes of the phenomenon of rent-seeking in Russian society, analyzes the structure of rent-seeking in Russian society, and analyzes how rent-seeking affects the relationship between politics and business and the development of Russian economy. The third part (Chapter 4) evaluates the impact of social rent-seeking on the performance and macroeconomic development of Russian society. The level of political and commercial rent-seeking in Russian society is in a high position in 30 transition countries, and corruption has become one of the important factors directly hindering the development of Russian enterprises. Rent-seeking behavior exists widely in Russian society, on the one hand because of the inevitability of rent-seeking, on the other hand, it is determined by the privatization reform and its specific historical conditions in the process of Russian transformation, and its rent-seeking behavior has its particularity. The result of rent-seeking is related to the relationship between government and business. The relationship between large enterprises and oligarchs and government officials is closer to partnership, often with spokesmen at the federal level that can influence decision-making at the federal level to some extent, while the relationship between small and medium-sized enterprises and officials is not equal. Bargaining power and speaking power are weak, and can not affect the decision-making of high-level government. This paper analyzes the mechanism and influence of social rent-seeking in Russia from different angles, and draws the following conclusion: (1) Rent-seeking is widely distributed in food, textile, machinery, transportation and other industries. The rent-seeking cost has nothing to do with whether there is a transaction relationship with the government, it is related to the nature of the industry. Different types of enterprises have different rent-seeking situations. The enterprises with state-owned capital have the closest cooperation with the government, followed by private capital. Second, rent-seeking does not bring about significant growth in corporate performance. The growth rate of sales is significantly lower than the overall average of countries captured by low governments. This is particularly true in the contrast between high and low government capture firms in Russia, so in the past three years Russian firms have not received a corresponding return from high government capture and have caused a waste of resources.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D771.2

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