本文選題：危機(jī) + 區(qū)域彈性　； 參考：《中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2010年博士論文

【摘要】： 目前,全球化與網(wǎng)絡(luò)化使本已復(fù)雜的社會環(huán)境更趨動態(tài)和不確定,公共危機(jī)和突發(fā)事件已成為社會環(huán)境的常態(tài)和“新標(biāo)簽”。如果沒有一套科學(xué)有效的應(yīng)對機(jī)制,危機(jī)的不確定性、復(fù)雜性和不可測性,將很可能導(dǎo)致危機(jī)的失控。對危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系和機(jī)制的研究將有助于建立起完整的危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系,從而對經(jīng)濟(jì)社會發(fā)展起到支持、保障和穩(wěn)定的作用。當(dāng)前學(xué)術(shù)界對危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系和機(jī)制的研究上仍然較為薄弱,大多數(shù)為零星、初步的理論性探討,還沒有形成一個體系化、系統(tǒng)化的研究,而結(jié)合我國實(shí)際的系統(tǒng)、深入研究還很少,定量研究更是少之又少。 本文基于危機(jī)周期理論、全面危機(jī)管理理論和可持續(xù)發(fā)展理論,運(yùn)用模型分析、案例分析、實(shí)證分析和統(tǒng)計(jì)與計(jì)量分析方法對區(qū)域彈性要素、應(yīng)急決策模式、協(xié)調(diào)型危機(jī)制度等問題進(jìn)行研究,主要研究內(nèi)容及創(chuàng)新如下: 1、態(tài)勢管理下的區(qū)域彈性評估�；趹B(tài)勢管理的視角,從內(nèi)部、時(shí)間和外部三個基準(zhǔn)面分析區(qū)域彈性構(gòu)成,進(jìn)而構(gòu)建一個層次結(jié)構(gòu)的區(qū)域彈性評估模型,有助于發(fā)現(xiàn)危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系的弱點(diǎn)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):區(qū)域彈性由抵抗力、恢復(fù)力和創(chuàng)新力等三個內(nèi)在屬性構(gòu)成,各內(nèi)在屬性的關(guān)鍵要素可作為區(qū)域彈性的具體衡量指標(biāo)。 2、危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系的主要影響因素分析。基于區(qū)域彈性評估模型,利用10個城市2003-2007年間的面板數(shù)據(jù)對區(qū)域彈性評估的要素進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,找出影響區(qū)域彈性的關(guān)鍵因素。結(jié)果表明,區(qū)域彈性與人均收入、應(yīng)急通路、應(yīng)急保障、社會制度等因素正相關(guān),其中應(yīng)急保障對區(qū)域彈性的影響因子最大。而信息傳播、GDP和失業(yè)率等因素與區(qū)域彈性負(fù)相關(guān)。 提出面向危機(jī)的區(qū)域彈性提升建議:應(yīng)當(dāng)改變當(dāng)前以“環(huán)境換發(fā)展”的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展模式,從強(qiáng)調(diào)發(fā)展、經(jīng)濟(jì)GDP,向生態(tài)文明、人文GDP轉(zhuǎn)變;建立跨部門的應(yīng)急保障體系,實(shí)行扁平化管理;構(gòu)建完善的信息傳播機(jī)制,保證危機(jī)信息的真實(shí)、完整、科學(xué);通過改善初次分配來提高大部分人的收入,避免內(nèi)部協(xié)調(diào)的失衡。 3、危機(jī)應(yīng)對協(xié)同治理模式研究。從協(xié)同學(xué)理論的角度出發(fā),分析危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系的特點(diǎn),進(jìn)一步研究了危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系的外部開放機(jī)制、內(nèi)部協(xié)同機(jī)制和動力機(jī)制,對構(gòu)建危機(jī)協(xié)同治理機(jī)制的有效路徑進(jìn)行深入探討并模擬仿真了危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系的自組織演化過程。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):建立跨部門的、綜合型的危機(jī)管理機(jī)構(gòu),構(gòu)建多層面的危機(jī)應(yīng)對協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制,加強(qiáng)應(yīng)急資源的保障和軟實(shí)力建設(shè),將有助于實(shí)現(xiàn)危機(jī)應(yīng)對的協(xié)同治理,危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系經(jīng)過足夠的時(shí)間將會自組織演化至均衡狀態(tài)。 運(yùn)用自組織理論分析危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系自組織演化機(jī)制,研究危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系自組織演化的必要條件和動因。并借用生態(tài)學(xué)中的Logistic模型構(gòu)建危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系的系統(tǒng)動力學(xué)模型。以含3個應(yīng)急管理主體的模型為基礎(chǔ),對其進(jìn)行仿真模擬。結(jié)果表明,危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系可自組織演化至穩(wěn)定狀態(tài);應(yīng)急管理主體達(dá)到的平衡所需時(shí)間與初始狀態(tài)和固有增長率正相關(guān),平衡時(shí)的規(guī)模與網(wǎng)絡(luò)內(nèi)應(yīng)急管理主體的數(shù)量、自身最大規(guī)模正相關(guān),應(yīng)急管理主體平衡狀態(tài)時(shí)的規(guī)模與競合效應(yīng)系數(shù)密切相關(guān)。因此,通過增強(qiáng)資源保障、多元參與、信息共享及協(xié)同治理等舉措有助于危機(jī)應(yīng)對體系的自組織演化。 4、危機(jī)應(yīng)對的動態(tài)決策模式和溝通對策研究。基于不完全信息動態(tài)博弈,分析危機(jī)管理者如何根據(jù)新接收的信息和階段性的應(yīng)對結(jié)果進(jìn)行應(yīng)急決策。并根據(jù)危機(jī)各階段的公眾需求制定溝通對策,以有效地應(yīng)對危機(jī)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):構(gòu)建危機(jī)管理者的應(yīng)急決策函數(shù),分析應(yīng)急方案優(yōu)劣,將有助于危機(jī)管理者進(jìn)行動態(tài)決策。而公眾的信息需求是危機(jī)溝通對策選擇的關(guān)鍵因素。 構(gòu)建了動態(tài)危機(jī)應(yīng)對螺旋模型,對危機(jī)的動態(tài)應(yīng)對過程進(jìn)行分析。把危機(jī)決策過程看成是博弈雙方為“危機(jī)管理者”和“危機(jī)”的多階段不完全信息動態(tài)博弈過程,分析了危機(jī)管理者進(jìn)行危機(jī)應(yīng)對的動態(tài)應(yīng)急決策過程,通過應(yīng)急決策函數(shù)計(jì)算各個救援方案之間期望效用的大小來比較它們的優(yōu)劣,為危機(jī)管理者的決策提供支撐。 提出了基于公眾需求的危機(jī)溝通策略。從公眾需求的視角出發(fā),研究了在危機(jī)潛伏期、爆發(fā)期、延續(xù)期及結(jié)束期間公眾對三類危機(jī)信息的需求變化,并據(jù)此提出四階段危機(jī)周期的溝通策略:內(nèi)在信息占優(yōu)策略、結(jié)構(gòu)信息占優(yōu)策略、調(diào)節(jié)信息占優(yōu)策略和內(nèi)在信息強(qiáng)化策略,以使受災(zāi)公眾及時(shí)獲取所需信息,有效地應(yīng)對危機(jī)。 5、協(xié)調(diào)型危機(jī)制度的進(jìn)化博弈分析。運(yùn)用進(jìn)化博弈論對危機(jī)應(yīng)對中的中央政府與地方政府、政府與媒體和應(yīng)急物資供應(yīng)商等關(guān)鍵主體兩兩之間的協(xié)調(diào)問題進(jìn)行研究,探求協(xié)調(diào)型危機(jī)制度的變遷路徑。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):博弈的多均衡性導(dǎo)致了危機(jī)制度的多樣性。而不同危機(jī)制度間的效益差就產(chǎn)生了制度變遷的壓力,但是制度變遷能否實(shí)現(xiàn)還取決于與制度所對應(yīng)的均衡是否具有隨機(jī)穩(wěn)定性。 構(gòu)建了基于信息的中央政府和地方政府博弈矩陣。通過分析認(rèn)為經(jīng)過足夠長的時(shí)間博弈雙方最終會達(dá)到公開消息均衡,而完善政府官員考核制度和建立政府內(nèi)部危機(jī)信息共享制度將使其盡快達(dá)到這一均衡。 從進(jìn)化博弈視角研究危機(jī)溝通制度變遷。構(gòu)建了參與方為政府和媒體的危機(jī)溝通制度博弈矩陣。雙方的博弈是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)占優(yōu)的博弈,且具有收斂性,即無論政府和媒體間的初始機(jī)制是什么,最終達(dá)到相互獨(dú)立的均衡狀態(tài)。而信息公開、政媒分家、公眾參與等制度的建立會加快政府、媒體向相互獨(dú)立的均衡轉(zhuǎn)變。 建立了應(yīng)急物資供應(yīng)商間競價(jià)博弈矩陣。通過分析得出應(yīng)急物資供應(yīng)商之間最終會在競價(jià)的過程中,形成一個主供應(yīng)商和多個次供應(yīng)商的多供應(yīng)商機(jī)制,且主供應(yīng)商會不斷變更。因而政府要建立備用供應(yīng)商資料庫,并為供應(yīng)商提供積極的公平氛圍和報(bào)價(jià)機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:At present, globalization and networking have made the complex social environment more dynamic and uncertain. Public crises and emergencies have become the normal and "new label" of the social environment. Without a set of scientific and effective coping mechanisms, the uncertainty, complexity and unmeasurability of the crisis will lead to the runaway of the crisis. The study of the system and mechanism will help to establish a complete crisis response system, thus supporting, ensuring and stabilizing the economic and social development. The current academic circles are still relatively weak in the study of the crisis response system and mechanism, most of which are fragmentary, and the preliminary theoretical discussion has not yet formed a systematized system. The study of chemistry and the combination of the actual system in China are few, and quantitative studies are few.
Based on the crisis cycle theory, comprehensive crisis management theory and sustainable development theory, this paper uses model analysis, case analysis, empirical analysis and statistical and econometric analysis methods to study regional elastic elements, emergency decision-making model, coordinated crisis system and other issues, the main content and innovation are as follows:
1, regional resilience assessment under situation management. Based on the perspective of situation management, the analysis of regional elasticity from the three benchmarks of internal, temporal and external, and then building a regional elastic evaluation model of a hierarchical structure, helps to find the weakness of the crisis response system. The study finds that regional elasticity is three of resistance, resilience and innovation. The key elements of each internal attribute can be used as a specific measure of regional elasticity.
2, analysis of the main factors affecting the crisis response system. Based on the regional resilience assessment model, the key factors affecting regional elasticity are found out by using the panel data of 10 cities for 2003-2007 years to find out the key factors affecting regional elasticity. The results show that regional elasticity and human income, emergency access, emergency support, social system and so on are shown. There is a positive correlation between factors, and the most important factor is regional resilience. The factors such as information transmission, GDP and unemployment rate are negatively correlated with regional elasticity.
Proposed the crisis oriented regional flexibility promotion proposal: we should change the current economic development model of "environment for development", from the emphasis on development, economic GDP, ecological civilization and the transformation of human GDP; the establishment of an interdepartmental emergency guarantee system, the implementation of flat management, the construction of a perfect information dissemination mechanism, to ensure the authenticity and integrity of crisis information. Learn to increase the income of most people by improving the initial distribution and avoid the imbalance of internal coordination.
3, crisis response cooperative governance model. From the perspective of synergetic theory, this paper analyzes the characteristics of the crisis response system, further studies the external opening mechanism of the crisis response system, the internal coordination mechanism and the dynamic mechanism, deeply discusses and simulates the effective path of the crisis cooperative governance mechanism, and simulates the crisis response. It is found that the establishment of a cross sectoral, comprehensive crisis management organization, the construction of a multi level crisis response coordination mechanism, the strengthening of the security of emergency resources and the construction of soft power will help to achieve the synergistic governance of the crisis response, and the crisis response system will evolve from organization to equilibrium after sufficient time. State.
The self-organization evolution mechanism of crisis response system is analyzed by self organization theory, the necessary conditions and motivation of self-organization evolution of crisis response system are studied. The system dynamics model of crisis response system is constructed by using the Logistic model in ecology. The simulation simulation is carried out on the basis of the model of 3 emergency management subjects. It is clear that the crisis response system can evolve from organization to stable state. The time required for the balance of the emergency management body is positively related to the initial state and inherent growth rate. The scale of the balance is positively related to the number of emergency management bodies within the network and the largest scale of its own, and the scale of the balance of emergency management owners is closely related to the coopetition effect coefficient. Therefore, by enhancing resource protection, multiple participation, information sharing and collaborative governance, we can contribute to the self-organization evolution of crisis response system.
4, the dynamic decision-making model and communication countermeasures of crisis response. Based on the dynamic game of incomplete information, this paper analyzes how the crisis managers make emergency decisions based on the newly received information and the results of the phased response. And according to the public needs of various stages of the crisis, the communication countermeasures are formulated to deal with the crisis effectively. The emergency decision function of the manager and the analysis of the emergency plan will help the crisis managers to make dynamic decision. The information demand of the public is the key factor for the choice of the crisis communication.
The dynamic crisis response spiral model is constructed and the dynamic response process of the crisis is analyzed. The crisis decision-making process is regarded as the dynamic game process of the multi-stage incomplete information game between the two parties as "crisis manager" and "crisis", and the dynamic emergency decision-making process of crisis managers should be analyzed, and the emergency decision is made. The function calculates the expected utility size of each rescue plan to compare their advantages and disadvantages, so as to provide support for crisis managers' decision-making.
The crisis communication strategy based on public demand is proposed. From the perspective of the public demand, the demand changes of three types of crisis information in the crisis incubation period, the outbreak period, the duration and the end of the crisis are studied. Accordingly, the communication strategies of the four stage of crisis cycle are proposed: the internal information dominant strategy, the structural information dominant strategy, and the adjustment of information Dominant strategy and internal information reinforcement strategy, so as to enable disaster victims to get the information needed in time and effectively cope with the crisis.
5, the evolutionary game analysis of the coordinated crisis system. The evolution game theory is used to study the coordination between the central government and the local government, the government and the media and the emergency material suppliers and other key subjects in the crisis response, and explore the path of the vicissitude path of the coordinated crisis system. The research finds that the multi equilibrium of the game has caused the danger. The diversity of machine system, and the difference between the different crisis systems has produced the pressure of institutional change, but whether the institutional change can be realized depends on whether the equilibrium corresponding to the system has a random stability.
The game matrix of the central government and local government based on information is constructed. Through the analysis, it is believed that the two parties will eventually reach the public message equilibrium after a long enough time, and the system of government officials' assessment and the establishment of the government internal crisis information sharing system will make it achieve this equilibrium as soon as possible.
From the perspective of evolutionary game, the change of crisis communication system is studied. The game matrix of the crisis communication system for the government and the media is constructed. The game between the two parties is a risk dominant game, and it is convergent, that is, whatever the initial mechanism of the government and the media is, finally reaching the state of mutual independence. The establishment of home, public participation and other systems will accelerate the transformation of the government and the media to an independent equilibrium.
The competitive price game matrix between suppliers of emergency materials is set up. Through the analysis, it is concluded that the supplier will form a multi supplier mechanism of the main supplier and multiple suppliers in the process of bidding, and the main supplier will be constantly changed. Therefore, the government should establish the supplier database and provide the supplier with positive information. A fair atmosphere and a pricing mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D523

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王維翊;長春市公共安全建設(shè)問題研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2011年

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本文編號：2107148