【摘要】：公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪是指國家工作人員的貪污賄賂犯罪，它以權(quán)錢交易、權(quán)力濫用為基本特征。高級不法公職人員，由于職位高、機會多，，大肆利用職權(quán)收取賄賂，斂財金額巨大，影響面廣，理應(yīng)受到社會各界的高度重視。與此同時，更有“小人物”儼然成為各類貪腐大案的“主角”，他們是底層的科級官員，有些甚至連科級都稱不上，如村官等。而他們實施的經(jīng)濟犯罪所造成的影響同樣令社會震驚。 可見，無論是高級別還是低級別公職人員，其經(jīng)濟犯罪的社會負面影響都是巨大的。不僅影響了干群關(guān)系、資金的合理分配，更是制約了和諧社會的構(gòu)建。因此，研究高低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪特征及其差異，具有重要的現(xiàn)實意義。 本文從實證的角度，利用相關(guān)經(jīng)濟學理論分析高低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪特征及其差異，并有針對性的對預(yù)防高、低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪提出行之有效的操作策略。主要研究內(nèi)容如下： （1）通過典型案例分析和描述性統(tǒng)計得出高低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪特征及其差異。首先，對高、低級別的六個典型案例進行分析，得出高、低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪的一般行為路徑。其次，對搜集的730個調(diào)研數(shù)據(jù)進行描述性分析，用事實說明不同級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪的特征。 （2）通過構(gòu)建公職人員效用函數(shù)，分析導致高、低級別公職人員實施經(jīng)濟犯罪行為的影響因素。首先，提出公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪行為決策的約束條件，分別為需求動機、“進入”成本和道德自律，并分析其對高、低級別公職人員的約束程度。接著，構(gòu)建公職人員效用函數(shù)，得出影響公職人員決策過程的因素包括個人效用偏好結(jié)構(gòu)、既有效用量、風險偏好和懲治力度，并分別對高低級別進行分析。 （3）構(gòu)建高、低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪隱蔽性影響因素的二元logistic回歸模型。根據(jù)已有文獻，本文選取潛伏期、斂財手段和資產(chǎn)處置方式作為公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪隱蔽性的指標。結(jié)論為：高級別比低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪更加隱蔽。影響高級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪隱蔽性的主要是潛伏期、犯罪次數(shù)、所得來源種類等犯罪因素；影響低級別的主要是年齡、教育程度、家庭狀況等個人因素；犯罪總金額則是兩者的共同影響因素。 最后，針對高低級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪的特征差異，提出預(yù)防不同級別公職人員經(jīng)濟犯罪的策略建議。
[Abstract]:The economic crime of public officials refers to the crime of embezzlement and bribery of state functionaries, which is characterized by the transaction of power and money and the abuse of power. Senior illegal public officials, because of their high positions and many opportunities, wantonly use their functions and powers to collect bribes, accumulate huge amounts of money and have a wide range of influence, and should be attached great importance to by all walks of life. At the same time, "small potatoes" have become the "protagonists" of all kinds of corruption cases, they are the bottom of the department level officials, some even department level, such as village officials and so on. The impact of the economic crimes they commit is also shocking to society. It can be seen that whether high-level or low-level public officials, the social negative impact of economic crime is huge. It not only affects the relationship between cadres and masses, but also restricts the construction of harmonious society. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the characteristics and differences of economic crimes of high and low level public officials. From the empirical point of view, this paper analyzes the characteristics and differences of economic crimes of high and low level public officials by using the relevant economic theories, and puts forward effective operational strategies to prevent the economic crimes of high and low level public officials. The main research contents are as follows: (1) through typical case analysis and descriptive statistics, the characteristics and differences of economic crime of high and low level public officials are obtained. First of all, six typical cases of high and low level are analyzed, and the general behavior path of economic crime of high and low level public officials is obtained. Secondly, the descriptive analysis of 730 survey data is carried out, and the characteristics of economic crime of public officials at different levels are explained by facts. (2) by constructing the utility function of public officials, the influencing factors of economic crime committed by high and low level public officials are analyzed. First of all, the constraint conditions of public officials' economic crime behavior decision are put forward, which are demand motivation, "entry" cost and moral self-discipline, and the restraint degree to high and low level public officials is analyzed. Then, the utility function of public officials is constructed, and the factors that affect the decision-making process of public officials include the structure of personal utility preference, both effective dosage, risk preference and punishment strength, and analyze the high and low levels respectively. (3) to construct a binary logistic regression model for the hidden influencing factors of economic crime of high and low level public officials. According to the existing literature, this paper selects the incubation period, the means of accumulating money and the way of asset disposal as the indicators of the concealment of public officials' economic crimes. The conclusion is that the economic crime of high-level public officials is more covert than that of low-level public officials. The main factors that affect the concealment of economic crime of high-level public officials are the incubation period, the number of crimes, the source of income and other criminal factors, the lower levels are mainly personal factors such as age, education level, family status, and the total amount of crime is the common influencing factor of the two. Finally, according to the characteristics of economic crime of high and low grade public officials, this paper puts forward some strategic suggestions to prevent the economic crime of different levels of public officials.
【學位授予單位】：太原科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D917

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