【摘要】： 企業(yè)是構(gòu)成國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的組織。細(xì)胞發(fā)生病變不僅會(huì)影響企業(yè)組織的健康，而且會(huì)侵害國民經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境。因此，本文從分析企業(yè)組織的病變?nèi)胧�，�?duì)國有企業(yè)高管犯罪及其控制手段進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)研究，旨在尋找提高企業(yè)高管犯罪控制力的路徑，建構(gòu)企業(yè)高管犯罪系統(tǒng)控制理論框架。 從實(shí)踐觀察的角度來看，犯罪行為與敗德行為和違規(guī)行為既有差別又有關(guān)聯(lián)。首先，犯罪行為必然是敗德行為，而敗德行為到達(dá)一定程度后才為犯罪；其次，違規(guī)行為與敗德行為具有交叉性，違規(guī)行為并不一定是敗德行為，敗德行為不一定是違規(guī)行為；最后，違規(guī)行為達(dá)到一定程度后，才為犯罪行為，而犯罪行為一定是違規(guī)行為。 從行為的決策程序來看，任何一個(gè)行為決策首先要考量的是是否符合道德要求，其次是是否能夠滿足制度要求，最后就是來自刑罰的威懾。因此，行為決策程序的三大考量決定了預(yù)防犯罪具有三大控制手段，即道德控制、制度控制和刑罰控制。 基于上述考慮，本文從五個(gè)方面切入國有企業(yè)高管犯罪問題，在犯罪動(dòng)機(jī)、行為、后果及其預(yù)防和控制的研究取得了創(chuàng)新性的進(jìn)展。第一，從微觀角度分析了犯罪決策的機(jī)理，在原有文獻(xiàn)模型的基礎(chǔ)上添加了嚴(yán)重影響刑罰威懾效果的變量，即刑罰延遲變量；第二，分析了國有企業(yè)與國有企業(yè)高管人員犯罪決策的機(jī)制，得出了單位犯罪本質(zhì)上就是自然人犯罪的結(jié)論；第三，率先借用學(xué)習(xí)演化博弈模型，解釋了道德演化機(jī)理，分析了不同道德變化趨勢(shì)中個(gè)人決策的機(jī)制；第四，從國有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)制度著手，根據(jù)多層委托代理理論，對(duì)監(jiān)督機(jī)制和激勵(lì)機(jī)制從犯罪預(yù)防角度進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)探討，其中，重點(diǎn)是將犯罪實(shí)現(xiàn)和處罰可能性引入委托代理監(jiān)督激勵(lì)機(jī)制的研究；第五，探討了刑罰延遲與刑罰威懾力之間的關(guān)系，其中突出了刑罰延遲對(duì)刑罰威懾力減損的機(jī)理，以及相應(yīng)的政策性建議。 本文的內(nèi)容結(jié)構(gòu)劃分為七個(gè)部分：第1章概述了本文研究的背景、意義、文獻(xiàn)、主題和內(nèi)容；第2章對(duì)犯罪決策進(jìn)行了多學(xué)科的理論分析；進(jìn)而提出了國有企業(yè)及其高管犯罪邊界判斷(第3章)；第4、5、6章分別對(duì)目前國有企業(yè)高管犯罪的控制手段進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)分析，全面檢討了國有企業(yè)高管犯罪三大控制手段存在的問題；第7章針對(duì)目前國有企業(yè)高管犯罪控制手段的缺陷，全方位的提出了對(duì)策和建議，，并對(duì)論文研究進(jìn)行了全面總結(jié)。
[Abstract]:An enterprise is an organization that constitutes the national economy. Cytopathic changes not only affect the health of enterprises, but also affect the environment of national economy. Therefore, this paper starts with the analysis of the pathological changes of the enterprise organization, carries on the systematic research to the state-owned enterprise executives' crime and its control means, in order to find the way to improve the enterprise executive's crime control ability, constructs the enterprise executive's crime system control theory frame. From the point of view of practice, there are differences and relations between criminal behavior and moral behavior and illegal behavior. First of all, criminal behavior is bound to be the behavior of failing morality, and the behavior of failing morality is only a crime after it reaches a certain degree; secondly, the illegal behavior and the behavior of failing morality have the nature of crossing, the violation behavior is not necessarily the behavior of failing morality, the behavior of failing morality is not necessarily the behavior of violation of morality; Finally, after the violation reaches a certain level, it is a criminal act, and the criminal behavior must be a violation. From the point of view of the decision-making procedure of behavior, the first consideration of any behavior decision is whether it conforms to the moral requirements, the second is whether it can meet the requirements of the system, and the last is the deterrent from the penalty. Therefore, the three major considerations of behavioral decision-making procedure determine that crime prevention has three major means of control, namely, moral control, institutional control and penalty control. Based on the above considerations, this paper makes innovative progress in the study of crime motivation, behavior, consequences and prevention and control of state-owned enterprise executives from five aspects. Firstly, it analyzes the mechanism of crime decision from the micro angle, and adds the variables which seriously influence the effect of penalty deterrence, that is, penalty delay variable, on the basis of the original literature model. Secondly, it analyzes the mechanism of the senior executives' crime decision-making in state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises, and draws the conclusion that unit crime is natural person crime in essence; Thirdly, we first use the game model of learning evolution to explain the mechanism of moral evolution and analyze the individual decision-making mechanism in different moral trends. Fourth, starting from the property right system of state-owned enterprises, according to the multi-level principal-agent theory, the paper systematically discusses the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism from the angle of crime prevention, among which, The focus is to introduce the possibility of crime and punishment into the principal-agent supervision incentive mechanism; Fifthly, the relationship between penalty delay and penalty deterrence is discussed, in which the mechanism of penalty delay detracting from penalty deterrence and corresponding policy suggestions are highlighted. The content structure of this paper is divided into seven parts: the first chapter summarizes the background, significance, literature, theme and content of this study; Then it puts forward the judgment of the crime boundary of state-owned enterprises and their executives (Chapter 3); Chapter 4, chapter 5 and chapter 6, respectively, systematically analyze the control methods of the crime of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, and comprehensively review the problems existing in the three means of controlling the crime of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. In chapter 7, aiming at the defects of the crime control means of the senior executives in state-owned enterprises, the author puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions in all directions, and summarizes the research of the thesis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：D917.6

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 郝春祿;基于人力資本開發(fā)的遼寧國企管理層建設(shè)研究[D];武漢理工大學(xué);2009年

本文編號(hào)：2428327