本文關(guān)鍵詞：網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件政府治理的演化博弈分析，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件政府治理的演化博弈分析

Analysis of Government Management in the Network Mass Incidents Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

[1] [2] [3]

LIU Renjing, SUN Bin, LIU Dehai （1. Xi＇an Jiaotong University, Xi＇an, China; 2. Dongbei University of Finance ＆ Economics, Dalian , Liaoning,China）

[1]西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院; [2]東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)數(shù)學(xué)與數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院

文章摘要：利用演化博弈模型預(yù)測輿論的發(fā)展趨勢,對政府應(yīng)對網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件采取的治理模式進(jìn)行了研究。在一般化復(fù)制動態(tài)模型基礎(chǔ)上建立網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件輿論的傳播方程,將地方政府部門與弱勢群體的策略互動和行為演化融入到傳染病傳播模型中,用以模擬輿論的擴(kuò)散和收斂過程。結(jié)果表明：在網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件初期,如果弱勢群體通過抗?fàn)帿@得政府補(bǔ)償?shù)母怕什粩嘣龃?將造成事態(tài)的擴(kuò)大。此時,地方政府應(yīng)控制信息的交流程度與初始抗?fàn)幦藬?shù),減緩輿論的擴(kuò)散;在網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件輿論大范圍擴(kuò)散階段,上級政府介入并采取懲罰措施,及時披露信息,促使網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿論的收斂平息,實(shí)現(xiàn)社會福利最大化。

Abstr：This study makes attempts to forecast the trend of public opinion and analyses the different modes of governance that government deals with network mass incidents using evolutionary game theory. The diffusion function of public opinion in network mass incidents is built by using the generalized replieator dynamics model, where the strategy interaction and behavior evolution between local government and social vulnerable groups are put into the traditional infectious disease diffusion model to simulate the spread and convergence process of public opinion. It is concluded that enlarging the probability of obtaining government compensation will cause the mass incidents, and meanwhile, to slow down the spread of public opinion government needs to control the opening communication de- gree and the protester number in the explosion phase. And in order to make the public opinion calm and maximize the social welfare, the high-level government needs to set the punishment mechanism and keep communication open.

文章關(guān)鍵詞：

Keyword：:evolutionary game theory network mass incidents the traditional infectious disease diffusion model communication social welfare maximization

課題項(xiàng)目：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目（71271166;71271045）; 教育部博士點(diǎn)基金資助項(xiàng)目（20120201110068）; 東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)科建設(shè)支持計(jì)劃特色學(xué)科資助項(xiàng)目（XKT-201411）

作者信息：會員可見

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：網(wǎng)絡(luò)群體事件政府治理的演化博弈分析，，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。