本文選題：職務(wù)犯罪　切入點：委托人　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2006年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：職務(wù)犯罪作為權(quán)力異化、以權(quán)謀私的極端表現(xiàn)，正在滲入國家的政治、經(jīng)濟、文化生活的各個領(lǐng)域，已經(jīng)成為制約社會健康發(fā)展、破壞社會穩(wěn)定的重要因素。本文采用博弈理論對職務(wù)犯罪這一社會問題進行分析，從經(jīng)濟學(xué)的角度揭示職務(wù)犯罪的演進規(guī)律。 全文共分六個部分。 一、描述職務(wù)犯罪的危害、現(xiàn)狀，論述職務(wù)犯罪的概念，概述了職務(wù)犯罪產(chǎn)生的原因和規(guī)律。 二、簡要介紹了博弈論的發(fā)展歷程、應(yīng)用、特點及概念，通過對經(jīng)典博弈模型——囚徒困境的分析，指出博弈分析的目的是找出博弈的均衡狀態(tài)，，進而分析影響博弈均衡的因素和均衡的含義。 三、通過對維權(quán)與侵權(quán)的博弈分析，論證了實然權(quán)利的殘缺性，犯罪是維權(quán)與侵權(quán)博弈的均衡結(jié)果。 四、本部分是論文的重點，首先用委托代理理論、尋租理論構(gòu)建職務(wù)犯罪的博弈模型，重點分析了職務(wù)犯罪的博弈參與人在不同博弈規(guī)則和條件下的職務(wù)犯罪均衡解以及影響職務(wù)犯罪均衡的因素，指出了委托人在均衡狀態(tài)下預(yù)防、控制職務(wù)犯罪的策略選擇。 五、通過對我國控制、預(yù)防職務(wù)犯罪政策的檢討，指出了我國現(xiàn)階段職務(wù)犯罪嚴重狀況的原因。 六、分析了法律在預(yù)防職務(wù)犯罪中的作用，論述了重建職務(wù)犯罪新的均衡狀態(tài)是委托人的理性選擇。
[Abstract]:As an extreme manifestation of power alienation and abuse of power for personal gain, job-related crimes are infiltrating into various fields of national political, economic and cultural life and have become a constraint to the healthy development of society. This paper analyzes the social problem of job-related crime by game theory, and reveals the law of evolution of job-related crime from the angle of economics. The full text is divided into six parts. First, it describes the harm and present situation of duty crime, discusses the concept of duty crime, and summarizes the causes and rules of duty crime. Secondly, the development course, application, characteristics and concept of game theory are briefly introduced. Through the analysis of the classical game model-Prisoner's Dilemma, it is pointed out that the purpose of game analysis is to find out the equilibrium state of the game. Then it analyzes the factors affecting game equilibrium and the meaning of equilibrium. Thirdly, by analyzing the game between rights protection and tort, the author proves that the real rights are incomplete, and that crime is the balanced result of the game between rights protection and tort. Fourth, this part is the focus of the paper. Firstly, the game model of job-related crime is constructed by principal-agent theory and rent-seeking theory. This paper mainly analyzes the equilibrium solution of duty crime under different game rules and conditions and the factors that affect the balance of duty crime, and points out the choice of strategy to prevent and control the duty crime in the equilibrium state of client. Fifthly, through the review of the policy of controlling and preventing duty crime in our country, the author points out the reasons for the serious situation of duty crime in our country at present. Sixth, it analyzes the role of law in the prevention of job-related crimes, and discusses that it is the rational choice of clients to rebuild the new equilibrium state of job-related crimes.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2006
【分類號】：D917

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