本文關(guān)鍵詞：水電工程施工安全管理激勵機制設(shè)計，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

水電工程施工安全管理激勵機制設(shè)計

Incentive mechanism design for safety management of hydropower construction

[1] [2] [3] [4]

CHEN Shu1, HU Zhi-gen1, LIU Quan1, GUO Jie2（1. School of Water Resource and Hydropower, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China; 2. Conghua Water Authority, Guangzhou 510900,

[1]武漢大學(xué)水利水電學(xué)院,湖北武漢430072; [2]廣州從化市水務(wù)局,廣東廣州510900

文章摘要：根據(jù)我國水電工程施工安全管理特點，借助多任務(wù)和多重委托代理理論分析框架，構(gòu)建施工安全管理的目標(biāo)函數(shù)，根據(jù)激勵約束、參與約束等約束條件求解激勵模型．通過分析模型stackelbe唱博弈均衡解的特征，發(fā)現(xiàn)在“安全事故一票否決制”條件下，工程建設(shè)和施工安全管理的最優(yōu)業(yè)績報酬也具有相互獨立性，且最優(yōu)業(yè)績報酬是絕對風(fēng)險規(guī)避度、邊際激勵成本變化率和可觀測變量方差的遞減函數(shù)，最后通過算例分別討論了政府與工程項目部的激勵參數(shù)，以期為中國水電工程施工安全監(jiān)管和實踐提供理論借鑒．

Abstr：To prevent major accidents fundamentally in hydropower constructions, it＇s necessary to a design incentive mechanism for construction safety management. The characteristics of hydropower construction are analyzed to seek for multitasking and multiple-agency relationship in safety management. According to the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, an incentive model is constructed to optimize the overall safety goals. The equilibrium solution of this model implies that the optimum performance pay between engineering construction and safety management is mutually independent under the condition of one-vote negation system concerning safety accidents. Simultaneously, the optimum performance pay is a decreasing function of the absolute risk aversion, the change rate of marginal incentive cost and the observable variables variance. Finally, an example is given to discuss the incentive parameters of the government and the project department.

文章關(guān)鍵詞：

Keyword：:multitasking principal-agent construction safety incentive mechanism

課題項目：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目（51079115）;中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費專項資金資助項目（201120602020006）.

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：水電工程施工安全管理激勵機制設(shè)計，，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。