本文關(guān)鍵詞：農(nóng)村小型水利設(shè)施的農(nóng)戶投入行為與激勵研究，，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

        全文以促進農(nóng)村小型水利的有效供給為目標,以農(nóng)村小型水利供給的體制演進為背景,以公共品供給理論、制度變遷理論、行為經(jīng)濟學理論、激勵理論為框架,基于農(nóng)戶的行為的視角,分析農(nóng)戶參與小型農(nóng)村水利設(shè)施的效用,分析影響農(nóng)戶投入行為的因素,剖析農(nóng)戶需求表達的不同模式,探討如何對農(nóng)戶投入意愿進行激勵,并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出對策和建議。1.研究的主要內(nèi)容(1)對本文需要借鑒的一般理論進行梳理,包括公共物品供給理論、制度變遷理論、行為經(jīng)濟學理論、激勵理論以及社會資本理論；對相關(guān)文獻進行綜述與評價,主要側(cè)重于國家——鄉(xiāng)村社會視角的水利供給,小型水利建設(shè)的制度變遷以及水利設(shè)施需求的實證因素。(2)根據(jù)小型水利的公共品屬性、以農(nóng)戶的行為為視角,從農(nóng)戶投入特征,投入主體的博弈等方面對小型水利的供給進行經(jīng)濟學分析。(3)對重慶小型水利工程的供給體制演進梳理與分析,劃分體制演進的四個階段,對各個歷史時期的特征、投入情況以及主要成就進行概括,總結(jié)經(jīng)驗與教訓(xùn),從歷史邏輯的角度探尋現(xiàn)行供給體制存在的問題及困難。(4)以近五年參與過小型水利設(shè)施投入的農(nóng)戶為樣本,運用排序二元選擇模型,對影響農(nóng)戶投入效用的因素進行了分析與討論,體現(xiàn)農(nóng)戶對水利投入所獲回報的主觀評價。(5)基于靜態(tài)博弈理論建立模型,根據(jù)農(nóng)戶投入的兩種不同形式區(qū)分投資行為與投工行為,采取二元選擇模型進行回歸分析,并對實證的結(jié)果進行討論(6)分析當前農(nóng)戶在小型水利建設(shè)中投入需求顯示的三種主要模式：主動接觸型需求顯示、強人替代型需求顯示以及投票型需求顯示。(7)研究農(nóng)戶行為的激勵問題,基于“效價—手段—期望”的框架,從資金支持、工具性完善與社會偏好培育三個途徑,全面分析顯性激勵與隱性激勵手段。2.研究的主要結(jié)論(1)政府與農(nóng)戶的責權(quán)重建是農(nóng)村準公共品有效供給的關(guān)鍵。小型水利是在一定地域范圍內(nèi)具有公共資源與俱樂部物品雙重性質(zhì)的準公共物品,并且具有較強的外部性與壟斷性。合作供給小型水利所需要的激勵機制、成本分攤、組織動員以及關(guān)系協(xié)調(diào)等實現(xiàn)集體行動的條件在大集體生產(chǎn)方式下能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)自然滿足,但在家庭經(jīng)營取代大集體生產(chǎn)之后,上述問題并未得到有效的制度安排,帶來的直接后果是小型水利建設(shè)的下滑,進而影響到農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)、城鄉(xiāng)統(tǒng)籌發(fā)展、國家糧食安全及生態(tài)安全等。興建小型水利設(shè)施既是農(nóng)戶切身利益的需要,也是政府職責所在。在政府加大投入的基礎(chǔ)上,尊重與引導(dǎo)農(nóng)戶的投入意愿,實現(xiàn)政府與農(nóng)戶在小農(nóng)水建設(shè)上合理的權(quán)責重建是實現(xiàn)小農(nóng)水有效供給的關(guān)鍵。(2)農(nóng)戶對現(xiàn)有水利建設(shè)投入的回報普遍感到滿意,但相比最初投入的積極性,仍然有所不足。農(nóng)業(yè)收入比例、用水量、是否參與管理、意見是否起作用、文化程度影響農(nóng)戶投入的效用。農(nóng)業(yè)收入比例越高,農(nóng)戶的滿意度越高；用水量越大,農(nóng)戶的滿意程度越高；參與管理的農(nóng)戶滿意度明顯高于未參與管理的；農(nóng)戶對水利建設(shè)方案的意見越起作用,農(nóng)戶的滿意度越高,文化程度較高的農(nóng)戶滿意度較高。(3)勞動力價格,組織者能力、社區(qū)非農(nóng)收入水平、政府出資力度、水利建設(shè)的效用、文化程度影響農(nóng)戶的出資意愿；水田面積、現(xiàn)有設(shè)施是否夠用、社區(qū)非農(nóng)收入水平、文化程度影響農(nóng)戶的出工意愿。實證結(jié)果表明,在農(nóng)民收入逐漸提高,以及政府對小農(nóng)水投資與獎補比例不斷上升,農(nóng)民實際投入相對下降的背景下,收入已不再成為影響農(nóng)戶投入的一個主要因素。勞動力價格的上漲,使農(nóng)戶更傾向于出資的投入方式,且家庭中主要勞動力價格越高,就越愿意出資。農(nóng)戶與農(nóng)戶之間,農(nóng)戶與政府之間存在著明顯的博弈行為。在文化水平較低的群體中,對于水利設(shè)施的重要性和使用價值的認識還不夠因而投入意愿較低。當前影響農(nóng)戶出工與出資意愿的因素存在著較大的差別,農(nóng)戶在進行出資決策時較多地考慮價格因素以及效用,并且表現(xiàn)出對政府投資的明顯依賴,其行為模式更符合“理性小農(nóng)”；只有當水利對農(nóng)戶比較重要時,農(nóng)戶才考慮出工,且水田面積越大,現(xiàn)有設(shè)施越不能滿足需求,農(nóng)戶就越愿意出工,而幾乎不考慮其他因素,在出工決策上表現(xiàn)得更象“生存小農(nóng)”。(4)政府可以通過對小農(nóng)水建設(shè)進行資金支持、制度支持實現(xiàn)對農(nóng)戶投入意愿的顯性激勵,也可以通過引導(dǎo)或培育公平感、道德情感和社會資本等社會偏好以增強農(nóng)戶投入行為的隱性激勵。目前,政府的資金支持比例已經(jīng)與大部分農(nóng)戶主觀期望相匹配,應(yīng)該在現(xiàn)有的成本分攤比例下擴大受益范圍,惠及更多水利投資項目。全面改進項目決策制度、資金監(jiān)管制度、水利設(shè)施的產(chǎn)權(quán)制度、組織制度以及水權(quán)制度,提供良好的制度環(huán)境,有助于激勵農(nóng)戶的投入行為。大多數(shù)農(nóng)戶對公平的態(tài)度是“相機抉擇對等者”,搭便車的現(xiàn)象對農(nóng)民公平感有明顯的負面影響。農(nóng)戶存在為社會福利進行支付的潛在動機,但水利并不是農(nóng)戶自愿捐贈的優(yōu)先選擇。社會網(wǎng)絡(luò)仍在一定程度上影響著村民的行為,為農(nóng)戶的合作帶來正向的激勵。(5)農(nóng)戶需求存在多元化的顯示方式。主動接觸型需求顯示的動機來自于對現(xiàn)狀的強烈不滿,需求顯示的真實性、一致性很強。提供暢通的信息傳遞渠道有助于消除主動接觸的動機：強人替代型需求顯示有著較高的效率,但大多數(shù)村莊不具備實現(xiàn)這種需求顯示方式的條件,此外,還存在強人“尋租”以及將自愿的需求顯示讓渡轉(zhuǎn)化為強制的需求顯示讓渡的隱憂；公共財政轉(zhuǎn)移支付資源的相對充足是投票型需求顯示得以實現(xiàn)的前提條件,但由于鄉(xiāng)村干部在規(guī)則提供與空間控制中占主導(dǎo)地位,村民的需求無法真實顯示,成為精英控制的表達；在村民需求與精英階層分歧不大的條件下,表現(xiàn)出高效率的特征：但如果存在較大的分歧,精英的控制則會損害村民的權(quán)益,甚至導(dǎo)致事實上的不合作。3.可能的創(chuàng)新點建立了一個效用——行為——需求顯示——集體行動的框架來描述個人行為與集體行動的關(guān)系,選擇農(nóng)戶行為的視角對小型水利設(shè)施的聯(lián)合供給進行了分析。不同于以往的研究中將農(nóng)戶的公共品供給決策視為理性假定下一個效用函數(shù)的思路,在考慮農(nóng)戶個體異質(zhì)性、社會偏好的基礎(chǔ)上,引入近年來農(nóng)民收入結(jié)構(gòu)變化、社區(qū)非農(nóng)收入水平不平衡發(fā)展,勞動力價格上升以及年近來政府投入的增加等因素進行分析,得出了較為可靠的實證結(jié)論,并探討顯性與隱性的雙重激勵途徑,為農(nóng)村小型水利設(shè)施的有效供給提供參考。

    Inorder to enhance the investment behavior for peasant households to promote the construction of small size water conservancy facilities(SWCFs), under the background of the system evolution of the rural public goods supply, based on public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics, motivation theories, social capital theories, this research focused on the peasant households’ behavior, analyzed general influencing factors on the investment behavior, discussed the way to stimulate the investment behavior, dissected the different display patterns for their demand, and put forward a countermeasure and suggestion.The main contents:1. Carding general theories which this research need to refer to, including public goods theories, institutional change theories, behavior economics,motivation theories and social capital theories. Summarizing and reviewing related articles, particularly emphasize on the state-rural society relationship and empirical factors which were affecting the water conservancy facilities demand.2. According to the public goods attribute of small water conservancy, based on the farmer behavior perspective, analyzed the behavior characters and game play of farmers on small water conservancy facilities supply.3. Teasing and analyzing the system evolution of the rural minisize water conservancy facilities in Chongqing by four stages, smmerizing the characteristic, condition and main achievements in each historical periods, summing up experience and lesson, exploring the exsisting problems and difficulties of the supply system in operation viewed of the historical point.4. Analyzing and discussing main factors that influencing the peasants’utility by Ordered Probit and Ordered Logit regression. This part of research used the sample of peasant households that invested in SWCFs in resent five vears. 5. Analyzing by binary logit regression of the investment willingness by money and labor respectively. This research is modeling on account of the static game theory, screening main factors that affects the peasant households’ investment willingness.6. Researching the incentive problem on the peasant households’behavior. This part of research analyzing both explicit and implicit motivation by ways of financial support, instrument perfection and social preference cultivation based on the framework of model "V-I-E".7. Analyzing three main pattern of the demand display, which including initiative contacting, strongman substitution expression, and voting.Conclusion:1. The key point of the effective supply for the rural quasi-public goods is that the reconstruction of rights and obligations between the government and the peasant households. SWCFs are quasi-public goods which has strong externality and monopoly with double nature of public resource and club goods in certain territorial scope. The motivation mechanism, cost apportionments, relationship coordination, organization and mobilization in the cooperated supply are satisfied under the production mode of big collective. However, when the households management replaced the collective production, these problems have not institutional arranged effectively., result in glide of construction of SWCFs, following bad influence on agriculture, urban-rural integration, food security and ecological safety. The construction of SWCFs are not only pressing needs of peasant households, but also duty-bound of the government. The key point of the effective supply for SWCFs is that, to increase the government investment, to respect and ductlead the willingness of peasants, to reconstruction of rights and obligations between them.2. Farmers were generally satisfied with the returns on existing water conservancy construction investment, but is still lacking compared to the initial investment’s enthusiasm, Agricultural income ratio, water use, whether to participate in the management, whether the views work, degree of education are influencing factors. The higher the proportion of agricultural income, farmers satisfaction is higher; The more of water consumption, the greater the famers’satisfaction; Farmers who participated in the management is more satisfied than who were not involved in management; Farmers whose views of the water conservancy construction project is worked are more satisfied; farmers with higher education whose satisfaction is higher.3. The ability of organizers, non-agricultural income level of community, government funded dynamics, utility of water conservancy construction, and education degree influence farmer’s intention to input money; area of paddy field, adequacy of existing facilities, non-agricultural income level of community and education degree influence famers intention to input labor. The empirical results show that, as the income of the farmers is increasing gradually, and the government investment ratio to the SWCFs is rising, income has not become one of the main factors affecting peasant investment. As labour costs rising, farmers tend to capital investment, and the price of main labor in the family is higher, the more willing to invest money. There is a game Among farmers and between farmers and the government. The lower educated groups has less understanding of the importance of water conservancy facilities and keep low investment willingness. There’s big difference between the influencing factor of capital or labour investment. more farmers to consider price factor and utility in theFor capital investment decision-making, they consider more price and utility factors, and behaves more like "Rational Peasant"; only when the water facilities is important, famers consider to input labour, and almost not consider of other factors, as behaves more like "moral famers".4. There are two ways for the government to motivate farmers willingness:the explicit motivation, including financial support and institutional support; the implicit motivation, by guiding or cultivating thesocial preference, such as sense of fairness, moral emotion and social capital. The government financial support is at present matched with the majority of peasants’ subjective expectation, demonstrating the importance to expand investment range in the existing cost sharing proportion, and benefit more water conservancy project. Comprehensive improvement of institutions such as decision-making system, financial supervision system, property rights system, organization system and the water rights system is helpful to enhance peasants’ willingness. Most of the peasants is " discretioner " on fairness, so hitchhike phenomenon has a significant negative impact. Farmers have the potential motive to pay for social welfare, but the SWCFs is not prior in their donation lists. Social networks are still in a certain extent influence the behavior, and encourage the farmers cooperative.5. Forms of willingness expression in construction of SWCFs is diversified. Initiative contacting comes from strong discontent with the status quo, with high authenticity and strong consistency. Broaden expression channels contribute to the eliminating the motivation for initiative contacting. Strongman substitution expression is with high efficiency, but most of the villages do not have such conditions. In addition, Possibility of "Rent-seeking" and mandatory substitution expression is notable. The relative adequacy of public financial transfer payment resources is the precondition of the realization of the voting expression, however the rural cadres are domaint in the rules and space control to suppress the villagers expression, as for the expression of "Elite-control".This form is high efficient in case the divergence is between the villagers and the elite is little, but when big differences occurs, elite control will damage the rights of villagers, or even lead the break of cooperation.Innovation: Established a frame of utility-behavior-demand display-collective action to describe the relationship between person and collective, and alanyzed the joint-supply of SWCFs from the perspective of peasants’ behavior. Be differ from existing research which consider the famers’ supply decision of public goods as a utility function submit to the hypothesis of rationality, this research considered individual heterogeneity and social preference, and introduced factors as income structure changes, uneven development of non-agriculture income level of community, rising of labour price and increase of government investment in recent years, arrived at reliable conclusion, discussed methods of motivation, and to refer to effective supply of SWCFs.

農(nóng)村小型水利設(shè)施的農(nóng)戶投入行為與激勵研究

摘要5-8Abstract8-11第1章 導(dǎo)論12-22    1.1 研究背景與研究問題12-16    1.2 概念界定及研究范圍說明16-18    1.3 研究思路與內(nèi)容18-20    1.4 研究方法20-21    1.5 可能的創(chuàng)新點21-22第2章 理論基礎(chǔ)與文獻綜述22-44    2.1 理論基礎(chǔ)22-34    2.2 文獻綜述34-44第3章 小型水利設(shè)施投入的農(nóng)戶行為理論分析44-60    3.1 水利設(shè)施的類型與屬性44-47    3.2 小型水利設(shè)施聯(lián)合供給的經(jīng)濟學分析47-49    3.3 小型水利設(shè)施投入的農(nóng)戶行為特征49-54    3.4 小型水利設(shè)施投入主體的博弈行為54-57    3.5 小型水利設(shè)施有效供給的條件57-58    3.6 本章小結(jié)58-60第4章 小型水利設(shè)施供給的體制演進60-68    4.1 國家主導(dǎo)下的大集體投入(1949-1978)60-62    4.2 承包制下以村為主體的供給(1979-2001)62-64    4.3 稅費改革后鄉(xiāng)村合作供給公共品的困境(2002-2011)64-65    4.4 市場化改革的深入與責權(quán)重建(2011至今)65-68第5章 小型水利設(shè)施農(nóng)戶投入的效用及影響因素68-78    5.1 研究假設(shè)與變量選擇68-70    5.2 描述性統(tǒng)計70-73    5.3 排序二元選擇回歸分析73-76    5.4 本章小結(jié)76-78第6章 小型水利設(shè)施農(nóng)戶投入行為的影響因素78-96    6.1 已有研究及啟示78-80    6.2 理論框架與研究假設(shè)80-85    6.3 數(shù)據(jù)說明及變量選擇85-91    6.4 實證分析91-93    6.5 本章小結(jié)93-96第7章 小型水利設(shè)施農(nóng)戶投入需求的顯示96-108    7.1 公共品供給的需求顯示困難96-97    7.2 背景材料97-98    7.3 主動接觸型需求顯示98-101    7.4 強人替代型需求顯示101-104    7.5 投票表達104-106    7.6 本章小結(jié)106-108第8章 小型水利設(shè)施農(nóng)戶投入行為的激勵108-120    8.1 理論模型與分析框架108-110    8.2 農(nóng)戶投入行為的顯性激勵110-113    8.3 農(nóng)戶投入行為的隱性激勵113-119    8.4 本章小結(jié)119-120第9章 研究結(jié)論與政策啟示120-124    9.1 研究結(jié)論120-121    9.2 政策啟示121-123    9.3 有待進一步研究的問題123-124參考文獻124-132附錄132-136致謝136-138攻讀研究生期間的科研成果138

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：農(nóng)村小型水利設(shè)施的農(nóng)戶投入行為與激勵研究，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。