本文選題：石油天然氣 + 長(zhǎng)輸管道�。� 參考：《西安科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,石油天然氣長(zhǎng)輸管道事故時(shí)有發(fā)生,教訓(xùn)十分慘痛,顯現(xiàn)出其安全監(jiān)管中存在的諸多問題。通過對(duì)油氣長(zhǎng)輸管道安全監(jiān)管方面存在問題的深入研究,提出有效對(duì)策建議,對(duì)提高安全監(jiān)管水平和保障管道安全運(yùn)行具有重要意義。首先,本文對(duì)油氣長(zhǎng)輸管道安全監(jiān)管和保護(hù)的相關(guān)理論和現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行歸納總結(jié),指出當(dāng)前監(jiān)管中存在的5方面問題:監(jiān)管與保護(hù)概念不清,監(jiān)管的法律法規(guī)支撐不足,企業(yè)安全生產(chǎn)主體責(zé)任不落實(shí),地方政府權(quán)責(zé)不一,土地權(quán)益不明晰。石油天然氣長(zhǎng)輸管道同時(shí)具有商業(yè)性和公益性的雙重屬性,是導(dǎo)致上述問題存在的主要原因。其次,運(yùn)用進(jìn)化博弈論原理,構(gòu)建了監(jiān)管主體和客體,即“政府—企業(yè)”之間的博弈模型,設(shè)定博弈參數(shù),建立支付矩陣,求解復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程,列出方程5個(gè)平衡點(diǎn)所對(duì)應(yīng)的雅克比矩陣行列式和跡的表達(dá)式,對(duì)4種博弈支付成本結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行定性定量分析求解,從而揭示博弈雙方在一定條件下決策策略的演化規(guī)律;構(gòu)建了政府承擔(dān)管道安全監(jiān)管工作的兩個(gè)主要部門,即“安監(jiān)部門—發(fā)改部門”之間的博弈模型,通過動(dòng)態(tài)方程計(jì)算,分析博弈雙方期望得益,探究雙方主動(dòng)選擇合作策略的有利條件。最后,以銅川市為例,結(jié)合全國(guó)監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀,分別從管道企業(yè)、政府、監(jiān)管部門三個(gè)層面,對(duì)各博弈參數(shù)的表征意義和影響參數(shù)變化的主要因素進(jìn)行深入分析,指明企業(yè)執(zhí)行成本過高、政府監(jiān)管成本高、監(jiān)管部門之間責(zé)任任務(wù)不清對(duì)管道安全監(jiān)管的負(fù)面影響巨大;進(jìn)而以回歸管道單位“企業(yè)屬性”為主線,提出了監(jiān)管執(zhí)法與管道保護(hù)區(qū)分并重,完善法律法規(guī)、健全體制機(jī)制、落實(shí)企業(yè)主體責(zé)任、統(tǒng)籌規(guī)劃建設(shè)、調(diào)動(dòng)地方政府監(jiān)管與保護(hù)積極性的對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, oil and gas pipeline accidents occur frequently, the lessons are very painful, showing the safety supervision of its many problems. Through the deep research on the problems existing in the safety supervision of long-distance oil and gas pipelines, the effective countermeasures and suggestions are put forward, which is of great significance to improve the level of safety supervision and ensure the safe operation of pipelines. First of all, this paper summarizes the relevant theories and current situation of safety supervision and protection of long-distance oil and gas pipelines, and points out five problems existing in current supervision: the concept of supervision and protection is unclear, and the legal and regulatory support of supervision is insufficient. Enterprise safety production responsibility is not implemented, local government rights and responsibilities, land rights and interests are not clear. Long distance oil and gas transportation pipeline has the dual attributes of commercial and public welfare, which is the main cause of these problems. Secondly, based on the evolutionary game theory, the game model between the subject and object, that is, "Government-enterprise", is constructed, the game parameters are set up, the payment matrix is established, and the replicating dynamic equation is solved. The expressions of the Jacobian matrix determinant and trace corresponding to the five equilibrium points of the equation are listed, and the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the four game payment cost structures is carried out to reveal the evolution law of the decision-making strategies of the game parties under certain conditions. This paper constructs a game model between the two main government departments responsible for pipeline safety supervision, that is, "safety supervision department-development and reform department". Through dynamic equation calculation, the paper analyzes the expectation of both sides of the game. Explore the favorable conditions for both sides to actively choose cooperation strategies. Finally, taking Tongchuan City as an example, combined with the current situation of national supervision, the paper analyzes the significance of game parameters and the main factors influencing the change of parameters from three aspects of pipeline enterprise, government and regulatory department respectively. It is pointed out that the implementation cost of enterprises is too high, the cost of government supervision is high, the negative impact on pipeline safety supervision caused by unclear responsibilities between regulators is enormous, and the main line is to return to the "enterprise attributes" of pipeline units. The countermeasures and suggestions are put forward, such as the equal emphasis of supervision and law enforcement and pipeline protection areas, the perfection of laws and regulations, the perfection of system and mechanism, the implementation of the main responsibility of enterprises, the overall planning and construction, and the mobilization of the enthusiasm of local governments for supervision and protection.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：TE973

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