本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國建設(shè)監(jiān)理執(zhí)業(yè)行為及行業(yè)委托代理機(jī)制的優(yōu)化研究　出處：《西安建筑科技大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 工程事故 監(jiān)理 行為模式 行業(yè)問題 傳統(tǒng)文化 約束 機(jī)制優(yōu)化

【摘要】：借鑒于西方的建設(shè)監(jiān)理制度25年來為我國工程建設(shè)綜合管理水平的提高發(fā)揮了巨大作用，但監(jiān)理人員素質(zhì)低下、責(zé)任心不強(qiáng)、注冊人員數(shù)量不足的行業(yè)問題始終未能解決。 本文緊密結(jié)合工程實(shí)踐對影響監(jiān)理執(zhí)業(yè)的制度框架、組織體系和相關(guān)主體的利益最大化行為進(jìn)行分析，修正“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”假設(shè)，將監(jiān)理人員所受的傳統(tǒng)觀念約束納入西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論框架，充分考慮我國“和諧中庸”、“重義輕利”與“無訟是求”等傳統(tǒng)觀念對監(jiān)理制度運(yùn)行的深刻影響，根據(jù)中西方文化差異，，把文化觀念約束細(xì)分為“競爭”與“和諧”、“重義輕利”與“重利輕義”兩個(gè)維度，將監(jiān)理人員分為競爭式努力盡職、競爭式權(quán)力尋租、和諧式努力盡職與和諧式權(quán)力尋租4種類型，拓展并修正層級代理理論的P-S-A模型，對監(jiān)理人員基于項(xiàng)目主管代理人行為導(dǎo)向的三類八種執(zhí)業(yè)模式進(jìn)行規(guī)范性研究后認(rèn)為：在項(xiàng)目法人或承包商為了自身利益最大化必然采取有限度質(zhì)量違規(guī)策略的前提下，監(jiān)理人員受傳統(tǒng)文化觀念影響難以選擇“獨(dú)立”和“盡職”兩種最符合社會(huì)公眾工程質(zhì)量安全利益的執(zhí)業(yè)行為模式，而是無奈選擇“默許”、“無訟”、“放任”三種執(zhí)業(yè)行為模式，各類工程事故并非監(jiān)理人員主觀故意以“敲詐”、“合謀”、“同謀”違規(guī)執(zhí)業(yè)模式謀取尋租利益所致。文章對國內(nèi)重大工程事故判決法律卷宗和相關(guān)工程事故調(diào)查結(jié)論進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，證明監(jiān)理人員通常采取“默許”、“無訟”、“放任”三種執(zhí)業(yè)行為模式，說明強(qiáng)制監(jiān)理制度客觀上是一種強(qiáng)迫監(jiān)理人員在工程驗(yàn)收環(huán)節(jié)“說假話”的機(jī)制，是對項(xiàng)目法人或承包商質(zhì)量安全違規(guī)行為的“不可置信威脅”。 本文依據(jù)研究結(jié)論對監(jiān)理機(jī)制進(jìn)行優(yōu)化設(shè)計(jì)，建議立法允許監(jiān)理人員對工程或工序驗(yàn)收出具“不合格”的評價(jià)意見，實(shí)施監(jiān)理有條件免責(zé)機(jī)制和以承包商的質(zhì)量安全履約保證金對監(jiān)理“說真話”損失的補(bǔ)償機(jī)制，能有效地將強(qiáng)制監(jiān)理制度轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)椤翱芍眯磐{”，扭轉(zhuǎn)工程領(lǐng)域驗(yàn)收環(huán)節(jié)集體“說假話”的現(xiàn)狀，迅速建立承包商的市場聲譽(yù)機(jī)制，徹底杜絕“非合格”工程與工程事故的出現(xiàn)。 文章運(yùn)用博弈論對監(jiān)理企業(yè)派駐無資質(zhì)人員開展監(jiān)理業(yè)務(wù)的的利益最大化行為進(jìn)行規(guī)范性分析，并利用監(jiān)理行業(yè)有關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究，說明監(jiān)理企業(yè)是監(jiān)理行業(yè)人員數(shù)量不足、素質(zhì)低下的獲利推手。文章建議本著客觀務(wù)實(shí)的原則，通過立法允許有一定專業(yè)資質(zhì)的非注冊人員進(jìn)行監(jiān)理執(zhí)業(yè)并賦予其簽字權(quán)來建立監(jiān)理企業(yè)的行為顯示機(jī)制，立法由監(jiān)理協(xié)會(huì)獲取部分監(jiān)理酬金的歧視性收益分配規(guī)則，和由監(jiān)理企業(yè)法定代表人代替非注冊從業(yè)人員承擔(dān)包括刑事責(zé)任在內(nèi)的全部法律責(zé)任的事故責(zé)任分擔(dān)機(jī)制，能夠有效地促進(jìn)監(jiān)理行業(yè)整體素質(zhì)的快速提高。
[Abstract]:In the past 25 years, the construction supervision system in the west has played a great role in improving the comprehensive management level of engineering construction in China, but the quality of the supervisors is low and the sense of responsibility is not strong. The problem of an industry with an insufficient number of registered personnel has never been resolved. This article closely combines the engineering practice to analyze the system frame, the organization system and the benefit maximization behavior of the related subjects, and to revise the hypothesis of "economic man". By bringing the constraints of the traditional concepts to the supervisors into the theoretical framework of western economics, the author fully considers the profound influence on the operation of the supervision system by the traditional concepts such as "harmonious and moderate", "emphasizing justice and light interests" and "seeking without litigation". According to the cultural differences between China and the West, the restriction of cultural concept is divided into two dimensions: "competition" and "harmony", "emphasizing justice over profit" and "emphasizing profit and interests". It extends and modifies the P-S-A model of hierarchical agent theory by four types of competitive power rent-seeking, harmonious effort diligence and harmonious power rent-seeking. Based on the normative study of three types and eight kinds of practice models based on the agent behavior orientation of the project supervisor, the author holds that:. In order to maximize their own interests, the project legal person or contractor must adopt limited quality violation strategy. Under the influence of traditional cultural concept, supervisors are unable to choose "independence" and "due diligence", which are the two most consistent with the social public engineering quality and safety interests, but reluctantly choose "acquiescence" and "no litigation". "laissez-faire" three modes of practice, all kinds of engineering accidents are not subjective and deliberate "extortion" and "collusion" of supervisors. The article makes an empirical analysis on the legal files of the domestic major engineering accident judgment and the investigation conclusion of the related engineering accident, and proves that the supervisor usually adopts "acquiescence". "No lawsuit", "laissez-faire" three kinds of practice behavior patterns, it shows that the compulsory supervision system is objectively a mechanism to force supervisors to "lie" in the link of project acceptance. Is the project legal person or contractor quality and safety violations of the "unbelievable threat." Based on the conclusion of the research, this paper optimizes the design of supervision mechanism, and suggests that legislation should be made to allow supervisors to issue "unqualified" evaluation opinions on the acceptance of projects or processes. The implementation of the supervision conditional exemption mechanism and the compensation mechanism of the contractor's "telling the truth" loss with the contractor's quality and safety performance bond can effectively transform the compulsory supervision system into a "credible threat". To reverse the situation of collective falsehood in the acceptance link of engineering field, to establish the contractor's market reputation mechanism quickly, and to put an end to the emergence of "non-qualified" engineering and engineering accidents. This paper applies game theory to the normative analysis of the maximization of the benefits of the supervision enterprises in which unqualified personnel are assigned to carry out supervision work, and makes an empirical study using the relevant statistical data of the supervision industry. It shows that the supervision enterprise is a profit-maker with insufficient number of personnel and low quality in the supervision profession. The article suggests the principle of objectivity and pragmatism. Through legislation to allow non-registered personnel with certain professional qualifications to practice supervision and give them the right to sign to establish the supervision enterprise behavior display mechanism. Legislation by the supervision association to obtain part of the supervision of the remuneration of discriminatory income distribution rules. The mechanism of sharing the responsibility of accident by the legal representative of the supervision enterprise instead of the unregistered employees, including the criminal liability, can effectively promote the rapid improvement of the overall quality of the supervision industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F203;F426.92

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