【摘要】：針對(duì)FPGA克隆技術(shù)展開(kāi)研究,指出其關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題在于對(duì)加密密鑰的攻擊,并以Xilinx公司7系列FPGA為列,討論了采用AES-256 CBC模式解密條件下的攻擊點(diǎn)函數(shù)選擇方法,通過(guò)單比特功耗模型實(shí)施差分能量攻擊,成功恢復(fù)了256 bit密鑰。同時(shí),針對(duì)不可直接代入密鑰檢驗(yàn)正確性的問(wèn)題,設(shè)計(jì)了一種基于DPA攻擊相關(guān)系數(shù)極性的檢驗(yàn)方法,避免了密鑰錯(cuò)誤引起FPGA錯(cuò)誤配置,實(shí)驗(yàn)表明,該方法能夠有效消除相關(guān)系數(shù)的"假峰"現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:Based on the research of FPGA cloning technology, it is pointed out that the key problem lies in the attack on encryption key, and the method of selecting attack point function under the condition of decryption in AES-256 CBC mode is discussed based on the FPGA of Xilinx Company's 7 series, and the method of selecting attack point function is discussed in this paper. The differential energy attack is carried out through the single bit power consumption model, and the 256 bit key is recovered successfully. At the same time, in order to check the correctness of non-direct substitution key, a method based on polarity of correlation coefficient of DPA attack is designed to avoid the misconfiguration of FPGA caused by key error. This method can effectively eliminate the phenomenon of "false peak" of correlation coefficient.
【作者單位】： 解放軍信息工程大學(xué);
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：TN918.4;TN791
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本文編號(hào)：2448433