本文選題：期權(quán)博弈 + 碳減排投資��； 參考：《中國(guó)管理科學(xué)》2017年11期

【摘要】：論文首先提出了基于發(fā)電成本最小的碳排放約束電力上網(wǎng)機(jī)制,在此基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建不對(duì)稱(chēng)的寡頭發(fā)電商碳減排投資期權(quán)博弈模型,模型的數(shù)值分析結(jié)果表明:1)發(fā)電商碳減排投資以后的上網(wǎng)電價(jià),對(duì)寡頭發(fā)電商的投資行為有顯著影響:即存在一個(gè)上網(wǎng)電價(jià)"閾值",當(dāng)上網(wǎng)電價(jià)低于該閾值時(shí),只有低排放發(fā)電商有碳減排投資動(dòng)機(jī);而當(dāng)上網(wǎng)電價(jià)高于該閾值時(shí),高排放發(fā)電商則會(huì)領(lǐng)先進(jìn)行碳減排投資;只有當(dāng)上網(wǎng)電價(jià)等于該閾值時(shí),兩發(fā)電商會(huì)同時(shí)進(jìn)行碳減排投資;2)上述發(fā)電商碳減排投資以后上網(wǎng)電價(jià)閾值與碳排放標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等參數(shù)有關(guān)。
[Abstract]:Firstly, the paper proposes a carbon emission constrained power access mechanism based on the minimum generation cost, and then constructs an asymmetric carbon emission reduction investment option game model for oligarchs. The numerical analysis results of the model show that the electricity price after the carbon reduction investment of the generation company has a significant effect on the investment behavior of the oligopoly: that is, there exists a "threshold" of the electricity price, when the price is below the threshold, Only low-emission generators have incentive to invest in carbon emissions reduction; when the price of electricity on the Internet is above the threshold, high-emission generators will lead in carbon emission reduction investments; only when the price of electricity is equal to the threshold, Carbon emission reduction investment by the two power producers at the same time. (2) the electricity price threshold after carbon reduction investment is related to the carbon emission standard and other parameters.
【作者單位】： 長(zhǎng)沙理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71671018,71271033)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F426.61;X322

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