【摘要】：安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理是政府工作的重要組成部分。安全生產(chǎn)工作成效的好壞,直接關(guān)系著人民群眾生命財(cái)產(chǎn)安全和來(lái)之不易的改革開放成果,關(guān)系到黨和政府在人民群眾心目中乃至在國(guó)際社會(huì)中的良好形象,關(guān)系到黨執(zhí)政地位的穩(wěn)定。目前,隨著我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)的快速發(fā)展,黨和國(guó)家越來(lái)越重視安全生產(chǎn)工作,我國(guó)安全生產(chǎn)的五大體系已經(jīng)基本建立。盡管國(guó)家對(duì)安全生產(chǎn)工作空前的重視,但是,生產(chǎn)安全事故仍然不斷發(fā)生,重特大事故也時(shí)有發(fā)生,同時(shí)事故瞞報(bào)也層出不窮。為了降低安全生產(chǎn)事故的發(fā)生率,杜絕事故謊報(bào)、瞞報(bào),國(guó)家三令五申出臺(tái)政策,陸續(xù)采取了一系列措施,然而收效甚微。 安全生產(chǎn)事故瞞報(bào)背后存在的各種官商勾結(jié)的利益鏈條使其成為公眾輿論關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。瞞報(bào)事故背后隱藏的主要是利益問(wèn)題。各參與方作為理性的經(jīng)濟(jì)人,參與活動(dòng)的最終目的是追求自身利益最大化,只是各方利益目標(biāo)不盡一致。故本文運(yùn)用博弈論研究生產(chǎn)安全事故發(fā)生后國(guó)家安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管部門與基層監(jiān)管者及事故發(fā)生企業(yè)之間的博弈是具有實(shí)際意義的。本文重點(diǎn)就各方之間對(duì)“瞞報(bào)”可能出現(xiàn)的不同博弈過(guò)程進(jìn)行了分析和研究。并且根據(jù)不同的假設(shè)條件、不同的信息結(jié)構(gòu)、不同的行動(dòng)順序,構(gòu)建了各方在生產(chǎn)安全事故瞞報(bào)中的博弈關(guān)系。 本文從國(guó)家安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管者的角度研究了防止事故發(fā)生企業(yè)隱瞞不報(bào)安全生產(chǎn)事故的對(duì)策,并對(duì)如何瓦解地方利益群體的合謀瞞報(bào)、促使人民群眾和各類媒體對(duì)瞞報(bào)事故的舉報(bào)、對(duì)事故發(fā)生企業(yè)如實(shí)上報(bào)的策略進(jìn)行獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)等提出了一些具體的措施。
[Abstract]:Production safety supervision and management is an important part of government work. The effectiveness of the work of safety in production is directly related to the safety of the people's lives and property, the hard-won achievements of reform and opening up, and the good image of the Party and the government in the eyes of the people and even in the international community. Related to the stability of the ruling position of the party. At present, with the rapid development of economic construction in our country, the Party and the country pay more and more attention to the work of safety in production, and the five systems of safe production in our country have been basically established. Although the state attaches great importance to the work of safety in production, the accidents of production safety still occur continuously, serious and serious accidents occur from time to time, and the accidents of hidden reporting are also emerging in endlessly. In order to reduce the incidence of accidents in production, prevent false reports of accidents, the state repeatedly issued policies, one after another has taken a series of measures, but little effect. The profit chain of all kinds of collusion between government and business behind the underreporting of safety accidents makes it the focus of public opinion. The main hidden problem behind the cover-up of the accident is the problem of interests. As rational economic person, the ultimate purpose of participating in the activities is to maximize their own interests, but the interests of the parties are not the same. Therefore, it is of practical significance to use game theory to study the game between the national production safety supervision department, the grass-roots supervisor and the accident occurrence enterprise after the production safety accident. This paper focuses on the analysis and study of the different game processes that may occur between the parties. According to different hypothetical conditions, different information structure and different sequence of action, the game relation between the parties in production safety accidents is constructed. From the point of view of the national safety production supervisor, this paper studies the countermeasures to prevent accidents from happening, and how to break up the collusion of local interest groups. Some concrete measures are put forward to encourage the people and all kinds of media to report the accidents and reward the enterprises to report the accidents truthfully.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：X922.2

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