發(fā)布時間：2018-05-17 11:35

  本文選題：煤礦 + 多主體　； 參考：《礦業(yè)安全與環(huán)保》2017年04期

【摘要】：采用演化博弈論和數(shù)值仿真方法,引入應急協(xié)作的救援收益、救援收益增量、收益增量分配系數(shù)、違約金、機會主義所得及先期成本等效益因子,構建了煤礦應急救援中多主體協(xié)作的行為博弈模型。通過分析各效益因子對煤礦企業(yè)達成應急協(xié)作可能性的影響,探討了不同企業(yè)之間進行協(xié)作的策略選擇。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):若企業(yè)雙方不協(xié)作時的凈機會主義所得均大于協(xié)作后的額外救援凈收益,此時雙方博弈結果均趨向于不協(xié)作,反之則雙方均趨向于協(xié)作;企業(yè)雙方選擇協(xié)作的幾率與救援收益增量、收益增量分配系數(shù)的合理配置及違約金呈正相關關系,與先期協(xié)作成本和機會主義所得呈負相關關系。
[Abstract]:By using evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation method, the benefit factors such as rescue benefit, rescue benefit increment, income increment distribution coefficient, penalty for breach of contract, opportunistic income and advance cost are introduced. The behavior game model of multi-agent cooperation in coal mine emergency rescue is constructed. By analyzing the influence of various benefit factors on the possibility of emergency cooperation in coal mining enterprises, this paper discusses the choice of strategies for cooperation among different enterprises. It is found that if the net opportunism of the two parties is greater than the net benefit of the additional rescue after cooperation, the game results of both sides tend to be non-cooperative, otherwise both sides tend to cooperate; The probability of cooperation is positively correlated with the increment of rescue income, the reasonable allocation of income increment distribution coefficient and the penalty for breach of contract, but it is negatively related to the cooperation cost and opportunistic income.
【作者單位】： 上海海事大學經(jīng)濟管理學院;鄭州大學管理工程學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目(71271194,71472171)
【分類號】：TD77

【相似文獻】

相關期刊論文 前2條

1 孫曉華;胡林;張國峰;;中外鐵礦石價格談判的演化博弈分析[J];南京財經(jīng)大學學報;2010年04期

2 王文軻;;基于有限理性的煤礦安全投資演化博弈研究[J];中國安全生產(chǎn)科學技術;2013年11期

相關碩士學位論文 前1條

1 譚黎;煤礦企業(yè)逆向物流的演化博弈分析及激勵機制研究[D];鄭州大學;2013年

，

本文編號：1901209