本文選題：煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管 + 有效穩(wěn)定性控制　； 參考：《北京理工大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版)》2015年04期

【摘要】：針對(duì)中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管過程中復(fù)雜動(dòng)態(tài)博弈且多方參與的問題,通過分析煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)的演化博弈關(guān)系,構(gòu)建國(guó)家監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)、地方監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和煤礦企業(yè)3個(gè)種群所組成的演化博弈模型,并將基于系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)的計(jì)算機(jī)仿真手段與動(dòng)態(tài)演化思想相結(jié)合,對(duì)上述演化博弈模型進(jìn)行求解與均衡點(diǎn)穩(wěn)定性分析。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):中國(guó)煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管的演化博弈過程出現(xiàn)反復(fù)波動(dòng)、震蕩發(fā)展的趨勢(shì),表明博弈過程不存在演化穩(wěn)定策略。進(jìn)而對(duì)此問題進(jìn)行博弈的有效穩(wěn)定性控制情景研究,提出動(dòng)態(tài)懲罰—激勵(lì)控制情景,并對(duì)此控制情景下的演化博弈穩(wěn)定性進(jìn)行仿真分析與理論證明,結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)在動(dòng)態(tài)懲罰—激勵(lì)控制情景下系統(tǒng)演化博弈過程的波動(dòng)性得到有效控制,即博弈過程存在演化穩(wěn)定策略,且在此穩(wěn)定策略均衡狀態(tài)下煤礦企業(yè)違法行為得到有效控制。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of complex dynamic game and multi-participation in the process of coal mine safety supervision and supervision in China, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game relation of coal mine safety supervision and supervision system, and constructs the national supervision organization. An evolutionary game model composed of three populations of local regulatory bodies and coal mining enterprises is proposed. The computer simulation method based on system dynamics is combined with the idea of dynamic evolution to solve the above evolutionary game model and to analyze the stability of equilibrium points. The results show that the evolution game process of coal mine safety supervision in China has the tendency of repeatedly fluctuating and fluctuating, which indicates that there is no evolutionary stability strategy in the game process. Then the effective stability control scenario of the game is studied, and the dynamic penalty-incentive control scenario is put forward, and the stability of the evolutionary game under the control scenario is simulated and proved theoretically. The results show that the volatility of the system evolution game process is effectively controlled under the dynamic penalty-incentive control scenario, that is, the game process has an evolutionary stability strategy, and the illegal behavior of the coal mining enterprise is effectively controlled under the stable strategy equilibrium state.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目“多因素耦合作用下煤礦事故復(fù)雜性機(jī)理及其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)度量研究”(71271206) 江蘇省普通高校研究生科研創(chuàng)新計(jì)劃資助項(xiàng)目“煤礦安全監(jiān)察監(jiān)管演化博弈系統(tǒng)分析及仿真與控制研究”(KYZZ_0377) 國(guó)家留學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目“國(guó)家建設(shè)高水平大學(xué)公派研究生項(xiàng)目”(20140642018)
【分類號(hào)】：TD76
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本文編號(hào)：1815154