本文選題：高危系統(tǒng)　切入點(diǎn)：安全行為　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),隨著我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和社會(huì)進(jìn)步,全國(guó)安全事故總數(shù)、較大事故數(shù)量和死亡人數(shù)雖呈穩(wěn)步下降趨勢(shì),但數(shù)值仍然較大,且高危系統(tǒng)安全事故在其中占有很大比重。然而,高危系統(tǒng)多屬于化工、能源、建筑、交通等國(guó)家支柱性行業(yè),為維持國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)的穩(wěn)定運(yùn)行和社會(huì)文化的持續(xù)發(fā)展起到了不可替代的作用。因此,研究高危系統(tǒng)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的產(chǎn)生機(jī)制和影響因素,為降低其運(yùn)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供可操作的措施和建議,具有重要意義。 本研究將認(rèn)知心理學(xué)理論引入演化博弈中,形成一類(lèi)主觀博弈方法,并用于分析三類(lèi)高危系統(tǒng)組織安全行為產(chǎn)生機(jī)制及影響因素,主要內(nèi)容如下： 首先,本研究基于理論與現(xiàn)實(shí)的矛盾提出了有意不安全行為產(chǎn)生和道路交通事故死亡人數(shù)占比過(guò)大這兩個(gè)問(wèn)題,并選擇了主觀博弈和分類(lèi)對(duì)比兩類(lèi)針對(duì)性的方法。在分類(lèi)方面,站在安全行為的直接執(zhí)行者和安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的直接承擔(dān)者的角度,將高危系統(tǒng)分成自組織、他組織和混合組織三類(lèi)。 其次,運(yùn)用主觀博弈方法考察了具有典型自組織特征的道路交通系統(tǒng)、具有典型他組織特征的核電站系統(tǒng)和具有典型混合組織特征的工程施工系統(tǒng)三類(lèi)系統(tǒng),得到當(dāng)個(gè)體(駕駛員、監(jiān)管員、作業(yè)員、施工員)不重視安全所造成的損失(安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的增加、處罰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等)不小于重視安全所需要耗費(fèi)的成本時(shí),所有個(gè)體均傾向于重視安全的結(jié)論。經(jīng)過(guò)對(duì)比分析還得到了高危系統(tǒng)混合組織形式有利于施工員和監(jiān)管員兩類(lèi)個(gè)體重視安全的結(jié)論。 第三,運(yùn)用數(shù)值仿真實(shí)驗(yàn)考察了高危系統(tǒng)組織安全行為的影響因素,認(rèn)為個(gè)體重視安全所需要耗費(fèi)的成本的減少,基礎(chǔ)安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、執(zhí)行員(駕駛員、作業(yè)員和施工員的統(tǒng)稱(chēng))的內(nèi)部安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳導(dǎo)系數(shù)及來(lái)自于監(jiān)管員的處罰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的增加,有利于博弈雙方重視安全；傳導(dǎo)給監(jiān)管員的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)系數(shù)的增加,僅有利于監(jiān)管員重視安全；執(zhí)行員內(nèi)部的處罰風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的增加,僅有利于執(zhí)行員重視安全；事故賠償比例對(duì)演化結(jié)果不產(chǎn)生影響。同時(shí),監(jiān)管員和執(zhí)行員重視安全的效果的提高,均有利于其自身重視安全,卻不利于對(duì)方重視安全,意味著兩類(lèi)人員間存在“搭便車(chē)”的現(xiàn)象。 第四,運(yùn)用數(shù)值仿真實(shí)驗(yàn)進(jìn)一步考察了兩類(lèi)人員重視安全的比例之間的關(guān)系,發(fā)現(xiàn)在其他參數(shù)取特定初始值的情況下,執(zhí)行員和監(jiān)管員重視安全的比例在較大初始值范圍內(nèi)呈現(xiàn)反向變動(dòng)關(guān)系,前者收斂于1而后者收斂于0。然而,當(dāng)前者初始值較小且后者初始值較大時(shí),在他組織高危系統(tǒng)中,二者交互軌跡收斂方向發(fā)生變化；在混合組織高危系統(tǒng)中,二者交互軌跡收斂過(guò)程受到干擾�？梢�(jiàn),他組織高危系統(tǒng)中,兩類(lèi)人員重視安全的比例在閾值附近的變化會(huì)對(duì)系統(tǒng)最終演化方向產(chǎn)生重大影響,且此過(guò)程對(duì)隨機(jī)干擾比較敏感,最終出現(xiàn)類(lèi)似“蝴蝶效應(yīng)”的現(xiàn)象；而混合組織高危系統(tǒng)中兩類(lèi)比例在閾值附近的變化會(huì)對(duì)系統(tǒng)演化過(guò)程產(chǎn)生干擾,卻未見(jiàn)對(duì)結(jié)果產(chǎn)生影響。 此外,以JH高速鐵路建設(shè)項(xiàng)目為例,詳細(xì)闡述了在基于不安全行為矯正的工程安全方案雙螺旋管理體系中,由模塊化的方案編制、全程動(dòng)態(tài)的宣傳教育、自動(dòng)可視的方案執(zhí)行監(jiān)控和立體化的評(píng)價(jià)改進(jìn)四部分組成的組織行為鏈帶動(dòng)個(gè)體行為鏈螺旋上升、持續(xù)改進(jìn)的過(guò)程和機(jī)理,為高危系統(tǒng)組織安全行為改進(jìn)提供了可操作的措施和建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with China's economic development and social progress, and the number of accidents, the larger the number of accidents and deaths have declined steadily, but the value is still large, and the safety accident risk system occupies a large proportion in them. However, the high-risk system belongs to the chemical industry, energy, construction, transportation and other national pillar industry, an irreplaceable role for the sustainable development of the national economy to maintain stable operation and the social and cultural factors. Therefore, the producing mechanism and effect of risk system security risk, in order to reduce the operation risk measures and suggestions for operation, which is of great significance.
In this study, we introduce the theory of cognitive psychology into evolutionary game, form a subjective game method, and analyze the mechanism and influencing factors of three kinds of high-risk organizations' safety behavior.
First of all, the contradiction between theory and reality is put forward based on intentional unsafe behavior and road traffic accident deaths accounted for over two of this problem, and the subjective game and compare the two methods for classification. The classification, on the safe behavior directly bear direct executors and security the risk of the perspective, the risk system is divided into self organization, he organized and mixed three types.
Secondly, effects of road traffic system has a typical self organizing feature using subjective game method, three kinds of system engineering construction system with nuclear power system typical of his organizational characteristics and typical characteristics of the hybrid organization, when individuals (drivers, supervisors, workers, construction workers) do not pay attention to safety caused by the loss (increase the security risk of punishment risk etc.) is not less than the safety that takes the cost when all the individuals are inclined to pay attention to the safety of the conclusion. Through contrastive analysis has been mixed form conducive to high-risk system construction workers and supervisors two individuals to attach importance to the safety of the conclusion.
Third, factors affecting the risk system organization safety were investigated by numerical simulation, that the individual needs to reduce the cost of the safety cost, basic safety risk, the execution officer (driver, operator and construction workers collectively) increased the internal security risk conduction coefficient and from regulatory penalties have risk. The two sides of the game to pay attention to the safety; to increase the safety coefficient of risk conduction of regulators, regulators can only pay attention to safety; increase executive internal risk of punishment, only to executive pay attention to the safety accident; compensation ratio does not affect the evolution results. At the same time, supervisors and executive attention safety effect improvement are conducive to their own safety, is not conducive to their attention to security, implies the existence of the phenomenon of "hitchhike" two types of personnel.
Fourth, the use of numerical simulation to study the relationship between the two kinds of personnel safety ratio, found certain initial value in the case of other parameters, executive and supervision of staff attaches great importance to the safety in the proportion of large initial value showed the reverse changes in the relationship within the scope of the former converges to 1 while the latter converges to 0. however. The initial value is small and the initial value is larger, in his organization risk system, the two interactive track convergence direction change; in high-risk hybrid organization system, the two track interaction convergence process is disrupted. Obviously, he organized the risk system, two kinds of personnel safety changes in the proportion of near threshold will the system evolution direction has great influence, and this process is sensitive to the random disturbance, eventually appear similar to the "Butterfly Effect" phenomenon; and two kinds of hybrid organization risk system The changes of the ratio near the threshold will interfere with the evolution of the system, but have not been affected by the results.
In addition, the JH high-speed railway construction project as an example, introduced in detail based on the double helix engineering safety management system scheme of correction of unsafe behavior in the program by the modular system, publicity and education throughout the dynamic evaluation, automatic visual monitoring and implementation of three-dimensional improved four part organization behavior chain composed of individual animals behavior of chain spiral, continuous improvement process and mechanism, provides measures and suggestions for the operation of the organization for security risk system behavior improvement.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：X91

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本文編號(hào)：1612194