本文關(guān)鍵詞： 煤礦安全生產(chǎn)事故 政府監(jiān)管 演化博弈 互惠博弈　出處：《東北財經(jīng)大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：煤礦安全生產(chǎn)問題在相當長的時間內(nèi)都給正在高速發(fā)展的中國經(jīng)濟留下了揮之不去的陰影,無論是從重特大事故的發(fā)生頻率來看,還是從居高不下的傷亡率來講,其所產(chǎn)生的影響已經(jīng)超過了安全生產(chǎn)本身的范疇,上升到事關(guān)政治社會穩(wěn)定、建設(shè)和諧社會大局的高度。統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)顯示,自2001年1月1日至2012年12月31日,全國大小煤礦共發(fā)生安全生產(chǎn)事故28509起,死亡人數(shù)達到50975,百萬噸煤死亡率高達2.11。我國以煤炭為主的能源生產(chǎn)和消費結(jié)構(gòu),以及經(jīng)濟發(fā)展長期以來對煤炭資源的依賴,使得煤炭安全問題越發(fā)引起全社會的關(guān)注,就像一把無形的重擔壓在安全監(jiān)管部門、產(chǎn)煤大省政府的肩上。當逐條對發(fā)生煤炭安全事故的企業(yè)自身原因和外部因素進行分析時,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一系列導致煤炭安全事故的原因都直指向企業(yè)的安全監(jiān)管問題。此處的監(jiān)管不僅包括企業(yè)自身的安全監(jiān)督和安全自查,更重要的是來自企業(yè)外部的,與煤礦企業(yè)相互獨立的監(jiān)管力量—政府的監(jiān)管。 本文針對煤礦安全監(jiān)管問題,運用演化博弈和互惠博弈理論研究煤礦安全監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和煤礦企業(yè)之間的博弈引發(fā)的煤礦安全問題。具體研究工作包括如下四點： 第一,將煤礦安全監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和煤礦企業(yè)視為個體之間的博弈,運用互惠博弈理論進行研究,分析煤礦企業(yè)和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)之間的互惠效用問題。結(jié)果表明：煤礦發(fā)生安全事故的概率受煤礦企業(yè)違規(guī)開采的超額收益,監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的監(jiān)管成本以及煤礦企業(yè)安全投入的收益凈值的影響。因此,為降低煤炭監(jiān)管失敗的概率進而提高煤炭生產(chǎn)的安全水平,應(yīng)該從降低煤礦安全監(jiān)管成本,抑制煤礦非法開采所獲得的超額收益,提高煤礦企業(yè)的安全投入收益凈值為主。 第二,建立了煤礦企業(yè)與政府監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的演化博弈模型,分析煤礦生產(chǎn)安全事故周期性波動的演化機理。煤礦安全監(jiān)管演化系統(tǒng)在混合策略均衡點附近的運動軌跡是以均衡點為圓心的極限環(huán)；隨著煤礦生產(chǎn)安全監(jiān)管力度的周期性波動,煤礦生產(chǎn)事故發(fā)生比例也將出現(xiàn)周期性波動。 第三,結(jié)合云南曲靖“11·10”礦難事故的案例進行數(shù)值分析,剖析了地方政府煤礦安全監(jiān)管失敗的主要因素結(jié)合數(shù)值,設(shè)定煤礦生產(chǎn)事故率的上限值后,影響地方政府煤礦安全監(jiān)管失敗的兩個主要因素是系統(tǒng)演化混合均衡點的位置(地方政府監(jiān)管機構(gòu)誤判煤礦違規(guī)超采收益)和周期性波動的振幅(煤礦企業(yè)和地方政府監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的策略選擇初值)。 第四,得出結(jié)論及提出促進煤礦安全監(jiān)管的相關(guān)政策建議。 國外對于博弈論的研究無論從理論研究層面與應(yīng)用層面都己趨于成熟,而國內(nèi)對于演化博弈論的研究主要側(cè)重于方法應(yīng)用層面。在煤礦安全監(jiān)管的博弈方面,主要集中于政府與煤礦企業(yè),沒有根據(jù)安全經(jīng)濟利益相關(guān)者進行全面的總結(jié)和分析,特別是對于對煤礦企業(yè)和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)之間的互惠效用博弈關(guān)系分析討論。本文在分析我國現(xiàn)行煤礦安全監(jiān)管問題的基礎(chǔ)上,運用演化博弈和互惠博弈理論對煤礦安全監(jiān)管中的關(guān)系進行分析,用互惠的方法研究煤礦安全監(jiān)管,用演化博弈的方法分析煤礦生產(chǎn)安全事故周期性波動的演化機理,以及導致地方政府安全監(jiān)管失敗的主要因素,并根據(jù)所得結(jié)論提出提高煤礦安全監(jiān)管效能的建議對策。
[Abstract]:The coal mine safety production problem has left a lingering shadow for China ' s economy , which is developing at high speed for quite a long time , whether from the frequency of heavy - scale accident or the high casualty rate , it has already exceeded the safety production itself , and has raised the concern of the whole society , such as the coal - based energy production and consumption structure , and the long - term dependence on coal resources . The supervision not only includes the safety supervision and safety self - inspection of the enterprise itself , but also the supervision power of the independent of the coal mine enterprises . According to the problem of coal mine safety supervision , the coal mine safety problem caused by game between coal mine safety supervision institution and coal mine enterprise is studied by using evolutionary game theory and mutual benefit game theory . First , the coal mine safety supervision organization and the coal mine enterprise are regarded as the game between the individual and the mutual benefit game theory is applied to the research . The result shows that the probability of the coal mine safety accident is influenced by the excess return of the coal mining enterprise ' s illegal exploitation , the supervision cost of the supervision institution and the net income net investment of the coal mine enterprise . Secondly , the evolutionary game model of coal mine enterprises and government regulators is established to analyze the evolution mechanism of the periodic fluctuation of coal mine safety accidents . The movement locus of the coal mine safety supervision and evolution system near the equilibrium point of the mixed strategy is the limit ring with the equilibrium point as the circle center . Thirdly , according to the numerical analysis of the case of " 11.10 " mine disaster in Qujing of Yunnan Province , the author analyzes the main factors of the failure of coal mine safety supervision in the local government and sets up the upper limit value of the accident rate of the coal mine , and the two main factors that affect the failure of the coal mine safety supervision in the local government are the position of the system evolution mixed equilibrium point ( the local government supervision institution misjudged the illegal earnings of the coal mine ) and the amplitude of the periodical fluctuation ( the initial value of the strategy of the coal mining enterprise and the local government regulatory agency ) . Fourthly , the author draws a conclusion and puts forward some relevant policy suggestions to promote coal mine safety supervision . On the basis of analyzing the problems of coal mine safety supervision , this paper focuses on the analysis of the relationship between coal mine safety supervision and coal mine safety supervision by using evolutionary game theory and mutual benefit game theory , and analyzes the relationship between coal mine safety supervision and coal mine safety supervision .

【學位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F224.32;F426.21;X936

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