【摘要】：債務(wù)成本的高低不僅會(huì)影響到企業(yè)的融資效率，也是對(duì)企業(yè)的業(yè)績?cè)鲩L和長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展起重要作用的因素之一。債權(quán)人與企業(yè)之間的代理問題和信息不對(duì)稱會(huì)使得企業(yè)的債務(wù)成本增加，雖然國外學(xué)者的研究表明高水平公司治理和高質(zhì)量審計(jì)監(jiān)督能緩解他們之間代理沖突和信息不對(duì)稱從而降低債務(wù)成本。然而，在中國資本市場上，對(duì)于公司治理和獨(dú)立審計(jì)的監(jiān)督作用是否能夠切實(shí)發(fā)揮還存在不少疑問和爭議，因此，成熟資本市場上的研究結(jié)論是否適用于國內(nèi)資本市場還需要進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)。 本文首先從理論上分析了公司治理與獨(dú)立審計(jì)在降低債務(wù)成本中的作用機(jī)理，然后實(shí)證考察了公司治理與獨(dú)立審計(jì)對(duì)債務(wù)成本的影響及在對(duì)債務(wù)成本的影響上兩者之間的相互關(guān)系，得出了以下的研究結(jié)論：第一，高水平的公司治理能夠降低債務(wù)成本。第二，高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)監(jiān)督也能降低債務(wù)成本，，即當(dāng)審計(jì)師為“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所時(shí)，債務(wù)成本會(huì)較低。第三，公司治理降低債務(wù)成本僅在審計(jì)質(zhì)量較低時(shí)成立，在對(duì)債務(wù)成本的影響上兩者存在著替代關(guān)系。具體來說，當(dāng)公司聘請(qǐng)“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所作為審計(jì)師，即審計(jì)質(zhì)量較高時(shí)，公司治理水平對(duì)債務(wù)成本的影響不顯著；而當(dāng)公司聘請(qǐng)非“十大”會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所作為審計(jì)師，即審計(jì)質(zhì)量較低時(shí)，公司治理水平的提升才會(huì)顯著降低債務(wù)成本。最后根據(jù)研究結(jié)論，本文認(rèn)為要想降低債務(wù)成本，加強(qiáng)對(duì)債權(quán)人的保護(hù)，要從完善制度環(huán)境和改善審計(jì)委托模式入手，以提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量并使公司自覺加強(qiáng)審計(jì)監(jiān)督；還要從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)、高管薪酬激勵(lì)以及信息披露等方面來不斷深化公司治理機(jī)制改革以提高治理水平。
[Abstract]:The cost of debt will not only affect the financing efficiency of enterprises, but also play an important role in the growth and long-term development of enterprise performance. Agency problems and information asymmetries between creditors and businesses increase the cost of debt. Although the research of foreign scholars shows that high level of corporate governance and high quality audit supervision can alleviate the agency conflict and information asymmetry between them and thus reduce the cost of debt. However, in China's capital market, there are still many questions and controversies on whether the supervisory role of corporate governance and independent audit can be effectively brought into play. Whether the conclusion of the mature capital market is applicable to the domestic capital market needs further examination. Firstly, this paper theoretically analyzes the mechanism of corporate governance and independent audit in reducing the cost of debt. Then the paper empirically investigates the influence of corporate governance and independent audit on debt cost and the relationship between them, and draws the following conclusions: first, high level of corporate governance can reduce debt cost. Second, high quality audit supervision can also reduce the cost of debt, that is, when the auditor is a "top ten" accounting firm, the cost of debt will be lower. Third, corporate governance reduces the cost of debt only when the audit quality is low, and there is a substitute relationship between them in the impact on the cost of debt. Specifically, when companies employ "ten" accounting firms as auditors, that is, the quality of audit is relatively high, the level of corporate governance does not have a significant impact on the cost of debt, but when companies employ non-" ten "accounting firms as auditors, When the audit quality is low, the improvement of corporate governance level will significantly reduce the debt cost. Finally, according to the conclusion of the study, this paper thinks that in order to reduce the cost of debt and strengthen the protection of creditors, we should start with perfecting the system environment and improving the mode of audit entrustment, in order to improve the audit quality and make the company strengthen the audit supervision consciously. It is also necessary to deepen the reform of corporate governance mechanism from the aspects of equity structure, board of directors, executive compensation incentive and information disclosure to improve the governance level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F239.4

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