地方政府競爭與產(chǎn)能過剩的理論與實證分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-11 17:09
【摘要】：自上世紀(jì)90年代我國首次出現(xiàn)產(chǎn)能過剩開始,我國已經(jīng)經(jīng)歷了三次嚴(yán)重的產(chǎn)能過剩階段,分別是上世紀(jì)90年代中后期、2003-2006年和2009年至今。過剩產(chǎn)能的范圍也從最初的生活用品到生產(chǎn)資料,到最后甚至連光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)、多晶硅等新興高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)也出現(xiàn)了嚴(yán)重的產(chǎn)能過剩,雖然中央政府多次下決心治理,但始終收效甚微,產(chǎn)能過剩問題已經(jīng)成為了嚴(yán)重影響我國經(jīng)濟(jì)健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的因素之一。 在我國產(chǎn)能過剩的不同階段,由于產(chǎn)業(yè)政策、市場環(huán)境和國際局勢有較大差異,因此影響產(chǎn)能利用情況的因素也有所不同,但是在所有這些因素當(dāng)中,地方政府之間的競爭始終貫穿于我國產(chǎn)能過剩的各個階段,并且在其中發(fā)揮著巨大的作用,而國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)對于此類問題的研究往往采用定性研究的方法,為此本文則在前人的基礎(chǔ)上采用定性分析和定量分析相結(jié)合的方法,對地方政府之間的競爭導(dǎo)致我國產(chǎn)能過剩的機(jī)制進(jìn)行全方位的分析。 本文通過建立一個關(guān)于地方政府和企業(yè)的簡單經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)模型,地方政府向企業(yè)提供產(chǎn)能補(bǔ)貼,企業(yè)根據(jù)利潤最大化原則制定生產(chǎn)計劃,通過均衡分析可得參與競爭的地區(qū)和企業(yè)越多,政府提供的補(bǔ)貼成本越低,越容易出現(xiàn)產(chǎn)能過剩的情況。而這個結(jié)果也十分符合目前我國的實際情況。我國目前的財稅體制和官員考核體制導(dǎo)致地方政府官員出于對地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益和自身政治利益的考量,有著強(qiáng)烈的競爭意識,而競爭的焦點則主要集中在了對資本資源的爭奪,因為資本資源可以在最大程度上轉(zhuǎn)化為地方政府的財政收入和GDP,最終成為地方政府官員的政績。而我國不清晰的土地產(chǎn)權(quán)、環(huán)境產(chǎn)權(quán)、銀行預(yù)算軟約束以及不完善的財政監(jiān)管體制又為這種競爭提供了“廉價”的手段,地方政府通過這些手段向企業(yè)提供大量直接或者間接的補(bǔ)貼已達(dá)到獲得投資,贏得地區(qū)競爭的目的。這種不符合市場規(guī)律的補(bǔ)貼嚴(yán)重扭曲了市場要素的價格,影響企業(yè)的投資決策,企業(yè)為了獲取政府補(bǔ)貼而擴(kuò)大投資規(guī)模,最終導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)能的過剩。 在實證分析中,本文采用數(shù)據(jù)包絡(luò)分析的方法,定量的計算了2000年-2012年我國31個省(直轄市、自治區(qū))國有及規(guī)模以上企業(yè)的產(chǎn)能利用情況,計算結(jié)果與我國產(chǎn)能過剩的階段性特征相一致。并且利用面板數(shù)據(jù)對影響產(chǎn)能利用情 況的各個指標(biāo)進(jìn)行回歸分析,結(jié)果顯示,地方政府補(bǔ)貼與產(chǎn)能利用情況呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)。 最后本文在理論和實證的基礎(chǔ)上,提出對產(chǎn)能過剩問題的治理建議：首先從地方政府的動機(jī)入手,從源頭上遏制產(chǎn)能過剩；其次從地方政府的手段入手,從技術(shù)上遏制產(chǎn)能過剩；最后從強(qiáng)化監(jiān)管入手,防止產(chǎn)能過剩死灰復(fù)燃。
[Abstract]:Since the first overcapacity appeared in China in the 1990s, China has experienced three serious stages of overcapacity, from 2003 to 2006 and from 2009 to present, respectively, in the middle and late 1990s. The scope of excess capacity also ranges from the initial household necessities to the means of production, and finally even the photovoltaic industry, polysilicon and other emerging high-tech industries have also experienced serious overcapacity, although the central government has made up its mind to deal with it many times. However, the problem of overcapacity has become one of the factors seriously affecting the healthy and stable development of China's economy. At different stages of overcapacity in China, the market environment and the international situation are quite different because of industrial policies, so the factors affecting the utilization of production capacity are different, but among all these factors, The competition among local governments is always running through every stage of overcapacity in our country, and plays a great role in it. However, the domestic and foreign literature often adopt the qualitative research method to study this kind of problem. On the basis of the previous studies, this paper uses the method of qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis to analyze the mechanism of local government competition which leads to overcapacity in our country. Through the establishment of a simple economic model about local government and enterprise, the local government provides the production capacity subsidy to the enterprise, and the enterprise formulates the production plan according to the principle of profit maximization. Through balanced analysis, the more competitive regions and enterprises, the lower the cost of subsidies provided by the government, and the more prone to overcapacity. And this result also accords with the actual situation of our country very much at present. The current fiscal and taxation system and the official assessment system in our country have led local government officials to have a strong sense of competition for their regional economic interests and their own political interests, and the focus of the competition is mainly on the competition for capital resources. Because capital resources can be translated to the maximum extent into local government revenue and GDP, finally become the achievements of local government officials. However, the lack of clear land property rights, environmental property rights, soft bank budget constraints and imperfect financial supervision system provide a "cheap" means for this kind of competition. Through these means, local governments provide a large number of direct or indirect subsidies to enterprises to achieve the goal of obtaining investment and winning regional competition. This kind of subsidy which does not conform to the market law seriously distorts the price of market elements and affects the investment decision of enterprises. In order to obtain government subsidies the enterprises expand their investment scale and eventually lead to excess capacity. In the empirical analysis, this paper uses the method of data envelopment analysis to quantitatively calculate the capacity utilization of state-owned enterprises in 31 provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) in China from 2000 to 2012. The calculated results are consistent with the stage characteristics of overcapacity in China. The results show that local government subsidies have a significant negative correlation with productivity use. Finally, on the basis of theory and practice, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to deal with the problem of overcapacity: firstly, starting with the motivation of local government, then curbing overcapacity from the source; secondly, starting with the means of local government. Technology to curb overcapacity, and finally to strengthen regulation to prevent the recurrence of overcapacity.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F224;F124;D630
本文編號：2237322
[Abstract]:Since the first overcapacity appeared in China in the 1990s, China has experienced three serious stages of overcapacity, from 2003 to 2006 and from 2009 to present, respectively, in the middle and late 1990s. The scope of excess capacity also ranges from the initial household necessities to the means of production, and finally even the photovoltaic industry, polysilicon and other emerging high-tech industries have also experienced serious overcapacity, although the central government has made up its mind to deal with it many times. However, the problem of overcapacity has become one of the factors seriously affecting the healthy and stable development of China's economy. At different stages of overcapacity in China, the market environment and the international situation are quite different because of industrial policies, so the factors affecting the utilization of production capacity are different, but among all these factors, The competition among local governments is always running through every stage of overcapacity in our country, and plays a great role in it. However, the domestic and foreign literature often adopt the qualitative research method to study this kind of problem. On the basis of the previous studies, this paper uses the method of qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis to analyze the mechanism of local government competition which leads to overcapacity in our country. Through the establishment of a simple economic model about local government and enterprise, the local government provides the production capacity subsidy to the enterprise, and the enterprise formulates the production plan according to the principle of profit maximization. Through balanced analysis, the more competitive regions and enterprises, the lower the cost of subsidies provided by the government, and the more prone to overcapacity. And this result also accords with the actual situation of our country very much at present. The current fiscal and taxation system and the official assessment system in our country have led local government officials to have a strong sense of competition for their regional economic interests and their own political interests, and the focus of the competition is mainly on the competition for capital resources. Because capital resources can be translated to the maximum extent into local government revenue and GDP, finally become the achievements of local government officials. However, the lack of clear land property rights, environmental property rights, soft bank budget constraints and imperfect financial supervision system provide a "cheap" means for this kind of competition. Through these means, local governments provide a large number of direct or indirect subsidies to enterprises to achieve the goal of obtaining investment and winning regional competition. This kind of subsidy which does not conform to the market law seriously distorts the price of market elements and affects the investment decision of enterprises. In order to obtain government subsidies the enterprises expand their investment scale and eventually lead to excess capacity. In the empirical analysis, this paper uses the method of data envelopment analysis to quantitatively calculate the capacity utilization of state-owned enterprises in 31 provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) in China from 2000 to 2012. The calculated results are consistent with the stage characteristics of overcapacity in China. The results show that local government subsidies have a significant negative correlation with productivity use. Finally, on the basis of theory and practice, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to deal with the problem of overcapacity: firstly, starting with the motivation of local government, then curbing overcapacity from the source; secondly, starting with the means of local government. Technology to curb overcapacity, and finally to strengthen regulation to prevent the recurrence of overcapacity.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F224;F124;D630
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