權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)影響收入分配的機制研究與模擬分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-14 10:58
【摘要】：本文在資源、權(quán)力與經(jīng)濟利益分配的既有分析框架下，界定了從資源到權(quán)力之間的關(guān)于權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)的理論內(nèi)涵。我們認為資源決定了主體在分配過程中可行使權(quán)力的大小，但是從資源到權(quán)力的轉(zhuǎn)換過程還受制于制度環(huán)境的相關(guān)約束，繼而可以通過權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)來刻畫在分配過程中從資源到權(quán)力的轉(zhuǎn)化過程，從中表達權(quán)力主體對客體的影響關(guān)系，以及制度環(huán)境對社會主體的制約效果。權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)是對權(quán)力的具體刻畫，而權(quán)力又是經(jīng)濟主體獲得分配所得的根本動力，因此本文試圖分析在分配過程中權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)對收入分配的影響效果。在本文的分析過程中得到了這樣如下幾個基本結(jié)論： 1、權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)是影響收入分配的根本因素，這是本文討論的理論基礎(chǔ)。在本文的分析框架中，權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)刻畫了從資源到權(quán)力的形成過程，反映了社會主體之間的關(guān)系，也在一定程度上反映了社會配置資源的能力。權(quán)力是社會主體之間的影響力，并且具有不對稱性，影響力的成因在于對資源的掌握和支配，不對稱性源于對資源的不同依賴程度，所以即便在相同的資源結(jié)構(gòu)下社會主體的權(quán)力也存在差異。借助于已有的元資源和衍生資源的劃分方式，本文認為衍生資源是社會主體對元資源的整合和運用，衍生資源按照功能可以分為政治資源、經(jīng)濟資源和社會資源，其中經(jīng)濟資源是一種生產(chǎn)性資源，而政治資源和社會資源是非生產(chǎn)性資源。政治資源、經(jīng)濟資源和社會資源可以相應(yīng)的轉(zhuǎn)化為政治權(quán)力、經(jīng)濟權(quán)力和社會權(quán)力，社會主體之間行使的權(quán)力是這三方面權(quán)力的綜合顯現(xiàn)。而從生產(chǎn)性和非生產(chǎn)性對資源劃分的角度也可以把權(quán)力相應(yīng)地分為生產(chǎn)性權(quán)力和非生產(chǎn)性權(quán)力。在本文的主體研究部分主要考察了由生產(chǎn)性權(quán)力與非生產(chǎn)性權(quán)力組合構(gòu)成的分配權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)對收入分配結(jié)果產(chǎn)生的影響。 2、通過基于沖突理論的分配模型分析，本文得出了以個人收入最大化為目標(biāo)的最優(yōu)分配過程的實現(xiàn)條件是經(jīng)濟主體的非生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力相等的基本結(jié)論，在非生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力相等的情況下，經(jīng)濟主體的分配所得主要依靠生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力獲得，但同時非生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力是生產(chǎn)分配過程的一種補充，能夠保證社會財富分配不會出現(xiàn)窮者愈窮，富者愈富的分配結(jié)果。對非生產(chǎn)性分配需要區(qū)別看待，一方面非生產(chǎn)性分配可能是由政府參與的賦予其它社會主體的再分配權(quán)力，這種非生產(chǎn)性權(quán)力是基于主體對其他社會主體的福利關(guān)懷而形成的社會價值基礎(chǔ)，滿足分配的正義性。另一方面非生產(chǎn)性分配可能源于對非生產(chǎn)性資源的不當(dāng)利用而形成分配權(quán)力的錯配，比如借助行政資源的尋租行為，在這種情況下的非生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力不具有分配的正義性，是對他人利益的不合理侵占。因此在分配制度的設(shè)計上應(yīng)該針對不同的非生產(chǎn)性權(quán)力的分配效果加以區(qū)分，既讓弱勢的社會主體能夠得到再分配帶來的經(jīng)濟援助，又避免尋租的泛濫。 3、在分析生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力與非生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力關(guān)系對分配結(jié)果的影響過程中可以看出，兩種分配權(quán)力的關(guān)系比例是決定分配結(jié)果的一個重要因素，同時經(jīng)濟主體之間的資源稟賦關(guān)系是決定分配結(jié)果的另一重要因素。新制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)指出制度變遷存在路徑依賴，路徑依賴其實就是經(jīng)濟活動隨時間變化的連續(xù)性發(fā)展的必然結(jié)果，分配過程亦是如此。當(dāng)將分配過程從單期擴展為存在跨期聯(lián)系的情況時，，就能夠模擬出分配過程的長期演變路徑。對生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力的傾向程度決定了合作生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)出水平以及生產(chǎn)合作者之間的分配關(guān)系。對生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力的傾向性越高，合作產(chǎn)出的水平也越高，生產(chǎn)合作者之間的收入差距也相對較大，當(dāng)對生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力的傾向性降低時，收入差距減小了，合作產(chǎn)出水平也降低了。但是無論權(quán)力傾向性系數(shù)如何選擇，在經(jīng)過一段時間后合作生產(chǎn)者之間的收入都會趨于均衡。所以本文認為為了降低貧富差距而過分重視非生產(chǎn)性分配過程不僅不會實現(xiàn)共同富裕，還會造成社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的停滯，只有重視生產(chǎn)性分配過程并且結(jié)合適度的非生產(chǎn)性分配過程才能在走向富裕的過程中實現(xiàn)共同富裕。 4、在研究權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)對初次分配的影響特別是對工資性收入的影響中，本文構(gòu)建了含有權(quán)力變量的工資定價模型。作為初次分配過程中最主要的分配形式，工資性收入可以分解為兩個步驟，第一步是企業(yè)所有者與企業(yè)工會之間的談判形成了企業(yè)職工的工資總額，第二步再根據(jù)企業(yè)職工個人分配權(quán)力決定個人工資的多寡。通過分析可以看出當(dāng)職工個人分配權(quán)力函數(shù)中生產(chǎn)性分配權(quán)力越大企業(yè)內(nèi)部的工資差距也就越大。從社會角度看待企業(yè)職工工資差異可以發(fā)現(xiàn)技術(shù)密集型企業(yè)職工工資高于資本密集型企業(yè)，更優(yōu)于勞動密集型企業(yè)。因此產(chǎn)業(yè)升級有利于提高企業(yè)職工的工資水平。 5、政府作為分配過程中不可或缺的主體，本文也根據(jù)它與公民之間的權(quán)力關(guān)系展開分析。政府是一個兼具公利性和自利性的特殊主體，在不同的特征下政府與公民之間的權(quán)力制約方式不同。公利性政府會根據(jù)公民個人利益最大化目標(biāo)和社會福利目標(biāo)作為政府決策的依據(jù)，而具有自利性的政府則會根據(jù)自身利益決策。但是模型同時也說明政府即便是自利的，也不能為所欲為實行權(quán)力，它所具有的行政權(quán)力也會受到公民經(jīng)濟權(quán)力的制約。
[Abstract]:Under the existing analytical framework of resource, power and economic benefit distribution, this paper defines the theoretical connotation of power structure from resource to power. We believe that resources determine the size of power that can be exercised by the subject in the process of distribution, but the process of transformation from resources to power is also subject to the relevant constraints of the institutional environment, and then. The power structure can be used to describe the process of transformation from resources to power in the process of distribution, from which the influence of power subject on the object and the restraint effect of institutional environment on the social subject can be expressed. The graph analyses the effect of power structure on income distribution in the process of distribution.
1. The power structure is the fundamental factor affecting income distribution, which is the theoretical basis discussed in this paper. In the analysis framework of this paper, the power structure describes the formation process from resources to power, reflects the relationship between social subjects, and to a certain extent reflects the ability of social resources allocation. Power is asymmetrical. The cause of influence lies in the mastery and control of resources. The asymmetry stems from the different degree of dependence on resources. Therefore, even under the same resource structure, the power of social subjects varies. By means of the existing division of meta-resources and derivative resources, this paper argues that derivative resources are social. According to the function, the derived resources can be divided into political resources, economic resources and social resources. Economic resources are productive resources, while political and social resources are non-productive resources. The power exercised between social subjects and social power is a comprehensive manifestation of these three aspects of power. From the perspective of productive and non-productive division of resources, power can be divided into productive power and non-productive power. The influence of the distributive power structure on the results of income distribution.
2. Through the analysis of the distribution model based on the conflict theory, this paper draws a conclusion that the realization condition of the optimal distribution process with the goal of maximizing personal income is that the non-productive distribution power of the economic subject is equal. When the non-productive distribution power is equal, the distribution income of the economic subject mainly depends on the productive distribution right. The power of non-productive distribution is a supplement to the process of production distribution, which can ensure that the distribution of social wealth will not result in the distribution of the poorer and the richer. On the other hand, the non-productive distribution may result from the improper use of non-productive resources, such as the rent-seeking behavior of administrative resources, in this case. The non-productive distribution of power does not have the justice of distribution, and it is an unreasonable encroachment on the interests of others. Therefore, in the design of distribution system, we should distinguish the distribution effect of different non-productive power, so that the disadvantaged social subjects can get the economic assistance brought by redistribution, and avoid the proliferation of rent-seeking.
3. In the process of analyzing the influence of the relationship between productive distribution power and non-productive distribution power on distribution results, it can be seen that the ratio of the two kinds of distribution power is an important factor to determine the distribution results, and the relationship between the resource endowment of economic subjects is another important factor to determine the distribution results. Institutional change has path dependence. Path dependence is the inevitable result of the continuous development of economic activities over time, and so is the distribution process. When the distribution process is expanded from a single period to a situation with intertemporal links, the long-term evolution path of the distribution process can be simulated. The higher the propensity to productive power distribution, the higher the level of cooperative output, and the relatively large income gap between producers. When the propensity to productive power distribution is reduced, the income gap decreases, and the level of cooperative output is also higher. However, no matter how the power inclination coefficient is chosen, the income between the cooperative producers will tend to be balanced after a period of time. Therefore, this paper argues that excessive emphasis on the non-productive distribution process in order to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor will not achieve common prosperity, but will also cause the stagnation of social and economic development, only pay attention to production. The process of sexual distribution combined with moderate non-productive distribution can realize common prosperity in the process of becoming rich.
4. In the study of the influence of power structure on the initial distribution, especially on wage income, this paper constructs a wage pricing model with power variables. As the main distribution form in the initial distribution process, wage income can be divided into two steps. The first step is the negotiation form between the owner and the trade union. The second step is to determine the amount of individual wages according to the individual distribution power of the employees in the enterprise. The wages of employees in technology-intensive enterprises are higher than those in capital-intensive enterprises, and better than those in labor-intensive enterprises. Therefore, industrial upgrading is conducive to raising the wages of employees in enterprises.
5. As an indispensable subject in the process of distribution, the government is also analyzed according to the power relationship between the government and the citizens. The social welfare goal is the basis of government decision-making, while the self-interested government will make decisions according to its own interests. But the model also shows that the government can not exercise power even if it is self-interested, and its administrative power will be restricted by the economic power of citizens.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F124.7
本文編號：2182637
[Abstract]:Under the existing analytical framework of resource, power and economic benefit distribution, this paper defines the theoretical connotation of power structure from resource to power. We believe that resources determine the size of power that can be exercised by the subject in the process of distribution, but the process of transformation from resources to power is also subject to the relevant constraints of the institutional environment, and then. The power structure can be used to describe the process of transformation from resources to power in the process of distribution, from which the influence of power subject on the object and the restraint effect of institutional environment on the social subject can be expressed. The graph analyses the effect of power structure on income distribution in the process of distribution.
1. The power structure is the fundamental factor affecting income distribution, which is the theoretical basis discussed in this paper. In the analysis framework of this paper, the power structure describes the formation process from resources to power, reflects the relationship between social subjects, and to a certain extent reflects the ability of social resources allocation. Power is asymmetrical. The cause of influence lies in the mastery and control of resources. The asymmetry stems from the different degree of dependence on resources. Therefore, even under the same resource structure, the power of social subjects varies. By means of the existing division of meta-resources and derivative resources, this paper argues that derivative resources are social. According to the function, the derived resources can be divided into political resources, economic resources and social resources. Economic resources are productive resources, while political and social resources are non-productive resources. The power exercised between social subjects and social power is a comprehensive manifestation of these three aspects of power. From the perspective of productive and non-productive division of resources, power can be divided into productive power and non-productive power. The influence of the distributive power structure on the results of income distribution.
2. Through the analysis of the distribution model based on the conflict theory, this paper draws a conclusion that the realization condition of the optimal distribution process with the goal of maximizing personal income is that the non-productive distribution power of the economic subject is equal. When the non-productive distribution power is equal, the distribution income of the economic subject mainly depends on the productive distribution right. The power of non-productive distribution is a supplement to the process of production distribution, which can ensure that the distribution of social wealth will not result in the distribution of the poorer and the richer. On the other hand, the non-productive distribution may result from the improper use of non-productive resources, such as the rent-seeking behavior of administrative resources, in this case. The non-productive distribution of power does not have the justice of distribution, and it is an unreasonable encroachment on the interests of others. Therefore, in the design of distribution system, we should distinguish the distribution effect of different non-productive power, so that the disadvantaged social subjects can get the economic assistance brought by redistribution, and avoid the proliferation of rent-seeking.
3. In the process of analyzing the influence of the relationship between productive distribution power and non-productive distribution power on distribution results, it can be seen that the ratio of the two kinds of distribution power is an important factor to determine the distribution results, and the relationship between the resource endowment of economic subjects is another important factor to determine the distribution results. Institutional change has path dependence. Path dependence is the inevitable result of the continuous development of economic activities over time, and so is the distribution process. When the distribution process is expanded from a single period to a situation with intertemporal links, the long-term evolution path of the distribution process can be simulated. The higher the propensity to productive power distribution, the higher the level of cooperative output, and the relatively large income gap between producers. When the propensity to productive power distribution is reduced, the income gap decreases, and the level of cooperative output is also higher. However, no matter how the power inclination coefficient is chosen, the income between the cooperative producers will tend to be balanced after a period of time. Therefore, this paper argues that excessive emphasis on the non-productive distribution process in order to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor will not achieve common prosperity, but will also cause the stagnation of social and economic development, only pay attention to production. The process of sexual distribution combined with moderate non-productive distribution can realize common prosperity in the process of becoming rich.
4. In the study of the influence of power structure on the initial distribution, especially on wage income, this paper constructs a wage pricing model with power variables. As the main distribution form in the initial distribution process, wage income can be divided into two steps. The first step is the negotiation form between the owner and the trade union. The second step is to determine the amount of individual wages according to the individual distribution power of the employees in the enterprise. The wages of employees in technology-intensive enterprises are higher than those in capital-intensive enterprises, and better than those in labor-intensive enterprises. Therefore, industrial upgrading is conducive to raising the wages of employees in enterprises.
5. As an indispensable subject in the process of distribution, the government is also analyzed according to the power relationship between the government and the citizens. The social welfare goal is the basis of government decision-making, while the self-interested government will make decisions according to its own interests. But the model also shows that the government can not exercise power even if it is self-interested, and its administrative power will be restricted by the economic power of citizens.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F124.7
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