聲譽、軟預算約束與混合所有制經(jīng)濟發(fā)展
發(fā)布時間:2018-07-25 09:35
【摘要】:本文以D-M模型為基礎,構(gòu)建了一個聲譽條件下混合所有制投資軟預算約束模型,探索軟預算約束對混合所有制投資項目的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在無聲譽條件下,混合所有制投資項目存在逆向選擇問題,是軟預算約束的產(chǎn)物;將借貸雙方聲譽引入后,聲譽對于硬化混合所有制投資軟預算約束、抑制逆向選擇的作用是毋庸置疑的。但聲譽功能的發(fā)揮面臨一些限制條件,制約了聲譽在硬化軟預算約束上的有效性,是制約中國混合所有制經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的障礙之一。對此,需要積極采取各種市場與非市場政策,努力培育成熟的市場經(jīng)濟。
[Abstract]:Based on D-M model, this paper constructs a soft budget constraint model for mixed ownership investment under reputational conditions, and explores the influence of soft budget constraint on mixed ownership investment projects. It is found that under the condition of no reputation, the investment project under mixed ownership has the problem of adverse selection, which is the product of soft budget constraint, and when the reputation of both borrowers and borrowers is introduced, the reputation will harden the soft budget constraint of investment under mixed ownership. The role of inhibiting adverse selection is beyond doubt. However, the function of reputation is faced with some restrictions, which restricts the effectiveness of reputation in hardening soft budget constraints, and is one of the obstacles to the development of China's mixed ownership economy. Therefore, it is necessary to actively adopt various market and non-market policies to foster a mature market economy.
【作者單位】: 東北大學工商管理學院;東北大學秦皇島分校經(jīng)濟學院;
【基金】:教育部人文社會科學研究青年基金項目“交叉所有權(quán)、最優(yōu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革:基于雙寡頭壟斷模型的研究”(15YJC790010) 國家社會科學基金重大項目“建立能源和水資源消耗、建設用地總量和強度雙控市場化機制研究”(15ZDC034)
【分類號】:F121.24
本文編號:2143394
[Abstract]:Based on D-M model, this paper constructs a soft budget constraint model for mixed ownership investment under reputational conditions, and explores the influence of soft budget constraint on mixed ownership investment projects. It is found that under the condition of no reputation, the investment project under mixed ownership has the problem of adverse selection, which is the product of soft budget constraint, and when the reputation of both borrowers and borrowers is introduced, the reputation will harden the soft budget constraint of investment under mixed ownership. The role of inhibiting adverse selection is beyond doubt. However, the function of reputation is faced with some restrictions, which restricts the effectiveness of reputation in hardening soft budget constraints, and is one of the obstacles to the development of China's mixed ownership economy. Therefore, it is necessary to actively adopt various market and non-market policies to foster a mature market economy.
【作者單位】: 東北大學工商管理學院;東北大學秦皇島分校經(jīng)濟學院;
【基金】:教育部人文社會科學研究青年基金項目“交叉所有權(quán)、最優(yōu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革:基于雙寡頭壟斷模型的研究”(15YJC790010) 國家社會科學基金重大項目“建立能源和水資源消耗、建設用地總量和強度雙控市場化機制研究”(15ZDC034)
【分類號】:F121.24
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