本文選題：遼河流域 + 生態(tài)補償　； 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：2012年黨的十八大報告明確指出，面對資源約束趨緊、環(huán)境污染嚴(yán)重、生態(tài)系統(tǒng)退化的嚴(yán)峻形勢，大力推進(jìn)生態(tài)文明建設(shè)，建立反映市場供求和資源稀缺程度、體現(xiàn)生態(tài)價值和代際補償?shù)纳鷳B(tài)補償制度。2014年修訂《中華人民共和國環(huán)境保護法》（2015年1月1日實施）第三十一條明確規(guī)定，國家建立、健全生態(tài)保護補償制度，所以，作為一種調(diào)節(jié)流域上下游生態(tài)環(huán)境保護相關(guān)利益主體之間關(guān)系的環(huán)境經(jīng)濟手段，將“生態(tài)補償”應(yīng)用于流域環(huán)境管理，成為學(xué)術(shù)研究和流域管理實踐的熱點內(nèi)容，也成為新時期我國流域水資源環(huán)境利益平衡的重要手段。 近年來遼河流域經(jīng)濟社會不斷發(fā)展，水資源的消耗和污染物的排放導(dǎo)致遼河流域污染嚴(yán)重，上游地區(qū)水土沙化嚴(yán)重，東、西遼河入遼寧省境內(nèi)時水質(zhì)均為Ⅴ類，跨省界河流污染問題嚴(yán)峻，嚴(yán)重威脅到遼寧省大部分地區(qū)的飲用水安全，流域用水關(guān)系日趨緊張，用水矛盾日益突出，由此引發(fā)的生態(tài)補償問題成為平衡流域上下游政府間用水關(guān)系和用水利益的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)。受流域上下游政府因存在經(jīng)濟社會和資源環(huán)境目標(biāo)和利益上的各種矛盾沖突，使流域上下游政府生態(tài)補償具有典型的博弈特征。基于此，本文在流域生態(tài)補償?shù)纳鷳B(tài)學(xué)、經(jīng)濟學(xué)以及博弈論的基礎(chǔ)上，綜合闡述遼河流域經(jīng)濟社會發(fā)展與自然環(huán)境概況，分析遼河流域水資源條件和水環(huán)境管理問題，論述流域生態(tài)補償?shù)谋匾�；然后從博弈論的視角，�?gòu)建基于成本收益的博弈模型，，系統(tǒng)分析遼河流域生態(tài)補償機制建設(shè)中上下游政府博弈關(guān)系；研究污染物定價模型和基于污染物總量控制的行政協(xié)調(diào)模型，并進(jìn)行了遼河流域污染賠償方法傾向性分析，構(gòu)建遼河流域生態(tài)補償標(biāo)準(zhǔn)模型；最后構(gòu)建遼河流域生態(tài)補償機制。 研究顯示，（1）政府投資對流域水資源保護與水污染治理起到積極的作用，但是實踐中政府投資還存在諸如資金需求缺口大、資金來源少投入渠道單一、資金分散列支缺乏有效整合、偏重項目建設(shè)、資金監(jiān)管薄弱、缺乏跨行政區(qū)域合作機制等較多的問題；遼河流域水環(huán)境管理還存在諸如缺乏流域水污染賠償實踐、現(xiàn)有生態(tài)補償機制不完善且手段單一以及跨省水環(huán)境管理機制薄弱等問題，需要完善的生態(tài)補償機制協(xié)調(diào)流域用水關(guān)系、平衡用水利益。（2）遼河流域上游出境水質(zhì)達(dá)標(biāo)情形下，下游政府要求更好的水質(zhì)，則在上下游保護與補償?shù)撵o態(tài)博弈中，上下游地方政府間生態(tài)補償博弈陷入“囚徒困境”，說明地方政府間橫向財政轉(zhuǎn)移支付對流域上游水環(huán)境保護處于失效狀態(tài)，必須通過地方政府間有約束力的協(xié)議及與中央縱向財政轉(zhuǎn)移支付相結(jié)合的模式，實現(xiàn)生態(tài)補償?shù)淖畲笮в�。�?）博弈結(jié)果顯示，若促進(jìn)生態(tài)補償機制順利實施，中央政府和下游政府生態(tài)補償額度為，下游政府的補償額度不能超過其獲得的收益，即c≤b外，其他的生態(tài)補償額度由國家進(jìn)行承擔(dān)，并確保c+c‘＞C-B內(nèi)。（4）流域上下游政府間的動態(tài)博弈結(jié)論顯示，通過市場機制達(dá)到流域優(yōu)化配置的情形，通過法律行政等手段保證下游的索賠權(quán)利，并引入激勵因子，合理設(shè)定激勵因子c補，使下游索賠的金額大于上游的治理成本，有效的改變上游的收益預(yù)期，使上下游的理性選擇最終實現(xiàn)流域環(huán)境的優(yōu)化，達(dá)到流域資源環(huán)境的優(yōu)化。（5）遼河流域遼寧省、吉林省和內(nèi)蒙古自治區(qū)因省界斷面水質(zhì)現(xiàn)狀及下游省份需求而成為生態(tài)補償?shù)闹黧w和客體，探討構(gòu)建的污染物排放補償金定價模型和基于污染物總量控制的行政協(xié)調(diào)模型，依據(jù)遼河流域“十二五”水污染防治規(guī)劃水質(zhì)目標(biāo)核算，遼寧省2011年需向內(nèi)蒙補償14025580元，吉林省需賠償遼寧省21567154元；依據(jù)遼河流域水功能區(qū)劃水質(zhì)目標(biāo)核算，2011年，遼寧省需向內(nèi)蒙補償9300917元，吉林省需賠償遼寧31654015元。（6）生態(tài)補償途徑。通過對資金、實物、市場、金融等補償及賠償手段的研究，探討可適用的遼河流域生態(tài)補償與污染賠償?shù)木唧w方式及途徑，提出資金補償、政策補償、產(chǎn)業(yè)補償和區(qū)域協(xié)作補償?shù)哪Ｊ酵緩�。提出建立遼河流域生態(tài)補償機制的推動力量、拓寬補償資金來源渠道、完善政府投資、政府投資的相關(guān)機制設(shè)計，并建立完善的生態(tài)補償與污染賠償評價監(jiān)督機制。 研究遼河流域生態(tài)補償機制，為解決遼河流域污染嚴(yán)重、生態(tài)環(huán)境惡化等問題提供了理論基礎(chǔ)和方法，同時完善了現(xiàn)有的遼河流域資源環(huán)境管理體制，為遼河流域的可持續(xù)發(fā)展和我國流域綜合管理提供參考。
[Abstract]:In 2012, the eighteen major reports of the party clearly pointed out that the ecological compensation system, reflecting the market supply and demand and the scarcity of resources, reflecting the ecological value and intergenerational compensation, was revised "People's Republic of China environmental protection" in the face of tighter resource constraints, serious environmental pollution and the severe situation of ecological degradation. The ecological compensation system that reflects the market supply and demand and the scarcity of resources, reflects the ecological value and intergenerational compensation in.2014. The thirty-first articles (implemented in January 1, 2015) clearly stipulate that the state establishes and improves the system of ecological protection compensation. Therefore, as an environmental economic means to regulate the relationship between the stakeholders of the ecological environment protection of the upper and lower reaches of the basin, the "ecological compensation" is applied to the environmental management of the basin, and it has become a practice of academic research and basin management. The hot topics also become an important means to balance the interests of water resources and environment in China in the new era.
In recent years, the economic and social development of the Liaohe River Basin, the consumption of water resources and the emission of pollutants lead to serious pollution in the Liaohe River Basin, the water and soil desertification in the upper reaches of the river is serious. The water quality of the East and the West Liao River is V in Liaoning Province, the pollution of the rivers in the provinces is severe, and the drinking water in most areas of Liaoning province is threatened by Yan Zhongwei, and the river basin is safe. The water relations are becoming more and more tense, and the water contradiction is becoming more and more prominent. The problem of ecological compensation has become a key link to balance the water use relationship between the upper and lower reaches of the river basin and the interests of water use. The ecological compensation of the upstream and downstream governments of the basin is caused by the various contradictions and conflicts between the upstream and downstream governments of the basin and the economic and social and resource environment. Based on the ecological, economic and game theory of ecological compensation in the basin, this paper expounds the economic and social development and the natural environment of the Liaohe River Basin, analyzes the water resource conditions and water environment management in the Liaohe River Basin, discusses the necessity of the ecological compensation in the basin, and then from the game theory The game model based on cost and income is constructed, the game relationship between the upper and lower reaches of the ecological compensation mechanism in Liaohe River Basin is analyzed systematically, the pollutant pricing model and the administrative coordination model based on the total amount control of pollutants are studied, and the tendency analysis of pollution compensation method in Liaohe River basin is carried out, and the ecological compensation standard of the Liaohe River Basin is constructed. Finally, the ecological compensation mechanism of Liaohe River Basin is constructed.
The research shows that (1) government investment plays a positive role in water resource protection and water pollution control, but in practice, government investment still exists such as large shortage of capital demand, single source of funds, lack of effective integration of funds, project construction, weak fund supervision and lack of cross administrative regional cooperation mechanism. There are many problems, such as the water environment management in the Liaohe River Basin, such as the lack of water pollution compensation practice, the existing ecological compensation mechanism is imperfect, the means is single, and the cross provincial water environment management mechanism is weak. It needs perfect ecological compensation mechanism to coordinate the water use relationship in the basin and balance the interest of water. (2) the upper reaches of Liaohe River Basin Under the condition of water quality standard, the downstream government requires better water quality. In the static game of the upstream and downstream protection and compensation, the ecological compensation game between the upper and lower reaches of the local government falls into the "prisoner's dilemma", which indicates that the local government transversal financial transfer payment is in the failure state of the water environment protection in the upper reaches of the river basin, and it must be made through the local governments. The agreement of the beam force and the mode of combining with the central longitudinal financial transfer payment can achieve the greatest utility of ecological compensation. (3) the result of the game shows that, if the ecological compensation mechanism is promoted smoothly, the compensation limit of the central government and the downstream government can not exceed the income obtained by the downstream government, that is, C < B, and other students. The state compensation amount is borne by the state and ensures the c+c > C-B. (4) the dynamic game conclusion between the upstream and downstream governments of the basin shows that through the market mechanism to achieve the optimal allocation of the river basin, the claim right of the downstream is guaranteed by means of legal administration, and the incentive factor is introduced and the incentive factor C supplement is reasonably set to make the amount of the claim downstream. Greater than upstream management costs, effectively change the upstream revenue expectation, make the rational selection of the upstream and downstream to optimize the basin environment and achieve the optimization of the basin resource environment. (5) Liaoning province of Liaohe River Basin, Jilin province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region become the main body and guest of ecological compensation because of the water quality status of the provincial section and the needs of the lower provinces. The pricing model of pollutant emission compensation and the administrative coordination model based on total amount control are discussed. According to the water quality target of "12th Five-Year" water pollution prevention and control planning in Liaohe River Basin, Liaoning province needs to compensate Inner Mongolia 14025580 yuan in 2011, and Jilin province to compensate Liaoning province 21567154 yuan; according to the water function area of Liaohe River Basin Water quality target accounting, in 2011, Liaoning province needs to compensate Inner Mongolia 9300917 yuan, Jilin province to compensate Liaoning 31654015 yuan. (6) ecological compensation approach. Through the study of funds, material, market, financial and other compensation and compensation means to explore the applicable Liaohe River basin ecological compensation and pollution compensation specific ways and means, and put forward capital compensation, The mode of policy compensation, industrial compensation and regional cooperation compensation, puts forward the driving force of establishing the ecological compensation mechanism of the Liaohe River Basin, widens the sources of compensation funds, consummate the government investment, design the related mechanism of government investment, and establish a perfect supervision mechanism for the evaluation of ecological compensation and pollution compensation.
The study of the ecological compensation mechanism in the Liaohe River basin provides a theoretical basis and method for solving the serious pollution of the Liaohe River Basin and the deterioration of the ecological environment. At the same time, the existing management system of the resources and environment of the Liaohe River Basin is perfected, which provides a reference for the sustainable development of the Liaohe River Basin and the comprehensive management of the river basin in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F127;X321

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