本文關(guān)鍵詞：全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡與美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

        自1999年以來(lái),美國(guó)的經(jīng)常賬戶赤字以及世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的不平衡都在迅速的加劇,很多學(xué)者認(rèn)為現(xiàn)在的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡是不可以持續(xù)的,應(yīng)該進(jìn)行調(diào)整,否則會(huì)產(chǎn)生危機(jī)。他們提出的調(diào)整方案也大致相同,不外乎緊縮的財(cái)政和擴(kuò)張的貨幣政策,匯率貶值以及通過(guò)貿(mào)易政策促使其他國(guó)家進(jìn)行調(diào)整。雖然經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們的討論十分熱烈,但是美國(guó)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策實(shí)踐,并不是按照經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們建議的去做。盡管美國(guó)2002年到2004年美元匯率貶值幅度不小,但是美國(guó)并沒(méi)有配合緊縮的財(cái)政政策。其政策組合的最終結(jié)果必然導(dǎo)致美國(guó)經(jīng)常賬戶赤字?jǐn)U大。不僅新世紀(jì)以來(lái)美國(guó)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策是近期全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇形成的重要原因,如果詳細(xì)的考察幾個(gè)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇的時(shí)期,我們都可以得到類似結(jié)論。美國(guó)既然采用了擴(kuò)大外部失衡的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策,我們可以推斷美國(guó)必定能夠從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡中獲得宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。美國(guó)從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡中到底獲得了什么樣的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益呢?不同于其他學(xué)者對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的看法,本文認(rèn)為并非美國(guó)金融行業(yè)的發(fā)達(dá)引起了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡,而是反過(guò)來(lái)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)了美國(guó)金融行業(yè)的發(fā)展。以此為基礎(chǔ),我們得到美國(guó)從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡中獲得的一個(gè)重要宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益即為金融行業(yè)的發(fā)展以及實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)。當(dāng)然,在不同的時(shí)期,全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡對(duì)美國(guó)金融行業(yè)發(fā)展的推動(dòng)作用并不相同。在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)之后至1980年代初期,美國(guó)采取了包括Q條例,利息平衡稅等等金融管制措施,避免美元資產(chǎn)的流出,同時(shí)也給美國(guó)向國(guó)外提供金融服務(wù)形成了障礙。即使美國(guó)有經(jīng)常賬戶赤字,其他國(guó)家對(duì)美元資產(chǎn)有需求,他們也無(wú)法推動(dòng)美國(guó)金融行業(yè)的發(fā)展。在1980年代之后,美國(guó)金融管制的放松,為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)美國(guó)金融行業(yè)以及實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展創(chuàng)造了條件。1990年以來(lái),美國(guó)金融行業(yè)在外部需求的推動(dòng)下,發(fā)展更為迅速。1990年以來(lái)美國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)指數(shù)的飆升,美國(guó)對(duì)外投資收益增加,新經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮等等,都體現(xiàn)了美國(guó)金融行業(yè)的大發(fā)展。美國(guó)金融行業(yè)發(fā)展除了通過(guò)提高資源配置效率,改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等傳統(tǒng)途徑推動(dòng)其經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)外,還通過(guò)Nasdaq市場(chǎng)的繁榮和新經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展來(lái)推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。美國(guó)從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡中獲得的另外一個(gè)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益是對(duì)通貨膨脹更好的控制。失衡對(duì)美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)價(jià)格水平控制的好處,可以從兩個(gè)層面來(lái)理解,第一是宏觀層面,第二是產(chǎn)業(yè)層面。宏觀層面上,即使其他國(guó)家的盈余美元大量回流到美國(guó),甚至出現(xiàn)了全球性流動(dòng)性過(guò)剩的現(xiàn)象,卻并沒(méi)有改變經(jīng)常賬戶與貨幣供應(yīng)量之間的相互關(guān)系。通過(guò)實(shí)證分析我們可以知道,美國(guó)貨幣供應(yīng)量受經(jīng)常賬戶影響的系數(shù)是正的,即赤字會(huì)減少貨幣供應(yīng),即使美國(guó)的系數(shù)值比其他國(guó)家要小。產(chǎn)業(yè)層面上,美國(guó)將國(guó)內(nèi)的勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)以及某些資本密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移到國(guó)外之后,凈進(jìn)口的不斷增加,必然導(dǎo)致國(guó)內(nèi)這兩種行業(yè)的價(jià)格水平下降。本文把紡織行業(yè)以及汽車行業(yè)等作為勞動(dòng)密集型和資本密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)的代表,通過(guò)實(shí)證研究證明了上述觀點(diǎn)。因此,不論從宏觀的層面上,還是微觀的層面上,我們都可以認(rèn)為失衡為美國(guó)控制國(guó)內(nèi)的通貨膨脹提供了便利。美國(guó)從貿(mào)易失衡中同時(shí)能夠獲得價(jià)格水平控制,金融行業(yè)乃至實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的好處,因此本文認(rèn)為美國(guó)的經(jīng)常賬戶最優(yōu)規(guī)模的決定函數(shù)必定和其他國(guó)家有區(qū)別。根據(jù)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)給美國(guó)帶來(lái)的兩個(gè)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益,本文改寫了以經(jīng)常賬戶狀況為重要變量的美國(guó)政府損失函數(shù),并且對(duì)幾個(gè)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇時(shí)期美國(guó)的最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶的方向進(jìn)行了討論。得到的結(jié)論是,全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇的幾個(gè)時(shí)期,美國(guó)的經(jīng)常賬戶最優(yōu)值均為負(fù)值。當(dāng)然,福利分析得到的政策建議,要成為現(xiàn)實(shí)中美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策制定的準(zhǔn)則,還要引入一個(gè)假設(shè),即實(shí)際的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策必須符合福利分析的結(jié)論,這樣本文才能夠認(rèn)為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡是美國(guó)實(shí)際執(zhí)行的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策造成的,而這又可以進(jìn)一步歸結(jié)為美國(guó)能夠從全球失衡中獲得重要宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。本文把上述的結(jié)論,歸納為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō)。全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō),和其他幾種全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡形成假說(shuō)有一定的關(guān)聯(lián),但是它比其他假說(shuō)更為深入的解釋了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡。全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō)之下,美國(guó)從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡中可能獲得的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益是失衡的最重要決定因素。只要美國(guó)能夠從失衡中獲取足夠的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益,憑借美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模以及美元在國(guó)際金融市場(chǎng)上的地位,他就能夠通過(guò)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策影響本國(guó)和外國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策以及經(jīng)常賬戶。從這個(gè)意義上來(lái)說(shuō),全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡要得到根本性的調(diào)整,其中一個(gè)重要條件就是美國(guó)從失衡中獲取的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益變得很小,相對(duì)而言失衡形成的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)他沖擊較大,美國(guó)才會(huì)主動(dòng)的調(diào)整其宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策。美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō)對(duì)于全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡調(diào)整的責(zé)任分配,也有一定的理論意義。無(wú)論是在20世紀(jì)70年代和80年代的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇時(shí)期,還是本世紀(jì)初的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇時(shí)期,對(duì)于全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的調(diào)整責(zé)任分配一直都是爭(zhēng)論的焦點(diǎn)。美國(guó)認(rèn)為其他國(guó)家應(yīng)該承擔(dān)調(diào)整的責(zé)任,并采取種種措施對(duì)他們施壓;經(jīng)常賬戶的盈余國(guó)家則認(rèn)為美國(guó)無(wú)視外部經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡而導(dǎo)致了全球失衡的加劇,因此美國(guó)應(yīng)該調(diào)整更多的調(diào)整責(zé)任。如果美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō)成立,則全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的一個(gè)重要原因在于美國(guó)(因?yàn)槟軌颢@得宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益)采取了擴(kuò)大外部經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策,所以美國(guó)對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的調(diào)整應(yīng)該承擔(dān)更多責(zé)任。在福利分析的過(guò)程中,本文認(rèn)為美國(guó)自1990年代以來(lái)的最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模應(yīng)該是負(fù)的,也就是有經(jīng)常賬戶的赤字。美國(guó)實(shí)際執(zhí)行的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策,是不是同福利分析的結(jié)論一致呢?通過(guò)對(duì)新世紀(jì)以來(lái)的美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策研究,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)確實(shí)并不在意外部經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡,其政策組合的目標(biāo)是抵消國(guó)內(nèi)受到的負(fù)面沖擊,避免經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退以及失業(yè)的出現(xiàn)。特別是美國(guó)新世紀(jì)以來(lái)的匯率水平的降低,并不代表美國(guó)打算調(diào)整其外部經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡,相反,他是美國(guó)政策組合特別是擴(kuò)張性貨幣政策,2001年美國(guó)負(fù)面沖擊對(duì)投資者信心影響以及經(jīng)常賬戶赤字?jǐn)U大的必然結(jié)果。況且,美元匯率貶值時(shí),一方面可以帶來(lái)需求轉(zhuǎn)移的效果,即美國(guó)居民將更多的收入用于購(gòu)買本國(guó)產(chǎn)品;另外一方面,由于美國(guó)債務(wù)多是以美元計(jì)價(jià),匯率貶值會(huì)使美國(guó)債務(wù)迅速縮水,降低國(guó)內(nèi)債務(wù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。所以美元貶值是美國(guó)調(diào)整內(nèi)部失衡政策的必然產(chǎn)物。進(jìn)一步的說(shuō),一旦擴(kuò)張性貨幣政策以及匯率貶值對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的推動(dòng)見(jiàn)效,美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)甚至趨于偏熱時(shí),美國(guó)2005年開始實(shí)行緊縮的貨幣政策,連續(xù)17次加息。美國(guó)緊縮的貨幣政策,也使得美元匯率有小幅的升值。因此,這進(jìn)一步證明了美國(guó)在這段時(shí)期內(nèi),匯率降低并非為了調(diào)整外部失衡,其政策取向一直都是以內(nèi)部失衡治理為中心。在次貸危機(jī)發(fā)生之后,許多學(xué)者都對(duì)他提出了自己的想法,但是沒(méi)有將次貸危機(jī)同全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的大背景聯(lián)系在一起,所以分析起來(lái)缺乏深度。次貸危機(jī)的發(fā)生,從根本上說(shuō)是經(jīng)常賬戶盈余國(guó)家不滿足于低收益?zhèn)?開始追逐美國(guó)高收益金融資產(chǎn)后,美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的高收益金融產(chǎn)品供給能力無(wú)法滿足其他國(guó)家需求所導(dǎo)致的金融泡沫。美國(guó)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的轉(zhuǎn)向,改變了金融泡沫所賴以生存的金融環(huán)境,才最終釀成次貸危機(jī)。因此,次貸危機(jī)從根本上說(shuō)是同全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡息息相關(guān)的。次貸危機(jī)發(fā)生之后,深刻地改變了美國(guó)從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡中獲得的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益,全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡可能并不能夠再如1990年以來(lái)那樣,產(chǎn)生大量對(duì)美國(guó)金融產(chǎn)品的需求,為美國(guó)金融行業(yè)的發(fā)展乃至實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。于是美國(guó)能夠從全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡中獲得的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益,將同其他國(guó)家的相差無(wú)幾。美國(guó)政府損失函數(shù)分析的結(jié)果則是最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模仍然是赤字。當(dāng)然,美國(guó)必定會(huì)為了國(guó)內(nèi)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)改善,執(zhí)行擴(kuò)張性的財(cái)政和貨幣政策,這將會(huì)在未來(lái)一段時(shí)間內(nèi),繼續(xù)加劇美國(guó)的經(jīng)常賬戶赤字以及全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡。不過(guò),如果未來(lái)美國(guó)發(fā)現(xiàn)擴(kuò)大外部經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡已經(jīng)不再給他們帶來(lái)可觀的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益,會(huì)考慮改變經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的取向,實(shí)行有利于美國(guó)外部經(jīng)濟(jì)平衡恢復(fù)的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策。美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益驅(qū)動(dòng)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇的根本原因。這對(duì)盈余國(guó)家有兩方面的重要含義:(1)美國(guó)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策可能會(huì)給盈余國(guó)家?guī)?lái)?yè)p失;(2)盈余國(guó)家的調(diào)整不可能根本改變?nèi)蚪?jīng)濟(jì)失衡的格局。因?yàn)槊绹?guó)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策會(huì)讓盈余國(guó)家有損失,這就意味著盈余國(guó)家必須進(jìn)行調(diào)整;盈余國(guó)家調(diào)整又不可能根本改變?nèi)蚪?jīng)濟(jì)失衡的格局,這就意味著他們必須選擇調(diào)整的方式。因?yàn)椴煌恼{(diào)整方式之下,盈余國(guó)家的損失以及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并不相同,需要作出權(quán)衡。盈余國(guó)家的調(diào)整方式主要可以分為兩種,一種是單獨(dú)進(jìn)行調(diào)整,一種是盈余國(guó)家聯(lián)合進(jìn)行調(diào)整。盈余國(guó)家進(jìn)行單獨(dú)調(diào)整時(shí),往往會(huì)因?yàn)閲?guó)際匯率制度等安排的缺陷,承擔(dān)更多成本和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此盈余國(guó)家需要進(jìn)行聯(lián)合調(diào)整,才可以避免風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和額外的成本。我們可以通過(guò)歐洲國(guó)家外匯儲(chǔ)備幣種構(gòu)成的調(diào)整與東亞國(guó)家儲(chǔ)備幣種構(gòu)成調(diào)整的滯后,來(lái)大致驗(yàn)證上述判斷。因此,本文傾向于認(rèn)為盈余國(guó)家應(yīng)該采取聯(lián)合調(diào)整的方式來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡。

    Since 1999, the US current account deficit and global imbalances have been increasing rapidly. Many economists worry about the sustainability and consequences of the global imbalances so that they recommend rebalancing the economic in order to avoid financial crisis. Their agenda are mostly the same: contracting monetary and budgetary policy, exchange rate depreciation and trade policies. As the discussion progresses, the US current account deficit and global imbalances have no response, because the US government didn’t adopt the recommendation of the economists. Furthermore, if we go deeply into the history, we will find that the several periods of increasing global imbalances coincident with expansionary macroeconomic policies as a whole.I deduce from the history that US must get something from global imbalances, or he will not leave the global imbalances alone. What can US get from global imbalances? In order to figure out the secret, reviewing the global imbalances theories is necessary. We find that US financial advantage didn’t cause global imbalances; the casual direction is quite the reverse. Based on the review, we get the message that US financial industry can benefit from the global imbalances as well as the US economic. However, the benefits US can get from global imbalances are quite different in particular period. From the World War Two till the early 1980s, the US current account deficit has little influences on the US financial industry. The obstacle behind is the US financial regulation policies. Although other surplus countries have demands on the US financial product, the Q quotation and IET raise the costs of supplying financial product to foreigners to a prohibitive level. After these policies are abolished, the US financial industries are pushed by these non-exhausting demands. Since 1990s, the benefits get larger and larger and we can learn it from the soaring US security market indexes, the large return differentials and the booming new economics.The other benefit that US get from imbalances is better control on price level. We can show it from the macro level or the industry level. From the macro level, although surplus dollar return to US, the basic principle between current account and money supply still exist in US. The current account deficit will reduce the money supply of America. If the price level is mostly influenced by money supply, we can say that the global imbalances can help US control its price level. From the industry level, US transfer the labor-intensive and some capital-intensive industries to other countries. According to the trade theories, the price level of these industries will be reduced by imports. The empirical analysis mostly supports the viewpoint above. In all the global imbalances can help US to control its price level.US can promote growth and stabilize inflation through current account deficit so that we believe the optimal US current account is quite different from other countries. Based on the benefits US gets, I restructure the lost function of US government where current account position is supposed to be the most important factor.Calculating the optimal current account value of specific period, we believe that the value is negative for the time when global imbalances got worsen rapidly. To draw pieces together, we need to introduce a proposition that economic policy of real world matches the welfare analysis for new institutional economic strongly oppose this proposition and cite many examples to support their view. After that, we can deduce that global imbalance may be caused by the US macroeconomic benefits which lead to expansionary economic policies. I call the theories as US economic benefits view of global imbalances. This view is connected with the other views and different from them too. It helps us go deeply down into the causes of global imbalances. If the US economic benefits view is right, the global imbalances will be de decided by the US benefits. The larger the benefits, the larger global imbalances for US economic policies will prone to make it larger. According to this view, one of the reason global rebalances will come into being is that US benefits from current account deficits get smaller or even become negative, because the US will have to adjust his attitude and economic policies after that. The periphery can’t do much about the imbalances.We believe that the US optimal current account value is negative since 1990, so the economic policies must match the analysis. We need to go into details about this question: if US macro policies cause current account deficits. The answer is yes. US didn’t worry about external imbalances, his objective is to promote economic growth internal, fight against the recession risk and reduce unemployment rate. Although the dollar depreciates a lot from 2001 to 2004, it did not mean that US try to reduce external imbalances. Once we go back to the floating exchange regime US adopt, it become obvious that the expansionary monetary policy, the negative shock and investors’confidence lead to the depreciation. Moreover, depreciating dollar will switch demand form imports products to domestic made ones; depreciating dollar will help shrink US debt for most of the US debt are nominated in dollar. After the macro policies achieve its objectives, the US once again raises its federal fund rate. The change make the dollar appreciate again. It’s common to us all that dollar appreciation will worsen its current account. We can tell that US didn’t want to reduce external imbalances.After subprime mortgage crisis, many scholars judge the event from different perspective. They may got some shells but forget about the sea. Subprime crisis is closely connected with global imbalances. The periphery is not content with US government debt with low return rates and tries to buy some financial products with better profits. The huge demand exceeds the supply power of US financial system so that a bubble come into being and finally bust. The fuse is that US change macro policies and raise the federal fund rates. However, even if the US haven’t change the direction of monetary policies, the bubble would still bust. As a result, the subprime mortgage crisis is caused by global imbalances to some extent.Subprime mortgage crisis greatly affected the US macro benefits, the investors’confidence about the US financial market may break down so that the periphery will invest less in the US financial markets even if they can still get lots of surplus dollar. The optimal current account value becomes larger which means US need to improve the current account. However, US government doesn’t want to experience recession so that he will make expansionary policies to stimulate growth even if the optimal value becomes larger. Once they realize the situation, they may change the macro policies and improve the current account as well.According to the US economic benefits view, there are two implications for periphery countries. First, the US macro policies may make at the expense of periphery countries’interest. Second, periphery can’t wipe out global imbalances by themselves. Consequently, periphery need to adjust and must try to choose the best way to do so. Different path may bring different risks and benefits.Generally, there are two ways periphery can avoid the loss caused by the US government policies. First, every country takes care of individual business. Second, they cooperate to do so. Once they do it alone, they may incur greater loss. For example, if A country appreciate against dollar, he may appreciate against other periphery countries too so that he loss competence in exports. Once we compare the European Union and East Asia, it’s quite clearly that EU does a better job at reduce dollar reserves. I think that cooperation is the best way for the periphery countries.

全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡與美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益

摘要3-7Abstract7-10導(dǎo)言19-27    0.1 問(wèn)題的提出及選題意義19-21    0.2 研究的主要內(nèi)容21-23    0.3 研究方法23    0.4 研究的主要結(jié)論、創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)和不足之處23-27        0.4.1 主要結(jié)論23-24        0.4.2 主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新點(diǎn)24-25        0.4.3 不足之處25-27第1章 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的概述27-43    1.1 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的定義及其規(guī)模27-31        1.1.1 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的定義27-29        1.1.2 全球失衡的規(guī)模29-31    1.2 歷史視野中的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡31-34    1.3 戰(zhàn)后全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡由美國(guó)主導(dǎo)34-35    1.4 歷次全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡加劇時(shí)期美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策35-41        1.4.1 1970-1973 年美國(guó)的宏觀政策36-37        1.4.2 1982-1987 年美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策37-39        1.4.3 2001-2006 年美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策39-41    1.5 小結(jié)41-43第2章 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡形成的金融優(yōu)勢(shì)假說(shuō)43-59    2.1 美國(guó)的金融優(yōu)勢(shì)假說(shuō)43-47        2.1.1 美元資產(chǎn)吸引力與外圍國(guó)家盈余動(dòng)機(jī)44-46        2.1.2 美國(guó)凈國(guó)外投資收益率差異46-47    2.2 圍繞金融優(yōu)勢(shì)假說(shuō)的爭(zhēng)論47-51        2.2.1 新布雷頓森林體系的脆弱性47-49        2.2.2 美國(guó)國(guó)外投資收益率差異可能并不重要49-50        2.2.3 美元貶值效應(yīng)并不大50-51    2.3 美國(guó)金融優(yōu)勢(shì)假說(shuō)的意義51-57        2.3.1 金融優(yōu)勢(shì)假說(shuō)51-53        2.3.2 經(jīng)常賬戶統(tǒng)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)該調(diào)整53-56        2.3.3 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡良性論56-57    2.4 小結(jié)57-59第3章 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)了美國(guó)金融行業(yè)發(fā)展及經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)59-79    3.1 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)了美國(guó)金融行業(yè)發(fā)展59-65        3.1.1 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡形成與美國(guó)金融行業(yè)優(yōu)勢(shì)無(wú)太大關(guān)聯(lián)59-63        3.1.2 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)了美國(guó)金融行業(yè)的發(fā)展63-65    3.2 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)美國(guó)金融行業(yè)發(fā)展的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)65-67    3.3 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡推動(dòng)美國(guó)金融行業(yè)發(fā)展的不同階段67-73        3.3.1 1960-1980 年美國(guó)金融環(huán)境與金融行業(yè)發(fā)展68-69        3.3.2 1980-1990 年美國(guó)金融環(huán)境及金融行業(yè)發(fā)展69-71        3.3.3 1990 至今美國(guó)金融環(huán)境及金融行業(yè)發(fā)展71-73    3.4 美國(guó)金融行業(yè)發(fā)展與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)73-76    3.5 小結(jié)76-79第4章 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡與美國(guó)通貨膨脹79-93    4.1 美國(guó)經(jīng)常賬戶與通貨膨脹79-87        4.1.1 經(jīng)常賬戶與通貨膨脹關(guān)系的理論框架79-84        4.1.2 美國(guó)經(jīng)常賬戶、貨幣供應(yīng)以及通貨膨脹的實(shí)證分析84-87    4.2 美國(guó)行業(yè)凈進(jìn)口與行業(yè)價(jià)格87-91        4.2.1 行業(yè)凈進(jìn)口與行業(yè)價(jià)格水平的理論框架87-89        4.2.2 行業(yè)層面價(jià)格指數(shù)與進(jìn)口的實(shí)證分析89-91    4.3 小結(jié)91-93第5章 美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益、最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡93-115    5.1 一般最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模的推導(dǎo)93-95    5.2 美國(guó)最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模的決定95-104        5.2.1 函數(shù)式的推導(dǎo)及其檢驗(yàn)95-96        5.2.2 美國(guó)最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模決定96-98        5.2.3 美國(guó)最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶的靜態(tài)變化98-104    5.3 最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模與經(jīng)濟(jì)政策制定104-109        5.3.1 福利分析與經(jīng)濟(jì)政策制定關(guān)系的粗略討論104-106        5.3.2 以80 年代美國(guó)貿(mào)易政策作為本文假設(shè)的例證106-109    5.4 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡的美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō)及其地位109-113        5.4.1 美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō)更為深入的揭示了全球失衡形成原因109-112        5.4.2 美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益假說(shuō)認(rèn)為美國(guó)應(yīng)該承擔(dān)更多失衡調(diào)整責(zé)任112-113    5.5 小結(jié)113-115第6章 次貸危機(jī)前美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡115-129    6.1 2001-2004 美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策并非為了治理外部失衡116-119    6.2 美國(guó)2001-2004 經(jīng)濟(jì)政策組合加劇外部失衡的作用機(jī)制119-124    6.3 2005 年至次貸危機(jī)前美國(guó)宏觀政策的一些變化124-127    6.4 小結(jié)127-129第7章 次貸危機(jī)后美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益及最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶規(guī)模129-146    7.1 次貸危機(jī)發(fā)生與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡130-135        7.1.1 經(jīng)常賬戶盈余國(guó)家積累了過(guò)多美元儲(chǔ)備130-131        7.1.2 盈余國(guó)家儲(chǔ)備調(diào)整困境以及對(duì)美元資產(chǎn)需求變化131-133        7.1.3 次級(jí)債務(wù)危機(jī)與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)失衡133-135    7.2 次貸危機(jī)之后的美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)利益及其最優(yōu)經(jīng)常賬戶135-138        7.2.1 次貸后美國(guó)經(jīng)常賬戶赤字可能會(huì)拖累其經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)135-138        7.2.2 美國(guó)對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)偏差將賦予更高權(quán)重138    7.3 美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策與福利分析的沖突及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)138-144        7.3.1 美國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策將重新變得擴(kuò)張138-141        7.3.2 美國(guó)擴(kuò)張政策給美國(guó)以及全球經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)141-144    7.4 小結(jié)144-146第8章 美國(guó)對(duì)外圍國(guó)家調(diào)整方式的影響146-165    8.1 美國(guó)政策可能會(huì)損害外圍國(guó)家的利益146-155        8.1.1 美元資產(chǎn)貶值給外圍國(guó)家?guī)?lái)的損失147-149        8.1.2 美元儲(chǔ)備資產(chǎn)持有的社會(huì)成本149        8.1.3 盈余國(guó)家貨幣政策獨(dú)立性缺乏149-151        8.1.4 美國(guó)迫使盈余國(guó)家承擔(dān)調(diào)整成本151-153        8.1.5 盈余國(guó)家損失函數(shù)變化及意義153-155    8.2 東亞國(guó)家的調(diào)整155-160        8.2.1 東亞財(cái)政和貨幣政策并未做出調(diào)整155-158        8.2.2 東亞國(guó)家的匯率制度并未根本變革158-160    8.3 盈余國(guó)家應(yīng)該采用合作調(diào)整的方式160-163        8.3.1 盈余國(guó)家單獨(dú)調(diào)整的困境160-161        8.3.2 歐盟聯(lián)合調(diào)整的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)161-163    8.4 小結(jié)163-165參考文獻(xiàn)165-175后記175-177

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