本文選題：技術(shù)要素 + 創(chuàng)新過程�。� 參考：《西安建筑科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代的到來，以知識(shí)為基礎(chǔ)和支撐的技術(shù)要素從眾多生產(chǎn)要素中脫穎而出，正式成為經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)中日益重要的要素資源，其所承載的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力正逐步強(qiáng)化對(duì)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響。陜西省具有豐富、優(yōu)良的科技資源，科技研發(fā)能力近年來一直處于全國(guó)前十之列，但陜西省的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力卻遠(yuǎn)落后于科技實(shí)力，即技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力的提高并沒能帶來陜西省經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)，這其中的一個(gè)主要原因在于，陜西省技術(shù)要素主體與技術(shù)需求主體合作創(chuàng)新收益分配的不合理導(dǎo)致。 在對(duì)技術(shù)合作創(chuàng)新收益分配的國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行綜述的基礎(chǔ)上，發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)有研究存在著諸如缺乏合作創(chuàng)新收益分配的系統(tǒng)性分析，模型建立依據(jù)較薄弱，模型較難用于實(shí)踐操作等問題。因此，本文在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上，利用定性與定量結(jié)合的方式，從技術(shù)要素參與合作創(chuàng)新的整個(gè)過程進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)性深入探究，劃分創(chuàng)新環(huán)節(jié)，分析各參與主體行為特點(diǎn)，并提出技術(shù)要素在創(chuàng)新過程中的轉(zhuǎn)化路徑及價(jià)值增值原理，從而推演出幾種不同的創(chuàng)新模式。在此基礎(chǔ)上，采用博弈論的方法，分別構(gòu)建了“技術(shù)推動(dòng)”形式下技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓模式的收益分配模型和“市場(chǎng)拉動(dòng)”形式下委托開發(fā)模式的收益分配模型，并針對(duì)創(chuàng)新過程中可能存在的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題建立了激勵(lì)機(jī)制，論文得出以下結(jié)論： 技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓模式下，技術(shù)方一般會(huì)挑選商業(yè)化能力強(qiáng)的企業(yè)進(jìn)行技術(shù)合作，并且技術(shù)主體對(duì)自身技術(shù)成果的期望值越大，企業(yè)得不到此技術(shù)的損失越大，則技術(shù)方在收益分配方案確定中的討價(jià)還價(jià)能力就越強(qiáng)；委托開發(fā)模式下，技術(shù)方受企業(yè)委托研發(fā)技術(shù)，其所獲的收益分配比例隨著努力水平的增加而增加，隨著技術(shù)價(jià)值的增大而提高，隨著自身創(chuàng)新性成本的增加而減少。 最終，以煤化工公司和研究所的技術(shù)合作項(xiàng)目作為案例，，進(jìn)一步詳細(xì)闡述了收益分配模型在實(shí)踐中的具體操作問題，并給陜西省政府提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of the era of knowledge economy, the technological elements based on knowledge stand out from many factors of production and become increasingly important factor resources in economic growth. The technological innovation capability it carries is gradually strengthening the influence on the regional economy. Shaanxi Province has rich and excellent scientific and technological resources, and its R & D capability has been among the top ten in the country in recent years, but its economic strength lags far behind its scientific and technological strength. That is to say, the improvement of technological innovation ability has not brought about the economic growth of Shaanxi Province, and one of the main reasons is that the distribution of cooperative innovation income between the main body of technological elements and the main body of technological demand in Shaanxi Province is unreasonable. On the basis of summarizing the domestic and foreign literature on the distribution of innovation income of technical cooperation, it is found that there is a systematic analysis such as the lack of cooperative innovation income distribution in the existing research, and the basis for establishing the model is relatively weak. The model is difficult to be used in practice. Therefore, on the basis of previous studies, this paper, by combining qualitative and quantitative methods, makes a systematic and in-depth exploration of the whole process of technological elements participating in cooperative innovation, divides the innovation links, and analyzes the behavior characteristics of each participant. The transformation path of technological elements in the process of innovation and the principle of value increment are put forward, and several different innovation modes are deduced. On this basis, using the method of game theory, the income distribution model of technology transfer mode in the form of "technology promotion" and the income distribution model of entrustment development mode under "market pull" form are constructed, respectively. And in view of the possible moral hazard in the process of innovation to establish an incentive mechanism, the paper comes to the following conclusions: In the mode of technology transfer, the technology side usually selects the enterprise with strong commercialization ability to carry on the technical cooperation, and the technology main body's expectation value to own technology achievement is bigger, the enterprise does not get this technology the loss is bigger, The greater the bargaining power of the technical side in the determination of the profit distribution scheme, the greater the profit distribution ratio of the technical side is increased with the increase of the level of effort when it is commissioned by the enterprise to research and develop the technology under the entrustment development model. With the increase of technical value, with the increase of its own innovative costs and reduce. Finally, taking the technical cooperation project of coal chemical company and research institute as an example, the paper further elaborates the concrete operation problem of the profit distribution model in practice, and puts forward corresponding policy suggestions to Shaanxi provincial government.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F124.3

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