本文選題：地方政府利益 + 地方產(chǎn)業(yè)政策��； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷地增長，我國原來已經(jīng)形成的低端制造業(yè)和資源耗費型產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)已不能支持經(jīng)濟(jì)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展，不得不進(jìn)行產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的轉(zhuǎn)型升級，政府也將產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級作為新時期的重要經(jīng)濟(jì)任務(wù)，那么政府的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策能否實現(xiàn)其目標(biāo)呢？起碼我們需要分析我國產(chǎn)業(yè)政策發(fā)揮作用的環(huán)境和機(jī)制。其實在我國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的每個階段，政府都通過產(chǎn)業(yè)政策對經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)行調(diào)節(jié)，但每次調(diào)節(jié)的效果并不是很好，其中一個重要的原因是由于我國轉(zhuǎn)型體制下地方產(chǎn)業(yè)政策形成機(jī)制和企業(yè)行為所導(dǎo)致。 改革開放后，我國各級政府之間進(jìn)行了經(jīng)濟(jì)上的分權(quán)，使得各級政府具有了干預(yù)經(jīng)濟(jì)和參與市場交易的雙重自主權(quán)，也使各級政府成為具有自身利益追求的利益主體，從而地方政府就會根據(jù)自身利益的需要來制定和執(zhí)行地方產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，于是地方產(chǎn)業(yè)政策、企業(yè)的市場行為和地方政府與企業(yè)之間的利益依賴和約束共同決定著地方產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的選擇和產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的結(jié)果，本文正是基于這種相互作用關(guān)系來分析我國產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的效果。 首先，我們分析企業(yè)自身參與產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的行為選擇。產(chǎn)業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)型升級最終都是依靠一個個企業(yè)經(jīng)營內(nèi)容的轉(zhuǎn)變來實現(xiàn)的，在市場機(jī)制下，企業(yè)是否參與產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級，參與到何種程度，都由企業(yè)自身利益的最大化來決定。我們把產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級過程中存在的外部性、投資成本和風(fēng)險、技術(shù)特征、階段特征等影響因素結(jié)合起來，分析這些因素如何影響企業(yè)參與產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的行為選擇和最終的產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級效果。結(jié)論是：企業(yè)追求自身利益最大化的結(jié)果，產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級不一定達(dá)到最優(yōu)效果。 然后，我們分析如果地方政府通過產(chǎn)業(yè)政策改變企業(yè)的成本或收益，企業(yè)參與產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的行為會發(fā)生怎樣的改變，以及產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級結(jié)果會發(fā)生怎樣的改變。我們以不同的產(chǎn)業(yè)補(bǔ)貼和稅收政策來代表產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的干預(yù)。結(jié)論是：合適的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策并且在產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的相應(yīng)階段正確運用，產(chǎn)業(yè)政策才能促進(jìn)產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級向最優(yōu)結(jié)果靠近，否則，產(chǎn)業(yè)政策還有可能惡化產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的結(jié)果。 進(jìn)一步，我們分析地方政府會采取什么樣的地方產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。從我國轉(zhuǎn)型體制下地方政府及其官員的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)利益追求作為分析的起點，解釋地方經(jīng)濟(jì)社會條件的不同、地方政府所處任期階段的不同、地方經(jīng)濟(jì)原有產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)約束的不同等環(huán)境下，地方政府的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策偏好。結(jié)論是：地方政府總會以自身利益來選擇地方產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，其結(jié)果是地方政府不一定以上級產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的要求或者產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的最優(yōu)效果來選擇產(chǎn)業(yè)政策。 在以上分析的基礎(chǔ)上，再把地方政府不同的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策選擇與其對企業(yè)參與產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級行為的影響結(jié)合起來，以解釋我國產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的效果。這里采取對比分析的方式來分析問題，先對比有無地方政府產(chǎn)業(yè)政策干預(yù)下企業(yè)行為的不同，以揭示政府產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的干預(yù)會給不同情況下產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級帶來什么結(jié)果，再對比地方政府不同的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策選擇導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的差異，以解釋我國經(jīng)濟(jì)社會條件不同的地區(qū)，處于不同時期的地方經(jīng)濟(jì)，其產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級效果上所存在的差異。結(jié)論是：經(jīng)濟(jì)社會條件較好的地方經(jīng)濟(jì)，產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級效果更明顯，也就是產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)更高級，經(jīng)濟(jì)運行更健康。地方政府所處的任期階段也會影響產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的效果，在任期初始階段，產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)會好一些，后期基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)會差一些。地方原有的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)也一定程度影響產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型的效果，，但這種影響程度取決于地方經(jīng)濟(jì)社會條件。 最后，以工業(yè)污染治理為例，通過實際經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)對以上的分析進(jìn)行檢驗，我們把工業(yè)污染治理看做對地方經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的要求，以地方人均財政收入代表地方經(jīng)濟(jì)社會條件的差別，以地方工業(yè)占地方GDP比重代表地方原有的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)。實證檢驗的結(jié)果基本與論文的分析過程和結(jié)論相一致。
[Abstract]:With the growth of our country ' s economy , the low - end manufacturing industry and resource - intensive industrial structure already formed in our country have been unable to support the sustainable development of the economy , and we have to carry out the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure . At the very least , we need to analyze the environment and mechanism that our industrial policy plays . At least we need to analyze the environment and mechanism that our country ' s industrial policy plays . In fact , in every stage of our country ' s economic development , the effect of each adjustment is not very good , one of the important reasons is that the local industrial policy forming mechanism and the enterprise behavior are caused by the transformation system of our country .


After the reform and opening - up , the governments at all levels of our country have carried out the economic decentralization , so that the governments at all levels have the double autonomy to intervene the economy and participate in the market transaction , and make the governments at all levels become the main interests of the pursuit of their own interests , so that the local governments can formulate and implement the local industrial policies according to the needs of their own interests , so the local industry policy , the market behavior of the enterprises and the interests dependence and restriction between the local government and the enterprises determine the choice of the local industrial policy and the result of the upgrading of the industrial transformation . This paper is based on this interaction relation to analyze the effect of the industrial transformation and upgrading of our country .


First , we analyze the behavior choice of enterprises ' participation in industrial transformation and upgrading . In the end , the transformation and upgrading of the industry depends on the transformation of the enterprise ' s business content . In the market mechanism , whether the enterprises participate in the upgrade of industrial transformation and the degree of participation are determined by the maximization of the enterprise ' s own interests .


Then we analyze how the local government changes the cost or benefit of the enterprises through the industrial policy , how the enterprises participate in the transformation and upgrading of the industry , and how the industrial transformation and upgrading results will change . The conclusion is that the appropriate industrial policy and the correct application of the industrial policy in the corresponding stages of the industrial transformation promotion can promote the industrial transformation and upgrading to the optimal result , otherwise , the industrial policy may also worsen the result of the industrial transformation and upgrading .


Further , we analyze the local government ' s local industrial policy . From the political and economic interests of the local government and its officials as the starting point of the analysis , the local government ' s industrial policy preferences are explained in terms of the political and economic interests of the local government and its officials . The conclusion is that the local government always selects the local industrial policy in its own interests , and the result is that the local government does not necessarily choose the industrial policy with the demand of the superior industry policy or the optimal effect of the industrial transformation promotion .


On the basis of the above analysis , the different industrial policy choices of local governments are combined to explain the effect of industrial transformation and upgrading in our country .


Finally , taking industrial pollution control as an example , we test the above analysis by actual economic data , and we see the industrial pollution control as the demand for the transformation and upgrading of local economy industry . In order to represent the difference of local economic and social conditions in the local industry , the local industry accounts for the local industrial structure . The result of the empirical test is basically consistent with the analysis process and conclusion of the paper .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F127

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