發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-21 14:33

  本文選題：國有企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)比重 + 國有資本經(jīng)濟(jì)比重��； 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在我國向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型的過程中,如何調(diào)整國有經(jīng)濟(jì)的相對(duì)規(guī)模一直是一個(gè)核心問題。誠然以前的純國有經(jīng)濟(jì)并不是一個(gè)最優(yōu)選擇,但因此轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榧兯接薪?jīng)濟(jì)是否也會(huì)導(dǎo)致走向另外一個(gè)極端?本文論證以我國的初始的純國有經(jīng)濟(jì)稟賦出發(fā),希望借此來找到一個(gè)最優(yōu)的國有經(jīng)濟(jì)在社會(huì)全部經(jīng)濟(jì)中的比重。本文分析國有經(jīng)濟(jì)的比重將從國有企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)比重和國有資本經(jīng)濟(jì)比重兩個(gè)方面入手。從國有企業(yè)來看,其相比于私有經(jīng)濟(jì)能充分利用社會(huì)分散信息的優(yōu)勢,國有企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)總體上則存在信息局限,這導(dǎo)致市場競爭下國有企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)比重會(huì)落至某一均衡水平,該水平構(gòu)成了規(guī)范意義上的國有企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)比重上限。當(dāng)國有資本經(jīng)濟(jì)最優(yōu)比重超過這一上限時(shí),超出部分的國有資本應(yīng)以參股私有企業(yè)的方式存在。而國有資本經(jīng)濟(jì)比重的確定取決于對(duì)國有資本經(jīng)濟(jì)優(yōu)勢的發(fā)揮,后者通過國有資本收益的公共福利性分配來實(shí)現(xiàn),這一分配既可以替代部分稅收從而節(jié)省稅收成本,又為政府優(yōu)化長期經(jīng)濟(jì)提供了一個(gè)與稅收互補(bǔ)的新手段。該水平確定了國有資本經(jīng)濟(jì)比重的下限。通過上述兩者的確定可以得到一個(gè)最優(yōu)均衡時(shí)的國有經(jīng)濟(jì)的水平。本文構(gòu)造了一個(gè)混合經(jīng)濟(jì)的Ramsey模型,以求解政府為引導(dǎo)出最優(yōu)增長而選擇的最優(yōu)稅率以及由之決定的最優(yōu)公共支出和國有資本經(jīng)濟(jì)最優(yōu)比重等。另外,混合經(jīng)濟(jì)與純私有經(jīng)濟(jì)的福利比較還表明,有稅收成本時(shí),前者不論在加總消費(fèi)水平還是消費(fèi)結(jié)構(gòu)方面均優(yōu)于后者。本文結(jié)論主要說明了以我國的初始稟賦點(diǎn)出發(fā),轉(zhuǎn)型為純私有經(jīng)濟(jì)國家并不是一個(gè)最優(yōu)選擇,選擇一個(gè)最優(yōu)的國有經(jīng)濟(jì)比重才能達(dá)到全民福利的最大化。
[Abstract]:How to adjust the relative scale of state-owned economy has always been a core problem in the process of transition from market economy to market economy. It is true that the former pure state-owned economy is not an optimal choice, but so the transition to a pure private economy will also lead to the other extreme? Based on the initial pure state-owned economy endowment of our country, this paper hopes to find out the proportion of an optimal state-owned economy in the whole social economy. This paper analyzes the proportion of state-owned economy from two aspects: the proportion of state-owned enterprise economy and the proportion of state-owned capital economy. From the point of view of state-owned enterprises, compared with the private economy, they can make full use of the advantages of social decentralized information, while the state-owned enterprises have information limitations in general, which leads to the proportion of state-owned enterprises' economy falling to a certain equilibrium level under the market competition. This level constitutes the upper limit of the proportion of state-owned enterprises in the normative sense. When the optimal proportion of state-owned capital economy exceeds this upper limit, the excess part of state-owned capital should exist in the form of equity participation in private enterprises. The proportion of state-owned capital economy depends on the advantage of state-owned capital economy, which is realized through the public welfare distribution of state-owned capital income, which can not only replace part of tax revenue, but also save tax cost. It also provides a new means for the government to optimize the long-term economy. This level determines the lower limit of the economic proportion of state-owned capital. The level of the state-owned economy in the optimal equilibrium can be obtained by determining the above two factors. In this paper, a Ramsey model of mixed economy is constructed to solve the optimal tax rate chosen by the government to guide the optimal growth, the optimal public expenditure and the optimal proportion of the state-owned capital economy determined by the optimal tax rate. In addition, the welfare comparison of mixed economy and pure private economy also shows that the former is superior to the latter in terms of total consumption level and consumption structure when there is tax cost. The conclusion of this paper mainly shows that the transition to a pure private economy country is not an optimal choice based on the initial endowment of our country, and the selection of an optimal proportion of the state-owned economy can maximize the welfare of the whole people.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F124

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本文編號(hào)：1782835