本文關(guān)鍵詞： 創(chuàng)新集群 主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同 Shapley值 Nash談判解 因子調(diào)整系數(shù)　出處：《燕山大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：伴隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化和區(qū)域化的飛速發(fā)展，全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日趨激烈，國(guó)家之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也開(kāi)始從傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治、軍事等方面的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)轉(zhuǎn)型為國(guó)家核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而一個(gè)國(guó)家的自主創(chuàng)新能力便是這個(gè)國(guó)家的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的最集中體現(xiàn)。2008年全球金融危機(jī)之后，各國(guó)政府逐漸將提升創(chuàng)新能力途徑的目光匯聚到了創(chuàng)新集群這一區(qū)域組織形式。隨著各國(guó)政府的大力支持，各國(guó)創(chuàng)新集群如雨后春筍般不斷涌現(xiàn)出來(lái)。隨之而來(lái)的如何協(xié)調(diào)集群內(nèi)部主體之間的互動(dòng)關(guān)系，如何協(xié)調(diào)主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同的收益分配問(wèn)題，從而保證創(chuàng)新集群可以健康、穩(wěn)定、可持續(xù)的發(fā)展，已經(jīng)成為創(chuàng)新集群發(fā)展關(guān)注的下一個(gè)方向和目標(biāo)。本文研究的思路以創(chuàng)新集群理論、合作創(chuàng)新理論、三螺旋理論、協(xié)同論和博弈論為依據(jù)，建立一個(gè)科學(xué)、合理、公平、持續(xù)的創(chuàng)新集群主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配模型，為保證創(chuàng)新集群穩(wěn)定和創(chuàng)新協(xié)同有效實(shí)現(xiàn)提供現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文介紹了創(chuàng)新集群主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同的研究背景和理論意義，總結(jié)了目前國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)創(chuàng)新集群和創(chuàng)新集群主體協(xié)同的研究現(xiàn)狀，分析了本課題所包含的知識(shí)體系，指出了當(dāng)前對(duì)于創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配問(wèn)題研究的缺失，闡述了本文的研究思路與方法。 本文分析了對(duì)創(chuàng)新集群主體協(xié)同效應(yīng)存在的基本問(wèn)題，確立了創(chuàng)新集群的主體在協(xié)同中的角色及功能定位，研究了主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同的類(lèi)型和方式，指出政府在集群主體協(xié)同中的作用。 針對(duì)創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配問(wèn)題，本文建立了創(chuàng)新集群主體，即產(chǎn)學(xué)研主體的創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配模型，提出了基于Shapley值的集群主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配模型和基于Nash談判解的集群主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配模型，并針對(duì)模型進(jìn)行了算例分析，實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明創(chuàng)新集群各主體在創(chuàng)新協(xié)同中獲得的收益高于主體單獨(dú)創(chuàng)新獲得的收益。 針對(duì)創(chuàng)新集群主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配模型的不足，本文改進(jìn)了基于Shapley協(xié)同收益分配和Nash談判解的協(xié)同收益分配模型，該模型考慮了在政府因素下對(duì)創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配的影響，對(duì)該模型中的相關(guān)參數(shù)給出了合理詳細(xì)的確定方法，并進(jìn)行了算例分析，，實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明政府對(duì)于集群主體創(chuàng)新協(xié)同收益分配構(gòu)成了重大的影響。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economic globalization and regionalization, the global competition is becoming more and more fierce, and the competition between countries has begun to transform from the traditional economic, political, military and other aspects of competition to the core competitiveness of the country. And the ability of a country to innovate independently is the most central manifestation of its core competitiveness. In 2008, after the global financial crisis, Governments are gradually turning their attention to innovative clusters as a form of regional organization. With the strong support of governments, The innovation clusters of different countries are springing up continuously, and how to coordinate the interaction among the main bodies in the clusters, and how to coordinate the income distribution of the innovation coordination between the main bodies, so as to ensure that the innovation clusters can be healthy and stable. Sustainable development has become the next direction and goal of the development of innovation cluster. Based on the theory of innovation cluster, the theory of cooperative innovation, the theory of triple helix, the theory of synergy and the theory of game, this paper establishes a science, which is based on the theory of innovation cluster, the theory of cooperative innovation, the theory of triple helix and the theory of game. A reasonable, fair and sustainable model of innovation synergy benefits allocation for innovation clusters provides practical significance for ensuring the stability of innovation clusters and the effective realization of innovation coordination. This paper introduces the research background and theoretical significance of innovation collaboration of innovation cluster, summarizes the current research situation of innovation cluster and innovation cluster agent coordination at home and abroad, and analyzes the knowledge system included in this subject. This paper points out the deficiency of the current research on innovation cooperative income distribution, and expounds the research ideas and methods of this paper. This paper analyzes the basic problems existing in the synergy effect of the main body of the innovation cluster, establishes the role and function orientation of the main body of the innovation cluster in the collaboration, and studies the types and ways of the main body innovation collaboration. This paper points out the role of the government in the coordination of the main body of the cluster. Aiming at the problem of innovation cooperative income distribution, this paper establishes the innovation cluster main body, that is, the innovation cooperative income distribution model of industry, university and research body. In this paper, the cooperative income allocation model of cluster agent innovation based on Shapley value and the model based on Nash negotiation solution are put forward, and an example is given to analyze the model. The experimental results show that the benefit of innovation synergy is higher than that of individual innovation in innovation cluster. Aiming at the deficiency of innovation cooperative income distribution model of innovation cluster, this paper improves the cooperative income distribution model based on Shapley cooperative income allocation and Nash negotiation solution. This model considers the influence of government factors on innovation cooperative income distribution. A reasonable and detailed method for determining the relevant parameters in the model is given, and a numerical example is given. The experimental results show that the government has a significant influence on the distribution of cooperative benefits of innovation among the main bodies of the cluster.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：燕山大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F113.2;F224

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